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Abstract  
Organisations throughout the world face threats to the security of their information. 
In most organisations these threats are thought to be a consequence of employees’ 
lack of knowledge of information security, security behaviours and/or 
understanding of the possible detriments to their organisation of not complying 
with their organisation’s information security policy (ISP). Therefore, empirical 
research is needed to explore the main threats to information security and the 
factors that influence how employees intend to behave in relation to information 
security policies. 
The main aims of this research were to investigate employees’ ISP compliance 
behaviour intentions and to explore the organisational and human factors that 
influence this. Consequently, this research conducted four studies to explore the 
views of both those responsible for information security (IT staff and system 
administrators) and non-security employees from a range of higher education 
institutions in the Sultanate of Oman.  
First, interviews were conducted with eight IT staff and system administrators from 
Omani universities and colleges to explore the common, current information 
security threats, organisational information security processes and their perceptions 
of employee information security behaviour in general, and their compliance with 
ISPs in particular. The findings of this study showed the weaknesses in information 
security in different organisations and IT staff suggested that employees may not be 
aware of information security and do not comply with their organisation’s ISP. The 
reported perceptions of IT and staff system administrators were used to design a 
survey of employee knowledge, awareness and behaviour intentions which was 
used in the second study.  
The second study used a questionnaire-based survey which was designed from the 
knowledge gained form the first study, a review of the relevant literature and actual 
ISPs in use at the organisations involved in the study. Data from 503 employees 
from multiple higher education institutions was analysed. The survey comprised 
three parts: (i) demographic questions, (ii) 14 information security scenario 
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questions designed to elicit employee behaviour intentions and (iii) some of the 
factors influencing their behaviour (underpinned by current theories in psychology). 
The results show that employees’ behaviour intentions vary according to the 
information security scenario they experience and that the biggest influences on 
their behaviour are perceived to be trust and authority.  
The third study involved 17 IT staff and system administrators from six higher 
education institutions.  Using the same questionnaire from the second study plus 
qualitative questions, the aim of this third study was to understand what behaviours 
were seen by IT staff and system administrators as most important and what non-
ISP-compliant behaviours they would, nevertheless, also deem to be acceptable. 
The results highlight the relationship between the behaviours that IT staff rate as 
important, and whether or not staff intend to adopt that behaviour.  
The fourth study used four focus groups (n= 21) from one higher education 
institution to further explore why employees may not intend to comply with the 
organisation’s ISP and to explore the factors that influence these non-compliance 
intentions. The focus groups also explored the employees’ recommendations for 
improving organisational information security management.  The finding of this 
study revealed some recommendations for developing information security 
organisation management and the motivators and barriers that influence employees’ 
security behaviours.  
Finally, the results of the four studies were analysed together and it was found that 
staff consider that communicating the information security policy, ongoing 
information security risk assessment, ongoing awareness and training, management 
support and commitment and good communication are important factors in 
information security compliance intentions. Secondly, it was found that the way 
organisations manage information security, and human factors in particular (mostly 
to do with trust and authority), is most important in maximising compliance 
intentions. Recommendations were provided to improve organisational information 
security management and to encourage employees to comply with ISPs.     
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION  
  Problem Statement  1.1
A major barrier to security is employees’ behaviour, particularly non-compliance 
with their organisation’s information security policy (ISP). Many researchers have 
attempted to explore the factors that influence such non-compliance (Guo et al., 
2011; Ifinedo, 2012; Pahnila et al., 2007; Safa et al., 2015; Vance et al., 2012). 
Failing to comply with the Information Security Policy can leave an organisation’s 
information exposed to theft or modification, however staff may be unaware of 
these consequences. Nevertheless, these nonintentional internal threats pose a great 
risk to information. These may arise from a lack of awareness amongst employees, 
a lack of support from information security management, poor communication and 
the misuse of data by employees through ignorance (Safa et al., 2016a). However, 
the enforcement of strict security controls and measures at universities and other 
higher education establishments is more problematic and complex than other 
organisations (Drevin et al., 2007; Rezmierski et al., 2002). 
In this research IT staff and system administrators’ views from multiple higher 
education institutions are gathered to explore the current information security 
threats to higher education organisations, management support for security and 
their perceptions of employees’ behaviour with regards to security and compliance 
with ISPs. This information then helps in the construction of robust instruments 
(such as questionnaires) to identify employees’ information security awareness in 
general, employees’ ISP compliance intentions and important factors that influence 
employees’ compliance behaviour. 
The literature on information security suggests that there are few very good tools to 
objectively measure the behaviours within multiple organisations and understand 
their ISP compliance behaviour across a range of behaviours that are commonly 
specified in an ISP. These behaviours include physical security, backup, password 
management, incident reports, phishing, virus threats, incident report and technical 
security with privileges. Given this difficulty, psychological theories of behaviour 
which use behaviour intention as a precursor to behaviour are explored alongside 
the factors that affect those intentions. In order to statistically explore behaviour 
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intentions, a large number of participants from different higher education 
organisations were recruited.  
Measuring employees’ information security awareness levels and compliance 
intentions was supplemented with the views of the people responsible for 
organisations’ information security. This permitted consideration of what they 
consider to be acceptable employee behaviour. This allowed comparisons between 
employee attitudes and beliefs around acceptable behaviour and those of the 
security staff. 
From this knowledge, recommendations to improve information security in higher 
education institutions can be proposed.       
 Research Question 1.2
 The aim of this thesis is to explore employees’ compliance intention towards 
information security policies in Omani higher education institutions and to identify 
the factors which employees believe influence their security compliance intentions.  
To achieve this, the following research questions were explored through this thesis: 
(a) What are the recent information security challenges and threats facing 
higher education institutions in Oman?  
(b) What are the information security awareness levels and ISP compliance 
intentions of employees within higher education institutions in Oman? 
(c) How can we reliably measure actual user information security awareness 
and compliance intentions? 
(d) What factors affect users’ intentions (both positively and negatively) 
toward information security policies within higher education institutions? 
(e) What relative importance do IT staff give different behaviours within the 
ISP and do they permit behaviours which are not written in the policy? 
In order to answer the above research questions, a mixed methods approach using 
both qualitative and quantitative techniques was employed. 
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 Research Methodology 1.3
This study uses a combination of qualitative interviews and focus groups alongside 
a quantitative questionnaire (see Figure  1.1) to explore employees’ information 
security awareness and ISP compliance intentions. Ethical approval for each study 
was granted by Northumbria University before starting each round of data 
collection (see Appendix A). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3.1 IT staff and system administrators’ interviews 
The first exploration used a semi-structured qualitative interview method with IT 
staff and system administrators in four higher education institutions in Oman. The 
collected data was transcribed to explore the IT staffs’ perceptions of end users’ 
Stage one: Interviews with 8 IT staff and system administrators 
Interviews with eight IT staff and system administrators from four higher education institutions.  Explore 
end users’ behaviour, compliance with information security policies, recent threats and recommendations 
to improve information security policy and awareness.  
 
Stage Two: survey of 503 employees from different higher education institutions  
Online Qualtrics survey platform of 503 employees from twelve universities and colleges in Oman. To 
explore employees’ information security awareness levels/compliance intentions in general and the 
factors that influence employees to behave positively or negatively towards organisational information 
security policy. 
 
Stage four: Focus group interviews with 21 employees  
Discussions with 21 employees from one institution in Oman spread over four focus groups, to identify 
employees’ views on their organisational information security, how they think they would behave in 
different circumstances and identify why different factors may influence their behaviour. 
 
Stage three: Questionnaires and interviews with 17 IT staff and system administrators 
Firstly, using the same questionnaires from the second study to rank the importance of each behaviour and 
identify other acceptable behaviours with 17 IT staff and system administrators in higher education. 
Secondly, semi-structured interviews with them related to the employee questionnaire results and their 
organisations.  
 
Figure  1.1: Thesis research methodology structure 
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behaviour, employee compliance with information security policies, recent threats 
and recommendations to improve information security policy and awareness.  
Thematic analysis (which assists in exploring and gathering themes and sub-themes) 
was used to analyse the data. 
1.3.2 Employee survey across different higher education institutions  
The second study used a scenario questionnaire which was disseminated to several 
universities and colleges in Oman to explore employees’ information security 
compliance intentions in general and the factors that affect this as well as the 
impact of non-compliance. In addition, this survey helped identify the specific 
behaviours within the ISP where more employees had intention to comply and not 
be influenced by other factors. 
The questionnaire utilised indirect scenario questions designed to explore 
employees’ behaviour intentions towards security and possible adherence to their 
organisation’s information security policies. These questions were based on a 
review of the literature, the universities and colleges’ ISPs, psychological theories 
and results from the first study. 14 scenario questions were developed to explore 
employees’ information security awareness levels in general and information 
security influence factors in particular and how those factors relate to their 
organisation’s information security policy. Each question had the correct policy-
compliant answer and three plausible but non-compliant answers (identified by 
others as legitimate reasons to not comply with the policy, e.g., at the request of the 
line manager). The survey also explored eight influencing factors for each scenario: 
knowledge, response efficacy, subjective norms for organisation and/or manager, 
compliance, behavioural intentions, and sanctions and rewards. These were 
identified from psychological theories of behaviour to understand participants’ 
behaviour and to make predictions as to what influences their ISP compliance 
intentions. Some of these factors were drawn from Protection Motivation Theory 
(Rogers (1983) and Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen (1991); this allows the 
exploration of factors that may affect how employees behave towards information 
security. 
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1.3.3 IT staff and system administrators’ prioritisation study  
The previous study identified that intention to comply was not universal across all 
14 behaviours, and it was necessary to consider what IT staff considered to be the 
most important behaviours. It may also be possible that IT staff accepted some 
behaviours that are not compliant with the ISP. To answer these questions, this 
third study again took an exploratory, qualitative approach.  
First, the IT staff were asked to rank the 14 employee scenario behaviours in order 
of importance to security in their organisation. They were then asked to explain 
how they ranked the top and bottom five behaviours.  Next, they were asked to 
provide all answers that they would find acceptable for each of the 14 scenarios to 
explore what non-policy-compliant behaviours they would also view as acceptable 
in their organisations. This helped to evaluate IT staff and system administrators’ 
information security awareness and knowledge as well as identifying behaviours 
they would allow even if not explicitly stated in the ISP. In addition, it helped to 
evaluate the employees’ questionnaire answers in terms of shadow security 
(Kirlappos et al., 2014), i.e., local behaviours that had become acceptable without 
updating the ISP. 
1.3.4 Employee focus groups   
The final stage conducted focus group discussions with 21 employees split into 
four groups from one institution in Oman to explore their security behaviour 
intentions in more depth.  
The questions were grouped into two parts: scenario questions based on six 
different scenarios to encourage discussions exploring employees’ information 
security awareness and identifying the underlying reasons for their compliance or 
non-compliance intentions towards the ISP in different security areas such as 
sharing passwords, social engineering, physical security, backing up data, incident 
reports and disabling antivirus protection. The second group of questions focused 
on the availability of information security policies, employee understanding of the 
security policy and compliance intentions, the factors that influence whether 
employees comply with security policies and the employees’ recommendations for 
writing security policies and improving compliance.     
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 Contribution  1.4
The aim of this research was to identify the compliance intentions of staff in Omani 
universities and colleges towards information security behaviours and to explore 
the organisational and human factors that influence these intentions in order to 
mitigate the risks of information security breaches and enhance the security of the 
information and systems.  As such this thesis makes the following contributions: 
 A recognition that compliance with security policy is not a single behaviour, 
and intentions to comply with the individual behaviours within the policy vary. 
This suggests that research which treats compliance as a single behaviour is 
flawed. The results of this thesis suggest that employees had awareness and 
higher compliance intentions for some behaviours, while not others. 
 A methodological contribution has been made in the creation and use of 
indirect scenarios used in questionnaires and the plausible answers derived 
through qualitative interviews and underpinning psychological theories. The 
use of indirect scenarios was more likely to discover what participants 
themselves would do when they are in those situations. 
 Understanding the compliance intentions of a large number of employees in 
multiple higher education institutions in the Sultanate of Oman. The large 
sample size and involvement of a number of institutions led to results that are 
more transferrable than previous research. This identified areas of behaviour 
which should be addressed.  
 The findings from the second study (employees’ survey) and fourth study 
(focus groups interviews) show that trust, authority and knowledge are the most 
important factors in influencing employees to comply with an organisational 
ISP. 
 Research Structure   1.5
This thesis comprises eight chapters, the first being this introduction. The 
remaining chapters are as follows. 
Chapter 2: Literature review.  
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This chapter reviews the literature around information security policy compliance. 
It highlights and explains several information security areas in management, 
security policies, psychological theories of behaviour, measurement methods, 
information security awareness and information security in higher education 
institutions.   
Chapter 3: Semi-structured interviews with IT staff and system administrators. 
This chapter describes the semi-structured interviews with eight IT staff and system 
administrators. The findings are organised into four main themes: 
1. Information security processes in the organisation; 
2. Types of online information security threats; 
3. Perceptions of employees’ ISP compliance behaviour; and 
4. Recommendations to improve compliance.  
The results of this chapter were used to design the employee questionnaires for 
Chapter 4.  
Chapter 4: A large scale employee survey.  
This chapter details how the online questionnaire method was used to capture data 
from 503 employees in multiple higher education institutions in Oman. Moreover, 
this chapter presents and discusses the participants’ background, behaviour 
intentions and factors that influence ISP compliance.     
Chapter 5: IT staff and system administrators’ prioritisation of security behaviours. 
This chapter presents a study of 17 IT staff and system administrators designed to 
discover their views on the scenarios used with staff to identify acceptable 
employee behaviours which are not in the ISP and the relative importance of the 
different behaviours within the scenarios. The results of this chapter are cross 
referenced back to the results of the employee survey findings in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 6: Qualitative follow on study of employee intentions. 
This chapter follows up the study in Chapter 4 to explore in more detail why 
employees behave the way they reported and the influencing factors that enhance 
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and/or are barriers to complying with the ISP. The results of this chapter are cross 
referenced back to the results of the employee survey findings in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 7: Discussion. 
This chapter synthesises the results of the four studies and discusses findings which 
may help to improve information security organisational management and motivate 
employee compliance with the ISP. Furthermore, this chapter provides 
recommendations for an organisation to implement proper information security. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion. 
The final chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the main results and 
discussing the contributions of the research. In addition, this chapter presents the 
limitations of the research and suggestions for further work.   
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Introduction  2.1
Organisations must be constantly vigilant for threats (both internal and external) 
that put the confidentiality, integrity and availability (in other words, security) of 
their systems and information at risk. There are serious consequences for an 
organisation when its information is compromised, which can lead to a loss of trust, 
money and/or time. In addition, these information security breaches can affect the 
organisation’s reputation significantly (Ahmad et al., 2012; Safa & Ismail, 2013). 
Peltier (2005b) defines information security as that which “directs and supports the 
company and affiliated organisations in the protection of their information assets 
from intentional or unintentional disclosure, modification, destruction, or denial 
through the implementation of appropriate information security and business 
resumption planning policies, procedures, and guidelines” (p.13).  
It is impossible to achieve perfect information security even with the 
implementation of the best available technology. It can be seen from the number of 
breaches reported in 2017 that there is still a long way to go. For example, in the 
2017 UK Cyber Security Breaches Survey, Klahr et al. (2017) reported that 46% of 
all businesses identified at least one cyber security breach or attack in the previous 
12 months and a third of those that experienced a breach reported that senior 
management saw cybersecurity as low priority. Interestingly, those organisations 
who say they have a formal information security policy are more likely to have 
experienced a breach. However, this might just be that those with policies are more 
aware of breaches within their organisation. Policies are less likely to cover 
employees’ use of mobile, personal, and cloud-based devices and storage of 
information. While comparative data is not available from Oman, Ramalingam et 
al. (2016) report that 71% of their respondents from higher education institutions in 
a survey on security awareness reported experiencing a security problem. Further, 
the Information Technology Authority (ITA, 2017) reported that in 2016 they 
stopped 279 million attacks on Omani Government websites. Janes (2012) argues 
that although many organisations assume that technology alone can solve the 
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problems of losing their information, because of attackers, insiders or business 
partners, this is not true. 
Janes (2012) advises that to successfully minimise the impact of information loss, 
the leadership team should effectively combine people skills (awareness and 
training programmes) processes (proper policies and procedures) and technology 
(monitor and prevent data leaving a business). These components are shown in 
Figure  2.1. Those organisations adopting a combination of technical, policy, and 
behaviour approaches to protect their assets are considered to be more effective 
(D'Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Li et al., 2010; Vance et al., 2012). However, it is not 
sufficient to simply have a policy in place, it must be ensured that staff adopt the 
behaviours outlined in the policy. There is a clear need to understand what 
motivates employees to adopt such behaviours. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whitman and Mattord (2012) define an information system as “much more than 
computer hardware; it is the entire set of software, hardware, data, people, 
procedures, and networks that make possible the use of information resources in 
the organisation” (p.16). Information security can be maintained in a number of 
ways, in particular those aimed at introducing better technological solutions and 
those aimed at managing and/or changing human behaviour. A technical aspect 
includes antivirus software, firewalls, cryptography, proxy servers, access control 
and intrusion detection software. Human aspects include users’ knowledge, 
attitudes, behaviours, and awareness. Technology relies on human behaviour to 
deliver its benefits.  
Technology 
Processes People 
Team Leaders 
collaboration in an 
organisation 
Figure  2.1: Successful information security at organisation 
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This chapter focuses on the literature which explores people and their security 
behaviour intentions within the workplace, particularly how they relate to 
information security policies. Where possible articles that explore behaviour within 
a University context are included. It explores theories of behaviour and how 
behaviour is influenced. 
 The Information Security Policy 2.2
Employees are the foremost members in any organisation and the most important 
group of people who can assist in minimising IT vulnerabilities and unintentional 
errors (Wilson & Hash, 2003). 
The increasing level of cyber threats, which have an effect on an organisation’s 
information systems, has compelled companies to establish security programmes. 
An ISP is the foundation of such organisational security programmes (Knapp et al., 
2009). Without ISPs, governance has no substance and no rules to enforce.  
Within organisations, the ISP is an internal document that outlines the 
organisation’s expectations, sets rules and outlines behaviours that the organisation 
wishes to promote in order to protect its information and systems (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010). A good policy will outline the roles, responsibilities, reporting processes and 
penalties that exist within the organisation (Teodor et al., 2014). When an 
organisation attempts to shape an ISP it must consider the basic rules. For instance, 
the policy should not conflict with law, should be properly supported and 
administered, and should be permissible in court. 
Bosworth and Kabay (2002); Peltier (2004) outline how to create high-quality 
policies. These combine to form the following guidelines:  
 Use all suitable policy resources from government, industry bodies and 
commercial organisations in preparation for creating policies 
 Policies should be easy for users to understand and use unambiguous 
language and short sentences. 
 The written policies should be applicable so that they meet the needs of the 
specific organisation. 
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 When an organisation and its workers practice policies they should meet the 
organisation objectives and not put the organisation at risk. 
 An organisation should make policies which are enforceable. 
 Prior to policies being published by an organisation they should allow the 
employees to comment on drafts. 
 Expectations of employees’ behaviours towards the policies should be made 
clear. 
 Employees should know they will experience disciplinary sanctions up to and 
including dismissal when they do not comply with an organisation’s policies. 
 Give reasons for polices. 
 Provide several ways of reading the policies, including printed text, 
electronic text, and hypertext.  
 Review and improve or adapt polices regularly. 
 Announce major changes. 
The concept of documenting the ISP in an organisation is to clarify the need for 
information security and furthermore, it provides an explanation to all of the 
organisation’s information resource users. In contrast, Baker et al. (2007) argue for 
the need to take appropriate action and that organisations need to be aware of the 
information security risks. In addition, they mentioned that there are many ISP 
options available, although a number of organisations are not sure about the most 
suitable method to protect their data from threats. As Karlsson et al. (2017) argue, 
the availability of an ISP does not necessarily guarantee information security. 
Alarifi et al. (2012) suggest that ISPs must be written with due care, as they are one 
of the most important documents in an organisation and policies should 
complement the business objectives of the organisation and align with management 
to operate the organisation in a controlled and secure manner. Unfortunately, 
organisations often write security policies without considering the goals and the 
abilities of the employees that must follow them (Beautement et al., 2016). Policies 
are not easy to write and assistance from outside the organisation may be required. 
Furthermore, the organisation must be aware that the policies must be suitable for 
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an organisation’s culture. Al-Awadi (2009) summarised different studies and 
recommended that an ISP must:       
 “Fit the organisational culture: the security policy of an organisation 
mostly depends on the common organisational culture. Organisations differ 
in their security requirements. What is suitable to one organisation may not 
be suitable to another. 
 Have a style which is consistent with the organisation’s general 
communication style: a common format makes the policy easier for 
employees to understand the purpose of it. 
 Be effective and dynamic: organisational policy should be revised and 
changed regularly; a minimum period of time could be six months or less to 
avoid any threats from happening and help to also define new threats; 
 Use simple language: Not described as a technical document, but uses 
simple language to ensure it is not difficult to understand. It should be free 
of jargon or technical terms, easy to understand and also be written in a 
solid language rather than an abstract language to stop any confusion for 
employees regarding policy. 
 Specify the job responsibilities: allow employees to find out what their 
responsibilities are and what they are required to do to follow the policy; 
 State the purpose of the policy and the scope of the organisation: the 
policy has to state the reasons for the policy and what the organisation's aim 
is, in order to let the employees understand the benefit of such policy; and 
 Explain what activity is acceptable and what is not: this will make it 
clear to employees what is acceptable behaviour and what is not” (p.29-30). 
Hellqvist (2014) found that the most crucial problems raised by many studies 
regarding a lack of ISPs in organisations are as follows: there is no clear 
understanding within the organisation of why it needs an ISP; no clear 
understanding of the purpose of the ISP; no clear understanding of the resources 
needed to develop and implement an ISP; no holistic view during the development 
of the ISP; no consideration or adaptation of the unique environment of an 
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organisation; and there is no suitable standard to guide the ISP development 
process and/or it is not clearly established in the organisation.  
2.2.1 Policy Infrastructure  
An ISP should be in place before technical and non-technical solutions are 
implemented. For instance, with regards to technical mechanisms, a firewall cannot 
be installed unless system administrators establish a clear ISP. Furthermore, 
information security training and awareness cannot commence without agreeing 
and documenting an in-depth ISP. From organisation to organisation, policies may 
differ considerably, but they still are important to practice to secure the company’s 
assets. Some organisations use a ready-made ISP established by international 
information security companies, while other businesses construct their own ISP 
according to organisational needs. 
The aim of the ISP is to ensure that sensitive information within an organisation is 
protected from destruction, unauthorized access, modification and disclosure, 
wherever it is stored or handled. Therefore, it is important to classify information to 
identify the level of sensitivity with regards to the information to ensure proper 
protection mechanisms and moreover, to identify who is responsible for doing so 
(e.g., employees, owners, or customers). Employees should distinguish between the 
internal use of information, for instance, human resources information (personnel 
data, financial or history) and public information when the organisation is 
connected to the internet, such as the organisation’s web site. For example, 
Carnegie Mellon University classified institutional data into three levels of 
sensitivity as shown in Figure  2.2 (Raderman & Markiewicz, 2015).   
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Figure  2.2: Data Classification 
Open information such as the university website, which has general information 
about the university products, international university services and so on, has 
access enabled for everyone who belongs to the university and for those outside the 
university. However, no one can change the data except authorised users who can 
edit data that would present little or no risk to the organisation and its affiliates. 
Private data can be shared between authorised university employees using the 
internal network who have rights to read, modify, remove and print electronic files 
such as course information and research publications. There is a moderate level of 
risk to the organisation if there was unauthorized access to this data. Finally, data 
should be classified as Restricted when assets become a significant control issue 
and pose a significant risk to the organisation if there was unauthorized disclosure, 
alteration or destruction of that data. This includes confidential information 
determined by government regulations and data protected by confidentiality 
agreements.   
2.2.2 Policy Implementation  
When the ISP of an organisation is documented, in place and available for all staff, 
those staff need the competence to implement these policies properly. The 
organisation has the responsibility to train staff in the implementation of 
information security policies. David (2002) declares that security is based on policy 
and to make policy effective, it must be enforced. 
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Procedures explain how staff should implement an organisation’s policies. For 
instance, the policy might state that all data should be encrypted when employees 
send it outside of the organisation or that staff should use virtual private network 
(VPN) software to encrypt data. A VPN allows employees to connect securely to 
internal company resources from a public network via remote access. 
Research suggests that the policy alone may not be sufficient. For instance a policy 
may state that an employee should select a strong password; however, if this is not 
enforced in some way, then it may not happen (Biddle et al., 2012; Florêncio & 
Herley, 2010). Consequently, organisations should not rely only on the policy, but 
should also pay more attention to methods that persuade users to comply 
(Mwagwabi et al., 2014). 
2.2.3 Information security: organisational roles & responsibilities  
All companies have employees that work at different levels of responsibility. At the 
bottom, a company relies on its functions to provide the services or products, whilst 
at the top team leaders set the strategy and direction for the company as a whole. 
All organisations have the responsibility of assuring confidentiality, integrity and 
the availability of sensitive information. Therefore, to prevent employee error the 
organisation should ensure that all staff are responsible for information security and 
understand their responsibilities. 
Any organisation should know whether their employees understand their roles and 
responsibilities in the security of the organisation and protecting its information 
assets. Waly et al. (2012) argue that roles and responsibilities are vital influences 
that should be the main priority of each employee from senior management to 
individual staff members.   
2.2.4 Information Security Policy Summary 
In summary the ISP sets out how employees are expected to behave within an 
organisation. However, people do not always behave as expected. The following 
sections explore the literature surrounding the factors that influence behaviour, 
particularly security behaviour.  
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 Understanding human information security behaviour 2.3
Human information security behaviour is a complex area to study and technology is 
not the complete solution to information security problems (Kearney & Kruger, 
2016). Bulgurcu et al. (2010) point out that an organisation can achieve information 
security when it considers both technical and socio-organisational factors. In recent 
years, most studies have paid more attention to the technical aspects of security 
rather than on security management to investigate the problems created by security 
breaches (Waly et al., 2012). To reduce the risk of information security incidents in 
an organisation, human aspects of information security should be considered 
alongside technological and organisational aspects (Hina & Dominic, 2017; Safa, 
Von Solms, & Futcher, 2016). 
The most frequent reason for information security violations is user behaviour. 
Karlsson et al. (2017) argue that around half of all security breaches were 
accidently caused by insiders while other research has estimated about 80% of the 
risk to information systems comes from insiders (D’Arcy, 2009; Walton, 2006). 
Others argue that many information security programmes do not spend enough 
time and effort understanding human behaviour, the costs of human failing and the 
protection required against it (Liginlal et al., 2009; Parsons et al., 2014; Schultz, 
2005; Spruit, 1998). 
Most businesses give their employees privileges to access, modify and/or transfer 
data between computers in the same network or a different network, although of 
course there is no guarantee of avoiding mistakes that could cause loss to the 
organisation in terms of time, money and trust. Furthermore, due to lack of 
information security policies, employees may cause problems to organisational 
assets by installing software from the internet that has malicious features hidden 
within it (Kissel, 2009).  
ISPs outline the protective behaviours expected from employees. There is a lack of 
consensus on the recommended behaviours in the workplace. However, there are 
many different behaviours to consider as outlined in different studies.  These 
include user authentication, the use of security software, keeping all software up to 
date, being alert to phishing attacks, being alert to actions that reduce privacy and 
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to maintaining secure internet use. Unfortunately, most IT managers pay more 
attention to technical problems and solutions (for example proxy servers, intrusion 
detection systems, firewalls and routers), and pay little or no attention to their end 
users (Katz, 2005). Research into ISP compliance has also concentrated on security 
technology and this is insufficient if behavioural and social aspects are ignored 
(Han et al., 2017). Technical solutions can fail due to human error (Rhee et al., 
2009). Therefore, human aspects should be considered as a critical issue (Safa et al., 
2015; Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016; Scholl et al., 2018). 
“The security of systems is dependent on the people that use them” points out 
(Lohrmann, 2014) but unfortunately, people may be the weak link in an 
organisation (Lebek et al., 2013; Tatu et al., 2018) and their misuse of information 
system components is a significant threat to organisations (D’Arcy, 2009; Madigan 
et al., 2004). When employees do not comply with organisational policy, they not 
only threaten the loss of important information, but it can also lead to the 
organisation losing money and time working on fixing the problems that they 
caused.  
Before attempting to understand employees’ behaviour, it is necessary to explore 
how security behaviour has been investigated. Quantitative survey explorations 
tend to explore what factors influence employee intentions to comply with the ISP. 
However, such research is problematic. First, it fails to recognise that there are 
many different behaviours listed within such policies, each of which may be 
influenced by different factors. Posey (2010) lists 67 protective workplace 
behaviours. Giving a single score for compliance is problematic if some behaviours 
are followed while others are not. Secondly, this approach assumes that employees 
have an ISP, and have knowledge of its contents. Third, it assumes that policies are 
consistent across organisations. These issues may be the reason for inconsistent 
findings from ISP compliance research (Sommestad et al., 2014). 
Given the importance of employee behaviour, the next sections will explore 
theories of behaviour and the factors that influence behaviour.  
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2.3.1 Theories of human behaviour used in information security 
Beautement et al. (2009) argue that numerous organisations have attempted to 
influence or change employee security behaviour, but discovered it to be a major 
challenge. Employee behaviour is affected by social, cultural, individual, and 
psychological factors (Spender, 1998). These factors are expressed within different 
theories of behaviour. 
It is important for security researchers to be aware of theories of behaviour and 
behaviour change from psychology. It is important to note that security researchers 
have not applied these theories consistently; some researchers use only components, 
rather than the whole theory, while others may use a combination of theories. There 
are many different theories of behaviour, with many different components, only 
some of which have been investigated within the domain of security (Coventry et 
al., 2014). There is no universally correct theory: each theory simply focusses on 
different aspects. This section reviews the most commonly applied theories in 
information security awareness and behaviour. 
Lebek et al. (2013) and Safa et al. (2015) identified Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB) and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) as the most frequently used 
theories in the literature of information security awareness and behaviour. Both 
theories incorporate intention to be a precursor to actual behaviour. However, some 
information security researchers argued that behavioural intention doesn’t always 
lead to actual behaviour (Crossler et al., 2013; Mahmood et al., 2010). The 
intention–behaviour gap is well established in the behaviour change research but 
more research is required in security to understand how positive intentions can be 
translated into actual behaviour.  
2.3.1.1 Theory of planned behaviour (TPB) 
Ajzen (1991) says that TPB has been the most frequently used and the most 
productive theory in explaining human behaviours. TPB contains three factors: 
attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control, as demonstrated in 
Figure  2.3, which, by their influence on intention, lead to a change in behaviour.  
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Figure  2.3: The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) 
The TPB has been shown to be a good predictor of ISP compliance (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Dinev & Hu, 2007; Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Sommestad et al., 2015). 
2.3.1.2 Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) 
Rogers (1983) developed Protection Motivation Theory and originally applied it to 
health psychology to understand how “fear appeals” affect an individual’s 
behaviour. This theory says that when people are confronted with a threat, they 
engage in two types of appraisal: threat appraisal and coping appraisal. 
 Vance et al. (2012) clarified that threat appraisal contains three factors (see 
Figure  2.4):      
1. Rewards or benefits (any intrinsic or extrinsic motivation for increasing 
or keeping an unwanted behaviour); 
2. Perceived severity (the magnitude of the threat); 
3. Vulnerability (the extent to which the individual is perceived to be 
susceptible to the threat).  
Coping appraisal also contains three factors:   
1. Response efficacy (the belief in the perceived benefits of the coping 
action by removing the threat);  
2. Self-efficacy (the degree that he or she believes it is possible to 
implement the protective behaviour) and  
 
21 
 
3. Response cost (to the individual in implementing the protective 
behaviour). 
 
Figure  2.4: Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) 
A number of studies in information security behaviour have applied PMT and 
noted that it is a useful theory to predict a person’s intention to engage in protective 
actions, or protection motivation (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Crossler, 2010; 
Hansen et al., 2018; Ifinedo, 2012; Jansen, 2015; Meso et al., 2013; Tsai et al., 
2016).  
2.3.1.3 Knowledge, Attitude and Behaviour (KAB) model 
Another model that is commonly used in security literature is the Knowledge, 
Attitude and Behaviour (KAB) model. The model “proposes that behaviour 
changes gradually. As knowledge accumulates, changes in attitude are initiated. 
Over some period of time, changes in attitude accumulate, resulting in behavioural 
change”  (Baranowski et al., 2003, p. 28s). For instance, when employees in an 
organisation know the importance (including the benefits) of complying with the 
ISP and the possible consequences to them and their organisation of non-
compliance then their attitude might change, leading to compliant behaviour (see 
Figure  2.5). In the KAB model, when researchers want to measure people’s 
knowledge they ask what people know. For attitude they ask what people think 
about situations. For behaviour they ask what people actually do.  
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Figure  2.5: Knowledge attitude behaviour model 
Several studies on information security awareness such as those by Kaur and 
Mustafa (2013); Khan et al. (2011); Kruger and Kearney (2006); McCormac et al. 
(2017) are based on the KAB model to measure the user’s information security 
awareness level. Furthermore, Parsons et al. (2014) applied the KAB model to 
examine the relationships between knowledge of policy and procedures, attitude 
towards policy, and behaviour when using computers at work and they found there is 
a significant relationship between knowledge, attitude and behaviour. Unfortunately, 
Khan et al. (2011) and Rimal (2001) argue that the KAB model is not always 
sufficient to change behaviour. Indeed, different research fields such as 
environmental awareness (Khan et al., 2011), information security awareness 
(Baranowski et al., 2003), and healthcare show that the KAB model and the theory 
of planned behaviour (TPB) should be combined to understand the process of 
behaviour change because knowledge is necessary but not sufficient to change 
behaviour.  
2.3.2 Applying theories of behaviour to information security policy compliance 
Many previous studies applied theoretical frameworks to understand employee 
behaviour intention in relation to information security in general and compliance 
with organisational ISPs in particular. Thomson and Solms (1998) have shown that 
insights from social psychology could be used to enhance the effectiveness of an 
information security awareness programme. Ifinedo (2012) integrated PMT and 
TPB to understand IS security policy compliance; he found that factors such as 
attitude toward compliance, perceived vulnerability, self-efficacy, response 
efficacy, and subjective norms have significant effects on individuals’ intentions to 
comply with organisations’ ISPs. 
Information security is a fundamental concept for organisations today (Thomson et 
al., 2006). Research studies have been carried out to identify factors that influence 
employees’ compliance with information security policies and to investigate how 
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important these factors are. The purpose of the behavioural assessment of security 
governance is to ensure that employees are practising and implementing the 
organisation’s rules and policies. Vance et al. (2012) note that a number of 
psychology theories have been used to explain employees’ failure to comply with 
ISPs. Teodor et al. (2014) argue that users’ compliance with ISPs will enhance an 
organisation’s information security levels. However, previous studies and field 
surveys suggest that employees seldom comply with information security 
procedures (Goo et al., 2013).  
Many studies applied psychological theories to understanding employees’ 
behavioural compliance with organisational ISPs. Several attempted to explain why 
employees do or do not comply with their organisation’s ISP by using different 
psychological theories (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Ifinedo, 2014; Pahnila et al., 2007). 
Mishra and Dhillon (2006) argue that criminology and social psychology theories 
have been frequently utilized to understand and predict employees’ security 
behaviour and awareness.  
A number of investigations applied a single theory, whilst others combined two or 
more theory elements to explain factors affecting employees’ compliance with 
security policies. Siponen et al. (2014) developed a new model by combining 
elements of the theory of reasoned action, protection motivation theory and 
cognitive evaluation theory to identify factors affecting employees’ compliance 
with security policies.  
2.3.3 Key influencing factors  
Many investigations have used different models to recognize and identify effective 
factors in information security (Waly et al., 2012). There are many factors to 
measure when considering employees’ compliance with ISPs that are incorporated 
into these different theories. 
2.3.3.1 Information security awareness/knowledge 
Alarifi et al. (2012), Hasan and Hussin (2010), Khalfan (2004), Rezgui and Marks 
(2008) and Waly et al. (2012) all argue that lack of information security awareness 
is one reason why employees behave negatively toward information security. 
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Organisations must recognise that increasing information security awareness is a 
key first step in protecting their physical and data assets.  
Information security awareness campaigns are designed to attract the attention of 
users, in order to raise their knowledge and concerns, in relation to information 
security (Tsohou et al., 2008). Moreover, an ISP should assume that information 
security awareness is the first priority in development (Ahlan & Lubis, 2011). In 
addition, the main purpose of security awareness is to ensure that users understand 
their personal roles and responsibilities towards security (Peltier, 2005a). To reduce 
the risk of information security breaches an organisation should consider 
information security awareness to be a very important issue and different training 
methods are recommended (Safa, 2017). 
The development of information security such as the guidelines, procedures, 
standards and policies is only the beginning of an effective information security 
awareness programme. Information security awareness encourages users to pay 
more attention to mitigate human error and comply with an organisation’s ISPs and 
regulations. 
Wilson and Hash (2003) declared that awareness is not training and attention to 
information security is the main aim of awareness and changing users’ behaviour. 
Khan et al. (2011) identified that information security awareness in an organisation 
is ensuring that all employees are aware of the regulations and rules regarding 
protection of the organisation’s information. 
Previous studies have attempted to use different technological and functional 
awareness and training programmes to improve employees’ information security 
skills, behaviour and knowledge (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Eminağaoğlu et al., 
2009; Khan et al., 2011). This is because lack of knowledge and skills may cause 
companies to face information security threats (Lacey & James, 2010). 
Bosworth and Kabay (2002) state that an organisation should include information 
security in their policies and focus attention on security by delivering an 
information security programme that is visible and credible for their employees in 
order to show that security is paramount and that it is a collective responsibility. 
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All the employees in an establishment should be involved in an awareness 
programme, which should begin with new employees and continue throughout the 
organisation. The organisation should set aside a period for their employees to 
participate in awareness activities and the employees should sign a statement 
acknowledging that they understand how to deal with the organisation’s material 
and comply with its ISP and procedures. In addition, the organisation should 
designate a person or group to manage the programme. The most effective way to 
enhance users’ information security behaviours in their workplace is by raising 
awareness.  
Kaur and Mustafa (2013) examined the effectiveness of knowledge, attitude and 
behaviour on information security awareness and they found that attitude and 
behaviour have a significant influence on the availability, confidentiality, and 
integrity of business information. Furthermore, they argued that lack of information 
security awareness could cause critical threats to organisational assets and security. 
Kruger & Kearney (2006) developed a prototype model to measure information 
security awareness in an Australian gold mining company by practising three 
measurements: what employees know (knowledge), what they think (attitude) and 
what they do (behaviour). The study measured six focus areas, namely actions-
consequence awareness, adherence to company policies, careful use of mobile 
equipment, careful use of the internet and mail, reporting security incidents, and 
secrecy of passwords along with an awareness of general information security and 
the ISP. The results showed that the overall score for regional users’ information 
security awareness level was 65%, which related to 77% awareness in terms of 
knowledge, 76% awareness in terms of attitude and 54% in terms of behaviour. In 
addition, regarding ISP compliance, users scored 44% overall based on 81% for 
knowledge, 55% for attitude and 18% for behaviour. They conclude that there are 
many reasons why organisations have to pay more attention to and spend resources 
on measuring awareness, which could be useful in security campaigns and return 
on investments. They established that the information security awareness of 
employees has a significant influence on the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information, while knowledge showed no significant relationship to 
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information security awareness. The primary reasons for users’ mistakes were a 
lack of information concerning security awareness, apathy, indifference, 
carelessness, and misbehaviour, in addition to resistance and ignorance (Safa, Von 
Solms, & Furnell, 2016). In addition, numerous information security incidents 
happen because of the unintentional behaviour of and negligence of employees, 
bringing about a genuine internal danger to the safety of organisational assets 
(Durgin, 2007; Hina & Dominic, 2016). 
2.3.3.2 Management  
In any organisation, there are different user positions, responsibilities, and roles 
requiring different access privileges. The key issue for organisational information 
security is good management which plays a very important role in enforcing 
employee compliance with an ISP (Choi, 2016; Lee et al., 2016; Puhakainen & 
Siponen, 2010). Knapp, Marshall, Kelly Rainer, et al. (2006) identified that top 
management support is a critical indicator of an organisation’s security culture and 
level of ISP enforcement.   
Truss et al. (2006) suggest that one of the most important factors influencing 
employee engagement is thinking that their manager is committed to the 
organisation. Furthermore, security studies argue that the role of management 
practices with security policies is very important for running a successful 
information security programme (Maynard & Ruighaver, 2006; Siponen et al., 
2014). In addition, managers should check employees’ information security quality 
and skills (Safa & Von Solms, 2016).  
Straub and Welke (1998) argued that top managers, middle managers and 
employees continue to ignore information security and that neglect leads to more 
security breaches in an organisation. Therefore, more studies are needed to explore 
the role of management in information security and how managers could play a 
very important role in information security (Soomro et al., 2016). 
Top management, immediate managers and IT administrators have the 
authorisation to interfere and change the information security in most organisations. 
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The effectiveness of management on employee policy compliance policy needs to 
be identified.    
2.3.3.3 Organisational and national culture  
Bates (1990) defined culture as “the system of shared beliefs, values, customs, 
behaviours, and artefacts that members of a society use to cope with their world 
and with one another, and that are transmitted from generation to generation 
through learning” (p.7). Organisational culture is a different concept but is related 
insofar as it pertains to the shared beliefs, values, customs and behaviours that are 
present in an organisation. Both national culture and organisational culture will 
have effects on employees’ security behaviour. Several studies have explored 
employees’ information security awareness across different nationalities and 
organisational cultures. Over time in work environments, trust between employees 
in the same organisation is built up and helps to get work done and this is a key 
aspect of organisational culture. But sometimes organisational culture (including 
factors such as trust between employees) can negatively affect them to not comply 
with their organisation’s ISP such as sharing passwords (Al-Mukahal & Alshare, 
2015). For example, an information security survey conducted by Boulder (2010) 
found that 40% of 2,500 users from Australia, UK and USA shared their password 
with one or more person in the previous one year. On the other hand, Tang and 
Zhang (2016) pointed out the positive role that organisational culture can play in 
encouraging staff to adhere with the ISP by gathering, protecting, scattering and 
overseeing data to enhance information security. 
Walsham (2002) described national culture as shared symbols, norms, and values 
in a social collective such as a country. National cultures and their relationship to 
information security may contribute either positively or negatively to employees’ 
information security behaviour. Many studies compared employees’ information 
security awareness and behaviour by different organisational culture fields and 
nationalities and these studies are described below. 
2.3.3.3.1 Organisational culture in different fields 
Khalfan (2004) selected several public and private sector organisations in Kuwait 
to identify the information security considerations in information systems/ 
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information technology and noted security criticalities, loss of control, vendor 
dependency, cost escalation, and poor service quality. Talib et al. (2010) found that 
information security knowledge and practice gained from a work environment 
could be transferred to the home environment. 
In a recent study by Waly et al. (2012) questionnaires were disseminated to three 
sectors (health, business and education). The questionnaires were used to (i) assess 
the employees’ level of information security awareness, and (ii) to evaluate the 
employees’ understanding of the ISPs. They also attempted to tease out (i) what 
factors influence user behaviour toward information security, and (ii) the impact of 
the training and awareness programmes on changing the information security 
management behaviour of the employees.   
The study found that when compared to employees in the business and education 
sectors, health sector employees are better at following and implementing ISPs. 
The authors of the study suggested that the reason for this is that health sector 
employees have better awareness along with good communication and reward 
systems. Moreover, employees in the health sector have a positive attitude to, and 
belief in the security policy norms as they recognise the significance of security 
policy. Other studies have shown that the level of information security awareness 
of employees working in banks in Australia were higher 20% than that of 
employees working in other industries and this was because of the sensitive nature 
of their organisation’s information (Pattinson et al., 2017).  
Alfawaz (2011) investigated the relationship between national, organisational and 
technological values to understand how they might affect the development and 
deployment of an organisation's information security culture in Saudi Arabia and 
found both dimensions of national and organisational culture to be underlying 
determinants of individuals’ behaviour and this extends to information security 
culture, particularly in developing countries.  
The question is how to apply appropriate ISPs in different cultural environments. 
Each organisation has different priorities, and the current organisational culture 
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may decide the desired level of information security culture (Tipton & Krause, 
2006). 
2.3.3.3.2 National culture 
Alarifi et al. (2012) conducted a survey of 462 members of the general public in 
Saudi Arabia and found that information security awareness is very poor due to the 
highly-censored, patriarchal and tribal nature of Saudi culture compared to Western 
pluralistic democracies. In addition, they compared their study with research 
undertaken by Kruger et al. (2010) by using the same questions for users shown in 
Table  2.1. 
Table  2.1: Password management 
Response South Africa      Saudi Arabia 
I never change my password 27.3% 65.7% 
I choose a simple and easy password 9.1% 45% 
I share my password with others 0% 35.8% 
 
The results showed that there was a significant difference between the two 
countries, and that South African users were more aware than Saudi Arabian users 
regarding password practices. Furthermore, Lang et al. (2009) found that 74% of 
users surveyed in Ireland said they never change their passwords. Karjalainen et al. 
(2013) conducted selective interviews with employees who were working in 
companies located in Finland, Switzerland, the UAE, and China. The findings 
show that employees in the UAE, and China are affected positively by 
administering punishments and rewards to comply with the ISP but not in Finland 
or Switzerland. In addition, monitoring ISP compliance had a negative effect on 
employees in Finland and Switzerland. The results suggest that different cultures 
require different information system security interventions. 
Hovav and D’Arcy (2012) used the deterrence theory on employees’ information 
system misuse in the U.S. and Korea. They found that the impact of perceived 
certainty of sanctions on IS misuse intentions for Koreans was stronger whereas the 
impact of perceived severity of sanctions was stronger for the U.S. However, 
regulations and rules are different from country to country and the studies above 
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showed that different factors influence employees’ security behaviour positively, 
negatively and/or have no effect. Therefore, investigations into employees’ security 
awareness and behaviour need to be in one country as they have the same 
regulations and roles.    
2.3.3.4 Sanction and rewards 
A number of studies have argued that sanctions and rewards have a significant 
impact on users’ compliance with ISPs (Karjalainen et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) and D’Arcy (2009) applied ISP behaviour compliance 
models to investigate the role of sanctions on compliance and found that sanctions 
play a very important role in motivating firmer compliance with ISPs. In addition, 
Siponen et al. (2010) discovered that sanctions have a significant effect on actual 
ISP compliance and they strongly recommend that managers and information 
security staff establish sanctions for non-compliance. Furthermore, rewards do not 
appear to have a significant effect on employees’ compliance. Knapp, Marshall, 
Kelly Rainer, et al. (2006) argue that one way to enforce the ISP is to use severe 
sanctions such as termination when employees regularly breach organisational 
security policy.     
Siponen et al. (2014) argue that employees’ vulnerability, normative beliefs, self-
efficacy and attitude had a significant impact on their intentions to comply with 
ISPs. On the other hand, employees’ rewards and response efficacy did not have a 
significant effect on compliance. 
Conversely, Herath and Rao (2009), in analysing the penalties, identified that 
certainty of detection was found to be significant while, surprisingly, severity of 
punishment was found to have a negative effect on security behaviour intentions. 
Similarly, Pahnila et al. (2007) argued that sanctions do not have a significant 
effect on intention to comply with an ISP and rewards do not have a significant 
effect on actual compliance. Moreover, attitude, normative beliefs and habits have 
a significant effect on intention to comply with IS security policies. 
Of course, not all the factors identified in this study will be useful for all 
organisations to improve employees’ compliance with ISPs because each 
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organisation has different business functions, objectives, culture, and other 
characteristics.   
2.3.4 Measuring information security awareness and compliance intentions 
Some organisations measure their employees’ information security awareness level 
regularly using different methods such as questionnaires of vocabulary (i.e., asking 
users to identify the meanings of key security terminology), scenario questions, 
qualitative interviews, and/or practical measurement by observing behaviours such 
as password strength. Employee awareness measurement identifies important 
factors which influence employees’ behaviour.  
Several researchers have conducted surveys to measure employees’ information 
security awareness levels. Employee information security awareness can be 
measured by different models and psychological theories and those measurements 
can be categorized into three groups: 
1. General information security awareness. 
2. Information security awareness toward ISP compliance. 
3. Information security awareness in different organisational and national 
cultures. 
Vroom and Von Solms (2004) argue that monitoring or auditing ISP compliance 
behaviour is very difficult and an alternative auditing tool needs to be found. In 
addition, observing users’ behaviours under laboratory conditions are not the same 
as actual users in the real workplace (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Therefore, 
behaviour (or, at least, behavioural intention) can be measured through scenario 
questionnaires, especially indirect questions (i.e., questions that do not directly ask 
participants what they would do in a given situation). In addition, Caulfield and 
Parkin (2016) argue that to explore how individual and organisational factors in the 
work environment affect security behaviours, scenario-based questionnaires can be 
used. Gross and Rosson (2007) investigated users’ knowledge of security and 
threats and how they manage their security concerns. The results demonstrated that 
all users were able to deal with important information to which they had access but 
that their knowledge of the technical components of security such as firewalls and 
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virus scanners was low. Kruger et al. (2010) applied a questionnaire that consisted 
of two sections. The first contained a vocabulary test which included basic and 
generally known terms (e.g., what is phishing, spam, etc.). The second section 
contained scenario-type questions to evaluate respondents’ behavioural intentions 
independently of their vocabulary knowledge. The findings confirmed that a lack of 
information security knowledge (vocabulary test) correlated with intended 
behaviour (scenario test) indicated by scenario-type questions. It is worth noting 
that the participants in the study were students and the sample size was small 
(n=44).   
2.3.4.1 Scenario measurements 
Alexander and Becker (1978) asserted that scenario questions provide researchers 
with something that closely approximates real-life decision-making situations. In 
particular, scenario questions have become more common in measuring 
ethical/unethical and anti-social behaviour (Hovav & D’Arcy, 2012).    
Trevino (1992) commented that it is difficult to measure individual behaviour by 
direct questions because respondents are likely to answer questions in socially 
desirable ways. The scenario method allows indirect questions to be used to 
measure a person’s likely intention to commit unethical behaviour. 
Scenario questions have been applied in quantitative studies to measure users’ 
information security behavioural intentions (see Table  2.2). All the studies in 
Table  2.2 used survey scenario questions. Interviewing participants leads to lower 
levels of self-disclosure of socially undesirable behaviour so in the current study 
online scenario questionnaires were used because they can make participants more 
comfortable disclosing personal information (Locke & Gilbert, 1995). Furthermore, 
the quantitative results can be generalised to a large population, which is randomly 
selected (Carr, 1994).  
Table  2.2: Studies using scenario questions 
Authors 
Scenario 
questions 
Scenario answers Population 
Number of 
questions 
Farooq et al. 
(2015) 
Direct 
Direct (multiple-
choice options) 
614 students 
from University of 
10 
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Turku 
Kruger et al. 
(2010)        
Direct 
Direct (multiple-
choice options 
options) 
Two different 
class groups of 
small population 
of students (44 
responses) at a 
university 
9 
D’Arcy 
(2009) 
Indirect Direct (point scale) 
269 computer 
users from eight 
different 
companies in the 
USA 
4 
Vance et al. 
(2012) 
Indirect Direct (point scale) 
210 employees 
from an  
organisation in 
Finland 
6 
 
Most studies used scenario-based questionnaires to measure users’ intended 
security behaviours, for example, see D’Arcy (2009), Farooq et al. (2015), Kruger 
et al. (2010)  and Vance et al. (2012). These studies differed in terms of the 
scenarios used, populations and the number of questions. When participants are 
presented with direct scenario questions they tend to select the best answer which 
does not necessarily reflect the way they would actually behave. Farooq et al. 
(2015) and Kruger et al. (2010) used direct scenario questions. For example, in 
Farooq et al. (2015) participants (university students) were asked to answer the 
question: 
“Once a password is allotted for your university’s email account, you do the 
following: (Select One most suitable) 
a. I never change my default password 
b. I change it when system asks me to change it 
c. I usually change it 
d. I always change it” (p.245). 
Similar direct scenario questions were used in the Kruger et al. (2010) 
questionnaires but participants were allowed to choose more than one answer. In 
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both studies the participants would give the best answer (if they knew it) to show 
that they are doing well even when they were not. In this case, the researchers 
could measure knowledge and attitude of users but not their real behaviour.  
D’Arcy (2009) and Vance et al. (2012) used indirect scenario questions in an 
attempt to measure information systems misuse behaviours. For example, D’Arcy 
(2009) included the following scenario: 
“Scenario 1: Taylor received an e-mail from a friend that contained a series of 
jokes. Many of the jokes poked fun at the stereotypes that people often associate 
with different ethnic groups. Taylor found the jokes very funny and decided to send 
the e-mail to several co-workers.” 
Participants were then asked to select their agreement level for that action as if they 
were in that situation. That is, “If you were Taylor, what is the likelihood that you 
would have sent the e-mail? (very unlikely to very likely)”. However, as the 
question is still asking participants what they would do it will still elicit direct 
responses leading participants to give what they think is the expected response 
rather than what they might actually do in that situation.  
Given the variety of approaches to scenarios – using indirect or direct questions, 
giving a single answer or multiple answers etc. – and that the populations are 
general students from a single organisation, there is a research gap to consolidate 
and improve the use of scenario questions to measure behavioural intentions.  
Indirect scenario questions followed by options identifying how a third party might 
behave enables assessment of employees’ likely compliance with an ISP and 
identification of factors that might stop them complying with policy. In addition, 
much security research uses populations of employees and different organisations 
in different sectors (such as the medical sector), yet little work has been carried out 
exploring staff within Higher Education.  
To address this gap, this thesis uses indirect scenario questions offering several 
behavioural options. These questions are put to staff within Higher Education 
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Institutes. In each question, participants are asked what the person named in the 
scenario should do. For example, (the current study): 
 “Ali is having a day off. His co-worker phones him and asks for Ali’s password in 
order to access an important email he has received. What should he do?  
a) He should give him his password because his co-worker is a trustworthy 
person. 
b) He should not give him his password. 
c) He should give him it if the email does not contain sensitive information. 
d) If he is a close friend it is fine to give it to him.” 
Each scenario has four different answer-options based on a literature review, 
organisational ISP and IT staff interviews (what users’ information security 
behaviour is considered to be like). The answers relate to reasons that have been 
given for noncompliance. Participants must select only one of the four possible 
answers. While Beautement et al. (2016) conducted an indirect scenario survey 
based on employees’ security behaviour and attitudes, their survey did not 
systematically use influencing factors in the answers to explain why the 
participants might not choose the policy-compliant answers. In addition, that study 
had only eight questions, which is smaller compared to the current study, which 
used fourteen questions.      
2.3.5 Higher education measurement and investigation methods 
Katz (2005) pointed out that colleges and universities have enormous computing 
power and have open access to their clients and the public, which makes them 
susceptible to attacks. In addition, the IT infrastructure of universities and colleges 
allows geographically distributed academics to share large amounts of data and 
virtual computing resources (Rezgui & Marks, 2008). Furthermore, universities and 
colleges over the world have national and international students and staff and hold 
personal and educational records for these staff and students (Hina & Dominic, 
2016). The ISP in the university is frequently ineffective at protecting information 
because of the lack of awareness amongst students and staff, less understanding 
with regards to the importance of information, lack of response in anticipating the 
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current issues, and a lower prioritisation of information security than other 
organisations (Ahlan & Lubis, 2011). Higher education institutions significantly 
depend on security controls and apparently ignore the compliance of end users with 
the ISP executed to guarantee institutional assets wellbeing (Hina & Dominic, 
2017). 
Kyobe (2010) examined factors influencing users’ compliance with security 
policies and regulations in universities and ascertained that policy compliance 
remains a major challenge. He recommended that to guide users’ compliance in 
universities, framework alignment requirements should be developed with control 
standards. Likewise, Hina and Dominic (2016) argued that the enhancement of 
information security awareness to keep information confidential, with integrity and 
available in higher education institutions is a challenging task.  
Marks and Rezgui (2009) compared end users’ information security awareness 
levels between different higher education institutions in different countries (UAE, 
UK and USA). They recommended that to establish enhanced information security 
in universities, elements such as having an ISP, campaigning and promoting, 
training, rewards and sanctions, and assessing and readjustment should be delivered 
sequentially. 
Waly et al. (2012) studied three different organisational sectors (education, health, 
and business) to explore the factors that influence information security behaviour. 
In contrast, this thesis investigates multiple institutions in a single sector (higher 
education) in a single country (Oman).    
Al-Awadi (2009) undertook interviews with 25 employees of the University of 
Glasgow in the UK as one part of a study. The investigation comprised two parts. 
The first used semi-structured interviews to elicit employees’ views on the 
organisation’ ISP, organisational security culture and ISP compliance. The second 
part was based on six indirect scenario questions to identify barriers to non-
compliance with the ISP and to understand opinions about employees’ behaviour 
based on those scenarios. The scenario questions covered leaving a computer 
without logging out, opening an unknown attachment, sharing passwords, writing 
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down passwords, illegal or immoral web surfing, and opening a CD from an 
unknown source in work machines. Her investigation centred on the effectiveness 
of the security policy in reducing security breaches within an organisation. The 
study revealed that employees do not comply with an ISP for several reasons: they 
are unaware of the security policy, they are affected by poor organisational security 
culture, they believe that it is someone else’s problem, and are affected by 
individual values and beliefs and work pressure.  
Several academic and industrial researchers have attempted to measure information 
security awareness in higher education sectors and have focused only on students 
and not on employees, such as Aliyu et al. (2010), Eyong (2014), Farooq et al. 
(2015), Fatani et al. (2013), Kruger et al. (2010), Masrom and Ismail (2008), 
Ngoqo and Flowerday (2015), North et al. (2006) and Zhang and Li (2015). 
Moreover, those studies that used employees as participants focused on only one 
university, such as  Mahabi (2010), Rezgui and Marks (2008) and Marks and 
Rezgui (2009). However, the aim in this thesis is to investigate employees’ 
behavioural intentions in multiple higher education institutions in Oman rather than 
one organisation in order to give a big picture of Omani organisations. While a 
focus on single institutions is helpful, there are differences across institutions in 
terms of reputation, size, location and policies. Looking at a range of institutions 
allows a better understanding of Omani institutions more generally.     
Al-Kalbani (2017) conducted a survey of 294 employees in public organisations in 
Oman (18% working in the education sector) to explore the factors that affect their 
information security compliance. This survey focused on high level policy and 
management issues, improving information security management, awareness and 
training and discovering what employees wanted management to do to support 
them. The study did not explore specific concrete security behaviours such as 
password management, backup, incident reporting, etc.  In addition, Parsons et al. 
(2014) argue that many survey studies of computer users in higher education 
focused only on one issue of information security awareness such as password-
related behaviours, mobile computing or security features within specific 
applications. The studies on higher education above focused on a few specific 
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security behaviours, so the study in this thesis uses 14 different indirect scenario 
questions and each one has four different employee behaviours (totalling 56 
behaviours) to identify employees’ ISP compliance intentions and overall 
awareness level. Furthermore, these scenario questions will help to identify factors 
that influence employees to behave positively or negatively with regard to the ISP. 
While it is difficult to identify the most significant factors (Alotaibi & Furnell, 
2016) this study will focus on eight factors: knowledge, response efficacy, 
subjective norms for organisation and/or manager, compliance, behavioural 
intentions, and sanctions and rewards in order to predict employees’ ISP 
compliance intentions (for each scenario there will be direct agreement questions). 
 Summary 2.4
This chapter has reviewed the background of information security awareness and 
behaviour intention studies. It described the previous findings of information 
system security threats and vulnerabilities at different organisational environments 
and specifically in higher education environments. The chapter has highlighted 
measurement tools to measure organisations’ information security awareness levels 
and the compliance intentions of employees. In addition, this chapter showed the 
role of information security awareness on employees’ ISP compliance. The chapter 
reviewed the importance of exploring human factors and their role in influencing 
ISP compliance.   
The literature showed that information security challenges still remain and research 
is needed to explore and understand the organisational and human factors that 
affect employee compliance with security policies especially in higher education 
environments.   
Previous studies showed that even when an organisation has a good ISP, 
information security awareness programme, and software and hardware security, if 
they do not study employees’ knowledge, attitude and behaviour the organisation 
will miss some critical issues.  
Researchers have attempted to identify and explore the factors that affect 
employees’ behaviour and found that challenges remain. An organisation cannot 
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guarantee that all employees will understand their roles in protecting information 
assets, even though an organisation may have an information security awareness 
programme (Kruger & Kearney, 2006). 
The literature review showed the limitations and gaps in current knowledge about 
information security awareness and employees’ ISP compliance. To the best of our 
knowledge, the direct and indirect roles of information security awareness on an 
employee’s compliance have not yet been studied. The literature shows that none 
of the previous research studies applied indirect scenario surveys with answers 
derived from influencing factors, for large numbers of employees of different 
nationalities and different higher education institutions in the same country, and nor 
did they attempt to measure overall employees’ information security awareness and 
behaviour intentions.      
It should be noted that interesting and important research exists, but there are few 
studies dealing with employee behaviour intentions in higher education. To address 
this gap, the next chapter details a study with administrators and IT staff about their 
perceptions of the employees’ behaviour and the threats this creates to information 
security. This helped to explore their perceptions of employees’ information 
security behaviours in general and how these related to their understanding of 
information security threats and specifically, helped to explore what IT staff expect 
employees to do in the context of information security.  
This information then fed into the design of a scenario questionnaire which was 
subsequently disseminated to employees within several universities and colleges in 
Oman (Chapter 4).  
The scenario questions are based on several areas of information security designed 
to explore employees’ information security compliance intentions (e.g., logging off 
or locking their computers when leaving their office, keeping passwords secret, 
backing up important data files.). In addition, this study aimed to identify factors 
that are perceived to influence employees to behave positively or negatively 
towards information security.   
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Chapter 3: UNDERSTANDING IT STAFF AND SYSTEM 
ADMINISTRATORS’ PERCEPTIONS OF INFORMATION 
SECURITY 
 Introduction    3.1
This chapter presents research into the implementation of information security 
policies in higher education institutions in Oman. There are more than thirty of 
these universities and colleges in Oman. The study is based on an exploratory 
approach using a semi-structured qualitative interview method with IT staff and 
system administrators in four different Omani higher education institutions. Data 
were collected, recorded, transcribed and subsequently analysed to explore IT 
staff’s perceptions of end users’ behaviour, compliance with organisational 
information security policies, behaviours they believe are important, recent threats 
and recommendations to improve information security policy compliance. 
Figure  3.1 shows the chapter structure and overview.  
 
Figure  3.1: The chapter structure and overview 
Organisations throughout the world face threats to the security of their information. 
These threats may arise from employees who, for whatever reason, do not comply 
with some or all of an organisation’s ISP (see literature review for factors affecting 
employees’ security behaviour). Users can find the security policy inconvenient, 
time consuming and generally a hindrance to getting on with what they want to use 
a system for (Chipperfield & Furnell, 2010) and so may not comply with it.  
To ensure that employees can behave appropriately we must understand the threats 
that IT has to defend against, if policies exist and, moreover, if they are complied 
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with. To this end, interviews were carried out with eight IT staff and system 
administrators in four higher education institutions in Oman to identify threats that 
these staff considered the most prevalent and discuss their understanding of users’ 
behaviours, either positive (promoting security) or negative (breaching policy and 
posing potential problems). The reason for conducting the interviews with IT staff 
and system administrators is because they are the people responsible for making 
decisions regarding information security in their universities and colleges. They are 
responsible for security, troubleshooting any problems, installing and configuring 
new hardware and software, meeting the needs of users and assisting them.  
Albrechtsen (2007) recommends the interview method in research to build an 
understanding of users’ experiences in relation to information security. In the 
current study, the interviews with IT staff aim to elicit what issues are faced by the 
organisation rather than why users behave insecurely.  
 Methodology 3.2
After ethical approval was received from the university, participants were 
approached to take part in the study. First the study was described to all 
participants via the Participant Information Sheet (see Appendix A). This covers 
the purpose of the study, how confidentiality was ensured and the right to withdraw 
from the study at any time. It is important to ensure that participants feel that the 
information they reveal will not be used against them (Myers & Newman, 2007).  
3.2.1 Interview questions 
The semi-structured interview questions were designed to explore users’ behaviour, 
which may contribute to information security threats and breaches, ISP compliance 
with and recommendations relating to information security in an organisation. In 
addition, the questions explored any recent security issues, the consequences of 
those issues and how concerned staff were about these issues. The initial questions 
are listed below:  
a) What online security problems do you believe are caused by the behaviour 
of staff and students? 
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b) What external threats do IT staff defend the university network from? 
(What is the most frequent type of attack on the system and employees?) 
c) Has the university experienced a security issue recently? If so, what do they 
think caused it and what were the consequences of that issue?  
d) What areas of the IT security policy/end user computing policy do the staff 
and the students adhere to? 
e) What parts of the IT security policy/end user computing policy do the staff 
and the students not adhere to? 
f) Do IT staff have concerns about online security which are not covered in 
the current policies? 
The qualitative approach was flexible and understandable and allowed the 
participants to explore the topic in depth. The questions were open-ended to 
encourage participants to speak freely, explore their own experiences, users’ 
behaviour and improvement factors relating to information security. Questions 2 
and 3 could have been combined but it was very difficult in the interviews to 
answer the third question, which is why they are separated. 
3.2.2 Participants and Procedures 
Eight IT staff and system administrators were interviewed using a one-to-one, face-
to-face method. The information security policies of each organisation were 
collected before and during each interview. All the participants had a university 
degree and at least three years’ work experience. These individuals are the persons 
responsible for network and information security in their respective offices or 
colleges and for that reason it was important to obtain detailed information from 
them.  
The interviews were organised at a time convenient for the participants and took 
place in their own offices and meeting rooms at their own organisation. The 
interviews were conducted in English. The interview lasted approximately thirty 
minutes. Data was collected via note taking and voice recordings. The recordings 
were transcribed and a thematic analysis of the data completed. As shown in 
Table  3.1, five participants were from universities and three from colleges. 
43 
 
Table  3.1: Participants from each Organisation 
No  Organisation 
Number of 
Participants 
1 A (Large size, university) 4 
2 B (medium size, university) 1 
3 C (medium size college) 2 
4 D (small size college) 1 
Total 4  8 
 
To ensure that the findings were not idiosyncratic of one organisation participants 
were recruited from different sizes of institution (both colleges and universities) 
and from different geographical locations. Of the eight interviewees, four were 
Omani and the others were originally from other countries. The number of 
interviews depended on the number of employees in the organisation. For example, 
organisation A has the largest number with B the second highest number of 
contributors. At the start, several participants were not happy about recording the 
interview when they responded to the questions; however, after explaining how the 
data would be saved and used, they became relaxed and gave genuine answers. 
 Data analysis  3.3
The interviews were designed to determine the perceptions of IT staff and system 
administrators regarding security threats and their views on the role of employees’ 
security behaviour. The interviews explored the problems that arise when 
employees do not comply with an organisation’s ISP. Furthermore, the interviews 
provided an opportunity for IT staff to recommend any changes they wanted to see 
in security management at their institution. 
Bogdan and Biklen (1992) identified data analysis as the  
Process of systematically searching and arranging the interview transcripts, 
field notes and other materials that you accumulate to increase your own 
understanding of them and to enable you to present what you have 
discovered to others. Analysis involves working with data, organizing them, 
breaking them into manageable unites, synthesizing them, searching for 
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patterns, discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and 
deciding what you will tell others (p.153).  
After collecting the data, analysis began with the transcription of the interviews 
into written form. Thematic analysis was chosen for the analysis of the semi-
structured interview data. Four main themes were identified from data. Based on 
the data, certain themes emerged which are related to internal and external threats 
to organisational security, staff’s adherence to information security policies, and 
recommendations to enhance information security. Through coding and analysing 
the data the themes that emerged are shown in Figure  3.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3.2, four broad themes emerged from the data analysis (1) 
organisation’s information security, (2) types of information security threats, (3) 
employees’ behaviour and compliance and (4) and recommendations. Within the 
major themes, sub themes were identified, such as password policy, not reading an 
email, etc. Subsequently, quotations from the interviews were used to directly 
Exploring information 
security awareness 
3. Employees’ 
behaviour and 
compliance  
2. Types of 
information security 
threats 
1. Information 
security 
organisational 
4. Recommendations 
to improve 
compliance 
Figure  3.2: The four emergent themes 
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clarify each of these main points. The qualitative findings are supported by 
verbatim quotes from the participants.  
 Results  3.4
Technological security is an important issue and employees have access to 
sensitive information. The IT & system administrators from the four higher 
education institutions are described by presenting their work tasks of the 
organisation’s information security. All organisations have a service centre to 
support the systems and other business areas, and furthermore, each one has a 
different name. The findings summarised in Table  3.2, shows the four main themes 
and their associated sub-themes. These themes represent the IT staffs’ views of 
what is going on in their organisation.  
Table  3.2: Summary of themes and sub-themes 
Theme Sub-theme Description 
1. Information 
security process in 
the organisation 
Technology tools 
form a strong 
defence 
IT staff depend on technology to 
secure their network, devices and 
applications. In addition, they have up-
to-date hardware and software.  
ISP and regulation is 
not universal 
Only two organisations have an ISP 
available and these do not cover many 
security issues and are not updated.    
The ISP is 
communicated via 
emails  
All organisations mostly use emails to 
disseminate the ISP to users and to 
communicate with them. 
Access and 
operating privileges’ 
are excessive 
Staff have excessive privileges which 
causes more information security 
problems than are caused by students.  
Because of the culture staff believe 
that they should have higher access 
and operating privileges (e.g. have 
administrator privileges, downloading 
software from internet, disable 
antivirus, etc.)  
2. Types of online 
information security 
threats  
Email phishing, 
spam and viruses 
are the most 
common threats 
Phishing and spam emails are the most 
common particularly if employees 
respond inappropriately such as 
providing usernames and passwords 
46 
 
on request and clicking on links. 
3. Employees’ ISP 
compliance 
behaviour 
Employees’ 
behaviour is 
perceived to be 
problematic  
The biggest threat to organisations’ 
information security were employees’ 
behaviours such as opening and 
downloading internet files and 
attachments that contain viruses.    
Compliance with ISP 
is perceived to be 
low 
According to IT staff very few 
employees comply with the ISP 
because of a lack of knowledge and 
experience. 
Non-compliance 
with ISP is common 
Most employees do not comply with 
the Organisational ISP because of a 
lack of awareness and factors related 
to organisational culture. 
4. Recommendations 
to improve 
compliance 
The ISP should be 
readily available  
ISP should be available, up-to-date and 
cover all relevant security issues. 
Communication to 
raise awareness   
An organisation should use alternative 
ways to raise employees’ information 
security awareness such as e-learning, 
videos, text mobile, face to face 
meeting etc.     
Join the domain and 
limit the employees’ 
privileges 
Minimise employees’ privileges and 
force them to join the domain network 
by strict policy and management 
support. 
Awareness and 
training 
Ongoing awareness sessions, 
workshop and training to all 
employees.  
Sanctions and 
benefit  
All users should know the benefits and 
consequences of following/not 
following the organisation’s ISP. 
 
3.4.1 IT staff and system administrators’ views on their organisational 
information security 
Organisations in the Middle East increase their security technology by using the 
latest software and hardware (Aloul, 2010). In the current study the semi-structured 
interviews showed that all the organisations involved believed they had adequate 
and up-to-date hardware (e.g., firewalls) and software (e.g. antivirus, firewall) to 
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protect their own information and the organisations’ services. IT staff consider that 
most problems encountered are due to users causing breaches in the security of 
their organisation which IT staff believe is because of carelessness and being 
uninformed, and a lack of strict punishments. IT staff either did not have (because 
such statistics are not maintained by the organisation) or were not willing to 
divulge (for reasons of organisational confidentiality or concerns over reputational 
damage — see section  3.4.2 below) specific numbers of security incidents whether 
caused by employees or system problems. Therefore, it was only possible to use the 
evidence reported by the IT staff. 
In the interviews, the majority of the participants said that there was good hardware 
and software in their organisations and they depend on technology to secure their 
network and devices and applications. Most organisations are using firewalls, 
antivirus software, and operating system patches and actively block ports which are 
not used in the network. According to one participant: 
We [system administrators] are just going to make some policies even staff 
connect using the firewall and no one can access our server before they pass 
our security policies. And for that policy we make them update antivirus. 
They will update with security patches when they are applicable and 
accepted. After that they will connect to our network. Before this they are not 
allowed to get connected to our network or get any IP from that one [P7]. 
All organisations depend on their mail server to filter incoming and outgoing 
emails to protect the network from viruses:   
We [organisation] have a mail server which is very good software that can 
protect our environment and our emails. It can filter the malicious software 
and it can scan all the emails going and coming and if some of staff have 
spam on their PC it can block him[employee] [P6]. 
3.4.1.1 Information security policy and regulation  
In most organisations there are two types of information security policy: one for 
networks and computers and a user policy supplied by system administrators and 
IT staff. Firstly, computer policies are set up by system administrators on the 
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network and operating systems that allow users privileges to perform certain tasks 
on computers and access university information and devices such as printers, 
scanners, emails and websites. User information security policies (regulations and 
rules of the organisation which all staff and students are required to comply with) 
were discussed by participant 3:        
First of all, we have two types of policies, computer policy and users’ policy. 
The computer policy (implemented at the system level by system 
administrator) which applies on the computer system itself the operating 
system and applications and things like the user cannot control it so 
everything control by us [P3].  
However, not all organisations have an information security policy. The interviews 
identified that two organisations in the sample have a documented information 
security policy ISP which is available on the website, as one participant said: 
They [end users] can read also the policy in the website [P1]. 
Two organisations do not have a formal documented ISP but all organisations send 
emails to all users to inform them what to do and not to do with regards to 
information security. One organisation presents small policy notes when users log 
in to the organisation networks. These emails and notes tell users what is expected 
of them. Another participant mentioned that users are presented with very small 
sets of guidelines or policies when they log in to the organisation’s network: 
We [the organisation] haven’t policy documented but we have some small 
notes when you switch on the computer you find small notes that guide you 
about what is computer and what password and what network is [P8].  
It is unclear which is the best approach: leaving a document on a website for users 
to view or actively sharing specific pieces of information. But clearly there are 
differences in practice that warrant further investigation.  
Unfortunately, policies are often not updated for long periods of time. For example, 
participant 5 said: 
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It [policy] should be updated because here long time I mean it is the same 
policies [P5]. 
In addition, the information security policy is not complete and not understandable 
to the users in the organisation as one of the participants says:  
Mobile services and wireless network access — these have not yet been 
implemented and the policy of those services which I mentioned are still an 
ongoing implementation and right now it is still in the development stage 
[P2]. 
3.4.1.1.1 Email communication of policy:  
The four organisations send email rules and regulations to all their users and that 
was the most frequent method to disseminate an organisation’s policy. For example, 
participant 1 said:  
We [system administrators] have email policy, always sending them [end 
users] the policy of the email so they can read, they aware of what they must 
do when using email account for the college [P1].  
In addition, if there are any problems or threats such as spam email in the network 
they use email alerts:     
We [system administrators] always send email to the whole users in 
university academic, staff and students to make them aware of these kind of 
security threat [P6]. 
Most participants (n=7) thought that despite their efforts their employees are not 
aware of information security policies and therefore don’t follow them which could 
result in security breaches. One participant said: 
We network [administrators] are asking them [users] to follow the email 
policy most of them are not aware of those policy which results as I have 
mentioned earlier, in a security breach in our system [P2]. 
Even when an organisation has an ISP clearly located on its website, IT staff 
perceive that employees are not necessarily reading it. 
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From the site [website of the organisation] most of the staff they are not 
going and reading all these [ISP] [P5]. 
The findings suggest that IT staff believe that it is very important for information 
security policies to be accessible, documented and updated and their absence or 
poor quality could impact negatively on the organisations’ information security. 
However, they also note that staff are not reading them. 
3.4.1.2 Staff have potential to cause more problems than students    
All of the interviewees said employees cause more problems than students because 
they have more privileges when using the organisations’ networks. As one of the 
administrator said: 
Staff have some permission but student don’t have that permission they have 
limited permission to access the computers. Student cannot install software 
from the internet but staff can install but they are not aware about what is the 
purpose or they only use Microsoft then it will create problem because which 
staff give him some permission to install software that will create problem 
[P7]. 
This was confirmed by another participant from a different organisation: 
Actually students’ accounts have very limited access to computer [P8]. 
The culture in higher education institutions in Oman allows employees to have full 
control of their computers. The participants’ comments above suggest that 
information security management staff do not have the power to force their 
employees to comply with their information security policy. For example, 
employees can disable antivirus software which is installed in the organisation’s 
computers and install programs downloaded from the internet. The employees 
believe that this is one of their rights. As one participant said: 
The most problems we [system administrators] are facing with staff is that 
they are prevented from joining the domain so this join to domain which is 
the main problem facing with the staff and without join the domain they will 
use the administrator so they have full control which they can install any 
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software which cause many viruses like third party software. ... They 
[academic staff] said I do not want work as limitation I want full control of 
my PC [P5]. 
This problem seemed especially true of those who have a higher position in the 
organisation: 
Some academic staff according to their position they push IT staff to open 
computer in administrator account to download some programs from 
Internet in that case the IT under the pressure of this academic staff he can 
open the computer in administrator password by his account or he change 
his account academic staff to administrator…. Sometimes like high position 
people push IT staff to give him administrator [P8].  
3.4.2 Types of online information security threats  
Interview question: What online security problems do you believe are caused by 
staff and students?  
Wiant (2005) points out that most companies fear bad publicity and don’t talk 
about incidents that occur as a result of security breaches. Most of the surveyed 
literature reports finding difficulty in obtaining logs of security incidents from their 
participants and many incidents are underreported or undetected. Organisations 
might be afraid about loss of reputation if the media discover and then report an 
incident. 
Most of the IT staff and system administrators believed that users are not aware of 
or do not care about security when they are using the internet in their organisation. 
The interview analysis shows that the majority of participants agreed that email 
phishing, spam and viruses are the biggest external threats particularly if employees 
respond inappropriately. In addition, breaches occur when the employees reply to 
spam or download attached files. Sometimes attackers use different methods such 
as spam advertisements as one participant notes: 
We [IT staff and system administrators] are facing many problems as normal 
spams, phishing emails like general attack from outside ... most of them are 
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phishing that we are system administrator and we need your account and 
sometimes like this or sometimes from a company and we are winning 
hundred million Omani Rials and like this [P8]. 
Another participant from a different organisation added:  
Online security problems we have actually encountered here - some malware 
attacks, and some phishing, also the problem of the email spambot which is 
external senders that send too many messages in our servers [P1]. 
Some participants shared the story of an attacker who has a valid username and 
password from an organisation, and what the consequences are, for instance, 
blocking an organisation’s domain to other websites. As one of the participants, in 
a remark about phishing emails, said:  
Say we need your password because we are doing maintenance some staff 
actually send their information without knowing those emails are not coming 
from the college, it comes from outside [P2]. 
And he mentioned the consequences that when hackers use usernames and 
passwords to access other servers then the domain of the university gets blocked: 
Sometime we [organisation domain] are been blocked from outside or from 
like the main email provider such as like Google or Yahoo sometimes they 
would block our mail servers and those accounts sends spam again to others 
that’s why we are been blocked [P2]. 
Another participant stated: 
So then the hackers use these username and password to send huge of emails 
and this cause us problem like we are going to blacklist so our domain will 
be in blacklist in most of organisation [P5]. 
Another consequence is that attackers can use a username and password given by 
employees through replying to phishing emails and as a result, get access to the 
organisation’s information system resources to steal data. One participant said: 
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A small hacker or a hack with a bit knowledge can get username and 
password and login remotely in somehow pretending that he is in the 
university and then use that person credentials and then access all the local 
information [P3]. 
Spreading viruses in the organisation (via USB sticks, CDs and opening attached 
files) was also perceived to be a direct result of staff behaviour. Viruses tend to 
spread through organisations’ networks through employees downloading files from 
the internet, attaching their own laptops to the network, or inserting USB memory 
sticks and disk drives or CDs as all of these can carry viruses: 
Sometime this virus attack that most came from USB some time they bring 
CD drive [P7]. 
In addition, employees tend not to scan their USB devices when using them in the 
organisation: 
Flash memory also we [system administrators] are facing some of the 
problems because they [employees] are using flash memory without scanning 
[P5]. 
Employees are using external email services and opening attached files which gives 
viruses access to the organisation. One participant said:  
Some of the staff is using Hotmail or Gmail which is not hosted in our 
environment they open attachments and this kind of things which have 
viruses [P6]. 
Regarding problems associated with installing software on their computers one 
participant said: 
The staff is not aware when they are install [software programs from the 
internet] in their computers so there is some program install in their PC it 
has phishing software [P2].  
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3.4.3 Employees’ ISP compliance behaviour 
The interview findings showed that IT staff perceive that employees comply with 
some areas of information security and not with others, but the majority of 
interviewees agreed that their employees do not comply with the ISP. The 
administrators believe that users’ behaviours cause many of the problems they face, 
including being blocked from email servers and viruses. 
The majority of participants (n=6) believe that most of their employees are not 
aware of the organisation’s information security policy and, hence, are also not 
aware of the consequences of their organisation’s policy.  
However, the picture is not uniform; two administrators mentioned that their 
employees follow certain parts of the organisation’s specific ISP. As one 
participant said: 
They [employees] are following some of the policies we apply [P4]. 
For specific rules some employees could comply with ISP when they want to get 
new equipment or move system from one area to another they follow the procedure 
of the organisation as one participant says: 
Most of employees here once they want a new system for example they follow 
the right procedure, they ask our director then he will forward it to the 
responsible department [P4]. 
IT staff believe that the employees’ security knowledge affects their compliance 
level and that those employees who have an IT background or knowledge of 
viruses would check emails and delete them:  
Sometimes some employees have experience and know this virus different 
information level they have because some of them have already IT 
background and they know this is viruses and must delete it [P8].  
The participants stated that their employees do not comply with their ISP for 
different security behaviours such as physical security and password usage. In 
addition, they felt that most employees do not act responsibly when they have more 
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privileges for operating the antivirus system on their computer and installing 
software. With respect to physical security, sometimes employees leave the doors 
to their offices and their computers unlocked when they are not there. One 
participant said: 
Plus, leaving the door office open which allow physical access to the 
computer… there is computer sometime they do not lock their computers 
[P3]. 
3.4.3.1 Password policy 
Participants reported that most users in the organisation do not follow the password 
policies relating to a strong password, for example: 
I am very sorry to say that regarding to the password policy they [students 
and employees] are not really following what organisation recommended as 
they have to use strong password [P6] 
Additionally, they reported that employees write passwords on paper and save it on 
their computer, especially non-academic employees who come from the public 
sector as one participant says: 
Most of the student or staff exactly I mean those who are old age coming 
from public sector [non-academic] they are writing the password in the 
papers [P5]. 
The system administrators perceive that their employees often experience problems 
with passwords and do not comply with password information security. With 
regards to the changing of passwords, when employees were requested to change 
their password they often just changed one character. For example, the password 
“W3man123” gets changed to “W3man125”: 
The changing of password, the password has period of time they need to 
change and whenever they change they always use similar password they just 
a letter or number and unfortunately using like obvious password [P3]. 
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System administrators also noted that employees share passwords with other 
employees. Sharing usernames and passwords is not allowed by information 
security policies but unfortunately some academic staff share their IDs and 
passwords with their colleagues. As one system administrator points out: 
We [IT staff and system administrators] have been announcing always [by 
email] telling them [users] please do not share your password please keep 
changing your password and these kind of things but unfortunately they are 
not following this policy [P6]. 
3.4.3.2 Privileges for employees 
Participants were concerned that employees were not taking responsibility for 
information security when they had increased security privileges. For example, 
they cited employees disabling antivirus software on their workstations and 
installing software downloaded from the internet as particular problematic 
behaviours. Staff were known to disable antivirus software to improve their 
computer speed. 
IT staff and system administrators believe that this undesirable behaviour was 
because the employees are not aware of information security that they do not see 
security as being their responsibility, and they believe that applications such as 
antivirus software slow down their computers. One interviewee summarised the 
problem thus:  
Staff complaining that their system is very slow, and this is because their 
system is compromised with virus, so what they did or what they are doing 
they are disabling their antivirus that are been installed in their 
computers…I [staff] will disable the antivirus to make my system work faster 
[P1].  
In other words, maintaining productivity was proposed as one reason for insecure 
behaviour. 
Another problem facing system administrators was that staff would download 
software directly from the internet without asking for permission from the IT staff 
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and without running virus scans to ensure the software is free from malware. In 
addition, some staff holding senior positions in the organisation ask for 
administrator privileges. As one participant remarked: 
Most of them [academic staff] say that they need that software urgently for 
teaching like this we need software to download from internet but maybe this 
software is free and it is open source software but he didn’t download before 
and check it by make scan by antivirus he need download direct from inside 
direct to his computer and he push technician to do that job and sometimes 
he said I am in hurry and no have time he make many problems to open his 
computer in administrator and he feel that if he is in higher position so he 
must have full facility full access to the network [P8]. 
Interviewees claimed that some employees open emails which have a virus 
attached even though IT staff send emails to all users in their organisation warning 
them not to open particular spam emails. One participant said: 
Sometime when we found this spam before it becomes an employee issue, I 
made general email to all university that is one email coming from company 
or from this source please when you found this email direct delete it without 
open that. Sometimes some employee opens and he is attacked by virus [P8].  
Of course, such warning emails are often sent after the phishing emails have 
already been received so IT staff are too late in responding for some users. 
Several of the administrators commented that most employees do not even check 
the source of emails. While this is not a reliable method for avoiding trouble, not 
checking it at all is problematic. Some emails could have attached files containing 
viruses. Some (written by hackers) could pretend to come from system 
administrators in their organisation and ask for a username and password. 
Unfortunately, employees open these emails and supply the requested information 
or download the attached file which has viruses: 
Unfortunately, they [employees] are not reading the email they receive an 
email they [hackers] ask for username and password and directly they give 
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the username and password so later on this hacker will use this username 
and password and they are using emails we are facing a lot of these [P5]. 
One interviewee mentioned that users do not check emails that they receive even if 
this is explicitly required by their organisation’s policy. As one interviewee noted:    
A lot of people when they receive phishing email when they asking for 
username and password they are kind of personal information they do fill the 
form or they click on the link and they go to those and that is why a lot of 
problems we are facing [P3]. 
3.4.4 Recommendations to improve compliance 
Participants recommended that management should enhance information security 
and try to increase information security awareness in order to improve ISP 
compliance. In addition, they mentioned important factors which could change 
employees’ behaviour regarding compliance with information security policy.  
3.4.4.1 Information security policies and regulations 
All participants confirmed that information security policies are very important for 
their organisation. They believe that policies should cover all areas, be up-to-date, 
easy to understand and available on the organisation’s website. One participant 
commented: 
The policy should be improved every year up-to-date because the IT 
improvement every day and IT change every day [P5]. 
Another advised that the information security policy should be on the 
organisation’s website: 
Policy must be clear for student for staff for everybody in website [P8]. 
In addition, system administrators believed that an organisation’s regulations 
should be known and strictly enforced. For example, all employees should sign an 
information security agreement that he/she is responsible for their behaviour 
regarding security issues and moreover, that there will be appropriate action taken 
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against those who disobey the regulations, legislation and/or organisation’s 
information security policy. 
With regards to changing passwords from time to time, one participant says: 
I think it should be forced by the administrators – to have to change their 
[users] password periodically which means every three months every six 
months I think we should follow this policy [P6].  
While users may make minor changes (e.g. one letter change) to get around this, 
the system could be designed to force more significant change. Of course, recent 
advice from the UK government’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC, 2015) 
recommends not requiring regular changes to passwords at all but, instead, 
choosing a memorable but very strong password and keeping it. 
3.4.4.2 Communication to raise awareness   
When the information security policy is written and in place in an organisation, 
participants felt that communication and sharing of knowledge between IT staff 
and all users in the organisation should occur. Organisations have many ways to 
disseminate the ISP and to raise awareness of it but they would be more effective 
for all users when there is effective communication:  
I think increasing awareness and these by emails like posters visiting 
[employees in] the colleges for awareness policies... I think is changing the 
way I mean like visiting these colleges and meeting staff and increase the 
awareness just to show to everyone [P5]. 
3.4.4.3 Minimise employees’ privileges and ensure they all join the domain 
network 
Most organisations implement different privileges related to different employee 
roles and responsibilities. For instance, the results show that each organisation has 
assigned IT staff and system administrators to have direct responsibility for the 
organisation’s overall information security and were required to maintain security 
policies, install and configure new hardware and software, add and remove system 
users, set up initial passwords, provide education and training to the end users, and 
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so forth. On the other hand, system administrators would prefer if end users were 
not be able to make system changes and did not have administrator privileges.  
One participant stated that it would be easy for him and his team to control and 
monitor employees’ computers and the network when they are in the domain: 
The computers were in domain it is easy for us it is centralized and easy for 
us to adapt to push any breaches, any update and control them and to 
monitor if there is any kind of weird or strange behaviour in those computers 
so at least really we can monitor what is happening [P3]. 
In addition, the same participant suggested that information security management 
should be centralised when all employees join the organisation domain which 
would help them to apply the proper policy:  
 We can apply for proper policy because once all the computers on the 
domain applying policies for those in the domain is easy to apply any other 
systems and control it centralised and everything through this kind of things 
[P3]. 
The most important finding was with regards to user privileges; in all four of the 
organisations involved, some employees insist on having full control of their own 
machines to enable them to download and install files from the internet, disable the 
antivirus, etc. System administrators believe that the ISP should restrict user 
privileges: 
If they [employees] are not joining to the domain, they should have the 
administrator but we are trying now to join most of them to the domain PCs. 
It is easy for us to make policies to reduce these viruses and spam [P5]. 
All four organisations complained about employees’ access privileges stating that 
most of them can get workgroup administrator privileges which allow them to 
install programs from the internet and run it on their work computer: 
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These staff’s computers are not connected with our domain they are working 
in a workgroup so sometimes they are able to remove the antivirus on their 
computes [P7]. 
3.4.4.4 Training and awareness  
All eight participants believed that the best way to reduce the number of security 
incidents is for their organisation to provide regular awareness and information 
sessions for their employees.  
We [system administrators] can minimise the threats which we have by 
giving them awareness and giving them [employees] sessions the right way… 
So my recommendations first of all to increase the awareness sessions for 
students and staffs and introduce them to the new technologies and services 
that centre providing for the university to minimise the threat of viruses and 
things like that [P3]. 
For my recommendation there should be awareness for staff and students so 
regular symposiums regular workshop for staff and students to be able for 
them to know or realised the important of those policy with proper training to 
them proper information to be able to see the importance of implementing 
those policy [P2]. 
Once we get our staff and students educated in IT. I mean we got some pain 
of headache getting this problem in our environment [P6]. 
Two participants indicated that employees will change their information security 
behaviour for the better when an organisation puts awareness programmes in place. 
When one participant was asked whether staff lock their office door and PC when 
they leave their office he answered:  
Majority now yeah, previously was not because since we started the 
awareness the improvement we can see the trend [P3]. 
While ISP awareness is not necessarily sufficient to increase compliance, it is 
nevertheless, one of the ways that IT staff felt would increase compliance. 
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3.4.4.5 ISP compliance: sanctions, benefits and responsibility  
One participant suggested that employees could be influenced to follow the ISP if 
they knew the benefits of policy compliance, and there should be sanctions for non-
compliance: 
When he [new employee] joins the organisation it must be in clear place for 
users to read security policy and regulations and know what are the benefits 
and the punishments if they did not follow this [P8].  
He mentioned that employees feel that information security is not their 
responsibility and they do what they want because they know that IT staff will fix 
their security problems when they occur.   
Others [employees] are not aware because they know that IT will replace his 
computer [P8]. 
  Summary of IT staff and system administrators’ views on 3.5
information security  
The results showed that higher education institutions have numerous technological 
practices available to protect the IT infrastructure. The organisations use security 
technology such as firewalls, antivirus, security patches, etc. The IT staff at the 
four organisations stated that information security is a very important issue for 
them and their organisations. This study indicated that IT staff believe that the 
major reasons for information security breaches were not to do with technology as 
all the organisations involved had up-to-date hardware and software. Rather, the 
study revealed that the IT staff and system administrators were mostly concerned 
with information security threats related to employee behaviour. Six out of the 
eight participants believed that most employees do not follow their organisation’s 
ISP. They offered a number of recommendations for a better information security 
environment.  
Participants believed that users should be provided with well-written ISPs, training, 
regular communication and awareness because these, they felt, play a very 
significant role in the process of enhancing information security behaviour in the 
organisation.  
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There was concern that the organisations suffered from a lack of user awareness of 
information security which was linked to poor information security behaviour. The 
participants admitted this because there is no ongoing and proper training, 
campaigning, strong communication or sanctions system regarding information 
security in their organisations. Participants from two organisations stated that they 
are giving awareness sessions for students and employees and they were improved 
but that was not continuing because of management. Yet very few universities are 
known to offer IT security awareness sessions to students and staff (Rezgui & 
Marks, 2008). 
In general, the findings have shown that email and website phishing, spam, viruses 
and denial of service were perceived as the most substantial threats to information 
systems. Interviewees believed that employees were not familiar with external 
threats and they were not aware of the consequences of security breaches which 
affect their organisation. In contrast, the findings indicate that employees with IT 
background and knowledge avoided these external threats.  
IT staff perceived employee mistakes, such as responding to spam or phishing 
emails to be particularly problematic. The interviews indicate that how employees 
behave in terms of in information security depends on their knowledge, background 
and experience of using computers. According to the participants, employees were 
replying to phishing emails and had bad password practices and this result agrees 
with the  results of a study of employees at the Zaid University in UAE (Marks & 
Rezgui, 2009). Participants across the four organisations stated that their employees 
did not follow basic information security practices such as not writing or sharing 
and changing their passwords. This is particularly problematic for organisations, as 
Safa, Von Solms, and Furnell (2016) point out "hackers target people, rather than 
computers, in order to create a breach”. They point to poor password, email and 
download behaviours as particularly problematic to organisations.  
Moreover, employees in all the organisations surveyed have different qualifications, 
with some of them having academic experience and others not. In addition, some of 
them have lengthy experience of dealing with computers, whereas others do not. 
Furthermore, organisational cultures, job positions, different nationalities and staff 
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joining from different organisations were judged by participants to play a 
significant role in employees’ information security behaviour.    
All the IT staff and system administrators interviewed believe that users should 
only have limited privileges to access their organisation’s software and hardware 
but the interview findings showed that all the organisations have provided most of 
their employees full control of their workplace computers and that this has caused 
many problems for the organisation. For example, employees download and install 
files from the internet which have viruses and they also disable the antivirus in their 
computers because they think it will make their computers faster. Eining and 
Christensen (1991) found that participants believed a person’s behavioural 
intentions would be influenced significantly by knowledge of the consequences. 
Similarly, the current interviewee suggests that bad behaviours result from a lack of 
knowledge about the consequences for their computers and the organisation.     
However, Wiant (2005) investigated whether the presence of an official 
information security policy impacted the number of security incidents and found 
that the presence of a written policy did not reduce the number of computer abuse 
incidents. Universities today need to find other ways to improve behaviour.  
Relying on end users to read the policies is less effective (Rezgui & Marks, 2008). 
Moreover, participants believed that organisations should provide ongoing 
education and training for employees to increase awareness. Overall, these results 
indicate that IT staff believed that employees do not feel that they are responsible 
for information security issues, as most participants stated that employees are not 
aware of information security and they believe that if anything happens to the 
organisation that only IT staff are to blame, despite the employees in the education 
sector revealing information that should not be disclosed to an unauthorised person 
and making their machines vulnerable to malicious code by opening attachments. 
Finally, all participants recommended ways to build successful information security 
management and improve employees’ ISP compliance. They suggested that 
organisations should have an up-to-date ISP which is available for everyone to see. 
Training should be provided to explain the ISP to employees and avoid the problem 
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of staff not reading the ISP. Furthermore, information security management should 
build good communication with their employees to share knowledge regarding 
information security to protect them from threats and meet with them face to face 
to introduce them about organisational information security policy. In addition, 
information security management should minimise the privileges of employees and 
force them to join a domain network that would help them to have good control 
over the security of the networking environment.  
 Summary  3.6
This chapter presented an overall discussion of information security problems, 
challenges and solutions perceived by IT staff in four higher education institutions 
in Oman. The findings indicated participants’ experiences with their organisations’ 
information security threats, incidents, consequences and their perceptions of 
employees’ information security behaviour in general, and specifically information 
security policies.  
The investigation established that the results from this study matched findings from 
previous studies by confirming that human behaviour is perceived to be a frequent 
cause of information security breaches. IT staff discussed a number of non-
compliant behaviours and ways in which users justify these behaviours. Therefore, 
the next step is to investigate these behaviours and explore factors that influence 
employee compliance with organisational information security policies.  
IT staff and system administrators recommended that the organisations should 
establish clear, strict rules in an up-to-date ISP, and provide regular workshop 
training for employees. There are a number of important changes which need to be 
made in organisations’ policies and strategies for information security and user 
behaviour. Moreover, more all organisations should undertake regular training and 
make proper information security available to all users. None of the institutions 
participating in this research offered information security training or awareness 
campaigning despite all participants identifying the importance of having employee 
awareness programmes.  IT staff also expressed a belief that enforcing sanctions 
for non-compliance would make a difference, however, Aurigemma and Mattson 
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(2017) point out that employees’ perceptions of the usefulness of sanctions is 
dependent on their previous experience with sanctions.  
It was not possible to get concrete data about the extent of security incidents in the 
organisations involved. Some organisations did not keep such records and others 
were not willing to divulge such information. However, the IT staff and system 
administrators interviewed were responsible for their organisations’ information 
security and were sharing their views and impressions based upon their experience 
of what happens in their organisations. Clearly, administrators believe employees 
are responsible for most security problems in their organisations. To explore the 
validity of these beliefs the next chapter presents a questionnaire survey that was 
distributed to a number of different education institutions in Oman to investigate 
the behavioural intentions regarding 14 different security behaviours extracted 
from ISPs. The survey also investigates what factors staff believe influence those 
intentions, in a range of information security scenarios. The results are then 
compared to the interview findings to see whether the IT staff and system 
administrators’ perceptions were accurate.  
67 
 
Chapter 4: UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEES SECURITY 
BEHAVIOUR INTENTIONS  
 Introduction 4.1
Previous studies (e.g., Bulgurcu et al. (2010)) have treated ISP compliance as a 
single behaviour, when in fact an ISP incorporates many different behaviours. This 
study examined employee intention to comply with ISPs in the Omani higher 
education sector. The aim of this study was to measure employees’ security and 
policy compliance intentions for each behaviour and likely. Online behavioural 
scenario questionnaires were used to identify factors that affect employees’ 
intentions regarding information security policies. 
The literature review has shown that both direct and indirect questions have been 
used previously. A drawback of using direct questioning (‘what would you do in 
this situation?’) is that participants are likely to give the answer they think the 
researcher is looking for rather than indicating their actual intentions. The literature 
suggests that giving participants indirect questions in which they advise a third 
party on what they should do leads to answers which more reliably reflect what the 
participant would, in fact, intend to do in that situation (Trevino, 1992).   
Each of the 14 scenarios used in this study provided four possible behaviours from 
which participants were required to choose which they thought the person in the 
scenario description should do. The scenarios and their four possible behavioural 
responses were designed to present participants with genuine situations in order to 
measure how they would intend to behave in the situations. Although only one of 
the responses for each scenario was policy-compliant (i.e., derived from the actual 
ISPs) the others were all plausible behaviours (some of which had been identified 
as being carried out by employees during the IT staff interviews discussed in 
Chapter 3). 
It is worth mentioning that only a few studies employing scenario questions to 
measure employees’ reactions have been conducted on information security in the 
workplace and do not utilise plausible answers as distractors. The questions and 
answers were drawn from the literature review, the interviews with IT staff and 
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system administrators in different educational sectors in Oman, and most scenario 
behaviour questions were drawn from the information security policies of several 
Omani academic organisations. The fourteen scenario questions were designed to 
test employees’ awareness and knowledge of their security behaviour. 
This chapter explores behaviour from three angles: demographics, scenario 
questions and social factors, as shown in Figure  4.1. 
 
Figure  4.1: Structure of Chapter 4 
The first identifies the relationship between demographics and compliance intention, 
identifying if any difference in compliance is related to demographic differences. 
The second identifies the behaviours that employees chose in response to security 
scenarios. The third section explores the factors that participants believed influenced 
their decisions about how the fictional characters in the scenarios ought to behave. 
 These factors have been drawn from a number of theories of behaviour. Protection 
Motivation Theory is particularly relevant to Information Security as it is based on 
assessing threats, in this case cybersecurity threats, and people’s ability to cope with 
the threat, i.e. are there responses, that people have the skills to employ, which will 
effectively remove the threat. In addition to this assessment of threat and ability to 
cope, they must also have knowledge of the expected behaviour (KAB models). In 
addition, the Theory of planned behaviour brings in the idea of social norms and that 
people are influenced by how others around them behave (both peers and influential 
others such as managers). This approach to behaviour is also recognised in Social 
Learning Theory which is frequently used in crime studies (Akers 2017). Lastly, it is 
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important to note that behaviour is influenced by rewards (positive reinforcement to 
encourage a behaviour) and sanctions (negative reinforcement to reduce a behaviour) 
(Skinner 2014). These factors will be utilised in Chapter 4 to explore which ones 
employees perceive to influence their behaviour.  
 Methodology  4.2
The questionnaire was based on knowledge gaps highlighted by the literature 
review and the results of the interviews conducted in Chapter 3. The survey, which 
was designed to explore employees’ information security compliance intentions in 
general and to identify specific information security issues around what employees 
consider to be appropriate behaviour in the light of their organisation’s information 
security policy, was disseminated to several universities and colleges in Oman. In 
addition, the survey was used to explore what factors impact employee information 
security behaviour intentions both positively and negatively.  
4.2.1 Questionnaire design and analysis  
The questionnaire was administered online using the Qualtrics survey platform (see 
Appendix D). The questions were based on a review of the literature on 
psychological theories which have been applied to security behaviours, colleges’ 
information security policies, psychological theories and analysis of the interviews 
conducted in the first study (Chapter 3). The survey comprised two parts: 
1. The first section dealt with general questions (demographic) such as name of 
organisation, job title (optional) academic/non-academic job role, nationality, 
gender, age group, employment period (years), qualifications, admin 
privileges, availability of ISP (and, if yes does he/she claim to understand the 
ISP). 
2. The second part comprised 14 indirect scenario questions. Each scenario 
contains three plausible but incorrect answers and one policy compliant 
answer, and rating scales for 8 different behavioural influencers. 
a) Each scenario has four behaviour options and participants were 
required to select the one option that they believed to be correct. The 
14 scenario questions focus on five main security issues:  backup, 
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password management, physical security, phishing and virus threats, 
data leakage, work environment and privileges. The 56 security 
behaviour options (14 scenarios  4 options) were based on the 
literature review, information security policies and the results of the 
interviews with the IT staff and system administrators (Chapter 3). In 
addition, the scenario questions were designed to measure five 
influence factors: trust, authority, productivity, responsibility and 
curiosity.  
b) In each scenario, participants were asked to rate their beliefs about 
influencing factors across the different scenarios. In this part, 
participants’ perceptions of influencing factors, knowledge, response 
efficacy, subjective norms for organisation and/or manager, 
compliance, behavioural intentions, and sanctions and rewards, which 
may influence employees to comply with an organisational ISP were 
measured using a five point Likert scale running from strongly agree 
(=5) to strongly disagree (=1).  
4.2.2 Pilot Study 
An initial version of the questionnaire was designed and piloted with 16 randomly 
selected employees (male and female) from different higher education institutions 
and different nationalities. The participants were between 26 and 65 years of age 
and came from a range of nationalities. After completing the questionnaire, 
participants gave their feedback on face validity (what did participants think each 
question was trying to achieve, and did they make sense) and provided suggestions 
as to how the questions might be made easier to understand. The survey was then 
revised to improve its comprehensibility to participants and correct any spelling 
and grammatical errors. 
4.2.3 Participants and procedures 
The revised questionnaire was then loaded onto the Qualtrics system to allow 
online data collection. Invitations to take part were sent by email to all employees 
in a number of higher education institutions in Oman. The invitations were sent by 
system administrators from the organisations to employees. 898 members of staff 
71 
 
responded, 395 were excluded from this study due to incomplete questionnaires.  
The remaining 503 complete responses were provided by participants from twelve 
universities and colleges across Oman which is 56% of the targeted sample. The 
average time taken to complete the questionnaire was 18 minutes.    
The first set of questions focused on demographic information about the 
respondents, such as the name of their organisation, age, gender and qualifications 
to enable the results to be categorised. Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) was used to collate and analyse the responses. 
 Results 4.3
Fourteen scenario questions were designed to test employees’ security behaviour 
intentions; only one participant out of 503 scored 100% correct answers, as shown 
in Figure  4.2. This figure also illustrates the spread of overall individual 
compliance intentions, i.e., some participants chose the compliant answer more 
than others. In this study, as measured by the number of correct answers, 88 
participants (17%) scored 1-5 (poorly), 290 (58%) scored 6-9 or (average) and 125 
(25%) scored 10-14 (good). The average score was only 7.7, which indicates 
employees provided the correct answer just over 50% of the time. That is, for each 
question, only half the participants gave the policy-compliant correct answer with 
the others choosing one of the three plausible but incorrect answers. Approximately 
half the participants achieved an average score.  
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Figure  4.2: Overall awareness level   
Kruger and Kearney (2006) classified awareness for a region or sector of a business 
in three levels: poor (0-59%), average (60-79%) and good (80-100%). In this data, 
the sector is higher education in Oman. Table  4.1 shows the frequency of correct 
scores achieved by this sector. This table highlights that behaviours should be 
considered individually as the number of employees making policy-compliant 
decisions, in the sector, varies by scenario.  
Table  4.1: Results grouped according to Kruger and Kearney (2006) awareness levels 
% Participants who intend to 
comply with ISP behaviour 
Behaviour scenario 
number  
    Good (80-100)     9, 12, and 13 
    Average (60-79)     4, 10, 11 and 14 
    Low (59 and less)     1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8  
 
In the following sections, the results for each type of behaviour are discussed. The 
following section is divided into three parts. The first looks at employee score by 
demographic characteristics. The second looks at the answers to the 14 scenario 
questions and the third part looks at the ratings for the eight influencing factors 
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(knowledge, response efficacy, subjective norms for organisation and/or manager, 
compliance, behavioural intentions, and sanctions and rewards).    
4.3.1 Survey data analysis demographic details  
Respondents came from twelve universities and colleges; five are combined as 
‘other’ as they consisted of very small numbers of respondents. Table  4.2 presents 
the summary statistics for the responses in numbers and their percentages in 
relation to the demographics. All questions are compulsory except organisation 
name and job title which were optional to provide further anonymity (job titles see 
Appendix B). As can be seen in Table 4.2, the highest number of participants came 
from organisation A (36%). 
Table  4.2: Demographic characteristics of participants  
Demographic/Group No. Responses Total of Responses (%) 
Organisation (University/College) 
A 181 36 
B 90 17.9 
C 87 17.3 
D 68 13.5 
Others 26 5.1 
E 20 4 
F 18 3.6 
G 13 2.6 
Category of staff 
Academic  385 76.5 
Non-Academic 118 23.5 
Staff nationality 
Egypt 7 1.4 
India 222 44.1 
Oman 170 33.8 
Other 33 6.6 
Pakistan 15 3 
Philippines 48 9.5 
United Kingdom 7 1.4 
Gender  
Male 324 64.4 
Female 179 35.6 
Age group  
18-25 years 16 3.2 
26-35 years 172 34.2 
36-45 years 247 49.1 
46-55 years 50 9.9 
56-65 years 18 3.6 
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Employment period (years) 
Less than 1 year 50 9.9 
1-5 years 264 52.5 
6-10 years 125 24.9 
11-15 years 38 7.6 
16-20 years 15 3.0 
21 years or more 11 2.2 
Qualification level 
High school 9 1.8 
Diploma 16 3.2 
Bachelor’s degree 110 21.9 
Master’s degree 263 52.3 
Doctorate 105 20.9 
 
The majority of the respondents (76%) are academic staff, 44% are from India and 
34% from Oman. The majority (64%) are male. Half of the respondents are from 
the 36-45-year-old age group. Moreover, in terms of years working in organisations, 
more than half of the respondents (52%) have worked from 1-5 years. The results 
demonstrate that the majority of the respondents are well-educated as 95% have 
university level education.  
To analyse this information, independent-sample t-tests and one-way ANOVA tests 
were employed to identify if there are significant differences in the mean value in 
the respondents’ security decisions. An independent-samples t-test was conducted 
to identify significant differences in the mean values of the respondents’ 
knowledge of the correct behaviour (the fourteen scenarios scores) in the staff 
category, gender and admin privileges groups, which comprise two different groups. 
Table  4.3 shows the relationship between compliant answers and the demographic 
variables with the results of a series of one-way ANOVA tests (Field, 2009) to 
assess whether demographic characteristics are linked to participants’ security 
behaviour intentions. The effect of ten demographic variables was examined: 
organisation, staff category, country, gender, age group, employment period, 
qualification, admin privileges and the availability and understanding of an ISP. 
Organisation, nationality, gender, age group, employment period, qualification and 
administrative privileges exhibit a significant effect on security decisions. 
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In addition to the significance tests, effect sizes were also estimated. An effect size 
is a way to measure the magnitude of any significant effect (Coe, 2002). According 
to Cohen (1992), effect size values of 0.1 signify small, 0.3 medium and 0.5 large 
effects, respectively. The second test was the ANOVA which was applied to the 
remaining variables from Table  4.3 , (A, C, E, F, G, I and J), which have more than 
two different groups. Table  4.3 confirms that six mean values were significantly 
different: nationality, gender, age, employment period, qualification and 
administrative privileges. 
Table  4.3: Comparisons of participants’ characteristics and correct responses 
Variable Group N Mean p-value 
Effect 
size  
Organisation  
A 181 7.3315 
0.06 - 
B 90 8.4000 
C 87 7.6437 
D 68 7.6765 
Others 26 7.6154 
E 20 8.2500 
F 18 7.6111 
G 13 8.7692 
Category 
Academic 385 7.6805 
0.52  Non-
Academic 
118 7.8559 
Nationality  
Oman 170 7.7824 
.000** - 
India 222 7.3964 
Pakistan 15 8.2667 
Philippines 48 8.5833 
Western 18 9.8889 
Other 30 6.8333 
Gender  
Male 324 7.9568 
0.006** 0.13 
Female 179 7.2961 
Age Group  
18-25 years 16 6.8750 
0.001** - 
26-35 years 172 7.2733 
36-45 years 247 8.0364 
46-55 years 50 7.7800 
56-65 years 18 8.2778 
Employment period (years)  
less than 1 
year 
50 7.2200 
0.000** - 
1-5 years 264 7.4318 
6-10 years 125 8.0400 
11-15 years 38 9.2632 
16-20 years 15 6.8667 
21 years or 
more 
11 9.1818 
76 
 
Qualification level 
No 
university 
25 6.4400 
0.006** - 
Bachelor’s 
degree 
110 7.9818 
Master’s 
degree 
263 7.9240 
Doctorate 105 7.2476 
Admin privileges 
Yes 105 7.0667 
0.008** -0.15 
No 398 7.8945 
Availability of ISP 
Yes 352 7.7955 
0.599 - No 22 7.4091 
I don't know 129 7.5736 
Understanding of ISP 
Strongly 
Agree 
89 7.7865 
0.160 - 
Agree 211 7.9953 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
41 7.1463 
Disagree 8 6.5000 
Strongly 
Disagree 
3 6.3333 
*Note: Degree of significance = *p <0.05 or highly significant = **p<0.01. 
Independent-samples t-tests regarding respondents’ compliance intention answers 
reveal that there is no significant difference between academic and non-academic 
staff. Conversely, significant differences were identified between different gender 
groups and moreover, who has or does not have administrative privileges. 
There was a significant difference between male employees (M=7.96, SD=2.66) 
and female employees (M=7.30, SD=2.41), t (501) =2.75, p<.01; however, the 
effect size (0.13) was extremely small. Furthermore, employees who did not have 
administrative privileges (M=7.89, SD=2.48), were significantly more 
knowledgeable about the ISP than those who have administrative privileges 
(M=7.06, SD=2.85), t (501) =-2.93, although the effect size is very small (-0.15). 
ANOVAs were run for characteristics that have more than two groups. There were 
no significantly different compliance scores for different organisations, and the 
availability and understanding of ISP. Conversely, there are significant differences 
between means for nationality, age, employment period and qualification levels. 
The results indicate that there are significantly different levels of 
awareness/compliance intention (p<.01) between employees from various countries. 
77 
 
The countries with the largest numbers of participants in this survey are India 
(N=222), Oman (170), the Philippines (N=48), Western countries (18), Pakistan 
(N=15) and other (most of the countries in this group had only one participant). 
There is no significant difference between the two largest national groups: Indian 
(M=7.4, SD=2.5) and Omani (M=7.78, SD=2.58). In contrast, there are significant 
differences between Western countries (M= 9.89, SD=2.05) and Indian and Omani 
employees. That is to say, the average score of participants from Western countries 
is higher than the Indian and Omani participants but they are a small group (18).  
With regards to age, five age groups demonstrate a significant difference between 
employees’ awareness scores (p<.01). The result shows that the 56-65 age group 
(N=18) scored significantly higher (M=8.277, SD= 2.585) and the 18-25 group age 
(N=16) scored the worst (M=6.8750, SD= 2.418) but these two groups have the 
lowest number of participants of all the age groups. Regarding the two largest 
groups, the 26-35 group age (N=172) with (M=7.273, SD= 2.595) scored less than 
the 36-45 group age (N=247) with (M=8.036, SD= 2.547).  
The sixth grouping, work experience, demonstrates significant differences in means 
and the overall p-value is zero. When we compare the two largest groups (1–5 
years, N=264 and 6–10 years, N=125) we see a significant difference between their 
performance (1–5 years, M=7.431, SD= 2.528; 6–10 years, M=8.040, SD= 2.553). 
Respondents’ qualification levels show a significant difference (p<0.01). 
Participants with a bachelor’s degree scored significantly higher (M=7.981, SD= 
2.756) than those with doctorates (M=7.247, SD= 2.786) and those with no 
university qualification (M=6.440, SD= 2.599). The finding that those with 
doctorates scored worse is unexpected and difficult to explain. Conducting several 
one-way between-groups ANOVA tests with a range of hypothesised interaction 
variables showed that while there was no significant interaction of qualification on 
age, gender, experience working with the organisation, or privileges, there was an 
interaction effect of qualification with nationality such that the effect on the scores 
of having a higher degree depends on nationality (F (12) =2.44, p=0.004). For 
Omanis, there was a consistent pattern of improvement in scores along with 
increasing qualifications; this was not the case for any other nationality. 
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4.3.1.1 Summary of employees’ demographic information  
The majority of employees (N=290) scored 6-9 from a maximum of 14 correct 
answers, which means their knowledge of good information security behaviour is 
average. The study examines whether or not there are differences in relation to 
employees’ awareness of the correct behaviour regarding information security, 
based on individual demographics. The fourteen scenario outcomes measure the 
difference between the mean scores of employees’ knowledge of ISP-compliant 
behaviour and their demographics. The results show that from ten demographic 
characteristics, six of them demonstrate significant differences: nationality, gender, 
age group, work experience, qualification level and whether they have computer 
administration privileges or not. Further work is needed in the future to investigate 
why these differences exist. 
It is interesting that there was no significant difference for availability of ISP 
suggesting that the presence of an ISP did not influence security 
awareness/compliance intention. In addition, there was no significant difference 
between those who said they understood the ISP and those who did not.  
However, gender did display a significant difference with men scoring higher than 
women. In addition, employees who are older and have acquired more years 
working in an organisation made significantly more policy-compliant choices than 
younger colleagues who have fewer working years. Moreover, employees (N=18) 
from Western countries scored better than Omani and Indian employees. 
Furthermore, the lower an employee’s qualification level, the less likely they are to 
score correct answers (although holders of bachelor’s degrees achieved better 
scores than holders of doctorates). The effect size between two-variable groups 
(category, gender and administrative privileges) with correct answers is extremely 
small.   
4.3.2 Analysis of employees’ compliance intentions   
The scenarios covered several areas of security behaviour from organisations’ 
information security policies based on the major security issues of any information 
system, such as backup, password management, physical security, phishing and 
virus threats, data leakage, work environment and privileges as shown in Figure  4.3.  
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4.3.2.1 Employees’ information security policy compliance 
Figure  4.4 shows that employees do not intend to comply equally with all aspects 
of the ISP. For example, 94% of employees chose the correct answer in scenario 13 
which dealt with incident reporting (missing files), while only 29% correctly 
responded to scenario 3 which dealt with the issue of sharing their password with 
their managers. This suggests that it is inappropriate to talk about policy 
compliance as if it is a single behaviour. 
Scenario 
information 
security issues 
questions 
Password 
Management 
Phishing and 
virus threats 
Backup 
Technical 
security with 
privileges 
Physical 
security 
Figure  4.3: Scenario information security issues questions 
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Figure  4.4: Result of employees' compliance with information security policies  
4.3.2.1.1 Password management  
Table  4.4 illustrates the circumstances in relation to employees sharing their 
passwords with other employees in different positions in their organisations. 
Sharing passwords is a particularly problematic area in this Omani data set and 
achieved the lowest score regarding security awareness, as can be seen from 
answers to scenarios 3, 4 and 6.  
Table  4.4: Sharing password 
Scenario 
No 
Circumstances  Share password 
with 
ISP-compliant 
response 
% 
3 When manager is extremely 
busy and needs to retrieve 
some files from employees’ 
accounts. 
Managers Decline the order 
and remind their 
managers it is not 
allowed. 
29 
6 IT staff want to perform 
some troubleshooting. 
IT Staff Delete the email 
without replying to 
it. 
31 
4 When employees are on a 
day off their co-workers 
need to access an important 
email they have received in 
their email accounts. 
Co-worker Not provide co-
workers with their 
password. 
65 
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In scenario 3, only 29% of employees indicated they would decline their manager’s 
order and remind him/her that password sharing is not allowed, while 71% of them 
would share their password with their managers if they requested it. The findings 
from scenario 6 reveal that only 31% of respondents would delete the email 
without replying to it. In contrast, 54% of employees would send their username 
and password through email if IT staff asked them to. In contrast, scenario 4 shows 
that 35% of employees are willing to share their username and password with their 
co-workers via the phone while they are off work in order to allow co-workers to 
access important emails. This highlights an important message effect, that is, the 
outcome is influenced by who asks employees to share their passwords. While 
happy to say no to co-workers, participants were less willing to refuse a request 
from someone in authority such as managers or IT staff.  
- Creating a new password  
Scenario 2 was about creating a new password and almost half of the respondents 
(49%) had difficulties in remembering new passwords when asked to create a new 
strong password. 
4.3.2.1.2 Phishing and virus threats  
Occasionally, employees receive suspicious emails which purport to come from 
people within their organisation, such as administrators, co-workers, IT staff and/or 
managers (hijacking emails) asking employees about their username and password, 
personal details and/or to click on a link or visit websites. Table  4.5 shows the 
scenarios with the highest number of policy-compliant responses. Scenario 13 has 
the highest correct response rate, revealing that 94% of employees would inform IT 
staff immediately they discover that files are missing or other changes to their 
computers. Most employees will report the incident because it may negatively 
impact their productivity or ability to get on with their work.  
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Table  4.5: Phishing and virus threats  
Scenario No Circumstances ISP-compliant response % 
13 A number of files are missing from 
their computers and several 
changes have occurred. 
Inform IT staff 
immediately. 
94 
9 Opened attachment email which 
unknown source. 
Delete the email 
immediately without 
opening the attachment. 
88 
12 Employees want to use their email 
for their own commercial 
purposes. 
Not use their accounts for 
personal or commercial 
purposes. 
80 
8 Applications windows start to 
move around on employees’ 
computers and several new 
windows suddenly appear. 
Disconnect their computer 
from the network and 
inform IT staff. 
57 
7 Personal details by logging in to a 
specific web link. 
Phone the administrator to 
report the email. 
33 
 
It is interesting to compare scenario 13 and 7 which both require employees to 
report the situation to IT staff. However, in scenario 13, the harm has already been 
realised, and the employee is being reactive, whereas in scenario 7 the employee is 
potentially less sure if they have been phished and the effect is not immediate. 
Consequently, fewer employees are likely to report the incident and be proactive 
(i.e., put in effort to prevent future harm) and assist the administrator. 
One of the highest correct actions is noted in scenario 9, where 88% of employees 
would delete a phishing email they received from an unknown source asking them 
to open an attached file. In scenario 12, a similar number of respondents (80%), 
would not use their work email account for personal or commercial purposes. 
However, 48% employees would verify the source and click on the link if they 
think it is safe. Unfortunately, currently there are many hijacked email accounts 
and it is difficult for an individual to know if the source is reliable and, even if the 
source appears to be legitimate, it could be spoofed. In addition, personal details 
are extremely important; thus, if an unauthorised person obtains them, it may 
possibly result in harm or financial loss to an employee. 
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With regards to identifying employee level soft skill in recognising a computer 
infected with a virus, scenario 8 confirms that more than half of the workers (57%) 
would disconnect from the internet and inform IT staff of the incident. However, 
only 29% of them would make sure that the antivirus is on, which indicates that 
they do not have adequate skills to deal with these types of viruses, and moreover, 
that they rely on the settings of the computer.  
4.3.2.1.3 Technical security with privileges   
Table  4.6 shows how employees’ ISP compliance intentions when they have 
elevated privileges on their workplace PC allowing them, for example, to disable 
antivirus software, or install software from the Internet. 
Table  4.6: Technical security with privileges  
Scenario No Circumstances ISP-compliant 
response 
% 
10 Employees want to disable antivirus 
software in their computers when they 
are very busy because they think it slows 
down their computers. 
Not disable the 
antivirus software. 
67 
11 Employees urgently need to install free 
software that they have downloaded 
from the Internet for work purposes. 
Ask a technician to 
install the software. 
63 
14 When the project is finished employees 
want to delete the files because they no 
longer require them. 
Ask permission from 
all the colleagues they 
work with. 
62 
 
In scenario 10, 67% of respondents said they would not disable their antivirus when 
working on their computer, even when they are busy; however, this leaves the 
institutions vulnerable as a third of employees think that switching off the antivirus 
may speed up their computer, and they may be tempted to do this to improve 
productivity. Similarly, in scenario 11, 63% of employees would ask for permission 
to install software from the internet when there are urgent situations, whereas 26% 
of workers would install it without permission, once they had verified there was no 
virus. In scenario 14, 62% of employees would ask for permission to delete files 
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from organisations’ hard disks when they finish a project. In contrast, 38% would 
delete the files in different circumstances, which is an unauthorised modification.  
4.3.2.1.4 Backup 
In scenario 1 only 35% of respondents would not send their confidential work file 
to personal email accounts for back up (e.g., Gmail), while 30% of them would. 
Furthermore, 31% would do this after asking their manager for permission. In 
addition, in scenario 14, 28% of employees would save their files to a USB as 
backup when they finished a group project and delete the files from the 
organisation’s hard disk. While participants may believe they are supporting the 
university, these behaviours increase security risks continues by saving company 
data to personal or external devices.    
4.3.2.1.5 Physical security  
In scenario 5, 41% of respondents would lock-up the office or work area (doors, 
windows) and their computer screens when they leave their workplace for only a 
few minutes. In contrast, 30% believe that it is not their responsibility to lock up 
their offices or workplace. However only, 5% of employees would not lock their 
computer screens when there are co-workers in the office. Furthermore, 25% of 
employees would only lock their computer screen and not the office door if they 
leave the office for a few minutes. This shows that the risk from the physical 
environment is ignored by the more than half the staff.  
4.3.2.2 Summary of employees’ applied knowledge   
In general, most employees would not intend to comply with some aspect of the 
organisations’ information security policy or they are not aware of the security 
policy in their workplace. Only three of the fourteen scenario questions had correct 
response rates of 80% or more. It should be mentioned that on occasion hackers 
send emails to employees and pretend to be an administrator asking for employees’ 
usernames and passwords. Even if the email appears to be from an administrator, 
employees should not send the information, for the reason that it is not permitted 
under any circumstances, as is written in organisations’ information security 
policies. However, the results are surprising and indicate that 71% of employees 
would share this confidential information with their manager, whilst 35% would 
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share with co-workers. In addition, the results show that almost half of employees 
have a lack of motivation when they are requested to create new passwords.  
It is important to point out that sending a password by phone or email via text or 
voice could expose the password to the public which is unacceptable behaviour. In 
the questionnaire, numerous employees indicated that they would share their 
password with their managers and administrators. In this case, managers and 
system administrators should not request login passwords from employees, under 
any circumstances. It is possible that the results observed here are due to Omani 
culture in which employees defer to their bosses.   
4.3.3 Exploring human factors in information security 
The principal aim of the study is to explore what factors affect compliance with 
ISPs. When positive and negative factors that influence employee behaviour are 
identified, this may assist an organisation to better understand how to motivate 
employees to comply with information security policy. The results showed that the 
overall employee information security awareness was approximately 57% across 
the 14 scenario questions.     
Employees can be influenced by organisational and social factors that distract them 
from complying with an ISP. Employees are also affected by personal factors such 
as trust in co-workers and IT staff, authority, productivity, responsibility and 
curiosity. The following sections discuss the wrong answers chosen by participants. 
These wrong answers reflect different ways that people may be influenced to 
behave in a noncompliant way. The factors explored in the answer set are trust, 
authority, productivity, personal responsibility and curiosity. 
4.3.3.1 Trust in co-workers and IT staff  
Trust was the highest factor influencing employees to disregard complying with the 
ISP, as they think they are safe. For example, in scenario 7, 58% of employees 
would try to verify the source and clicking on the link, or click on the link to 
substantiate what is there, when they receive an email that appears to have been 
sent by an administrator asking them to visit a specific web link to confirm their 
personal details. Unfortunately, this is more than those who comply with the ISP 
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(33%). In addition, in scenario 1, 34% of employees trusted personal emails and 
co-workers to send confidential files; 30% of them would send their confidential 
files to commercial emails and 4% of them think it is alright to send confidential 
files to trusted co-workers. 35% of respondents gave the ISP-compliant answer. 
Similarly, in scenario 6, 47% of employees would send their username and 
password via email if IT staff ask them to once they had ensured that the email is 
from IT staff. This is strictly against policy which does not allow username and 
password sharing and furthermore, is more than those who comply with the ISP 
(31%). These two cases reveal that employees believe that they are not doing 
anything wrong because they trust IT staff. 
Trust, such as sharing important information for work purposes, can be developed 
between employees at the same organisation. This in group-trust is due to 
belonging to the same group organisation. In scenario 4, 65% of employees would 
refuse to give a co-worker their username and password but 35% were willing to 
share their username and password with co-workers via the phone because of trust 
while they are off work. Furthermore, scenario 3 showed that 17% of employees 
would give their username and password to their manager if they need to access 
confidential files. This is probably influenced by Omani culture in which trust in 
superiors is high. 
4.3.3.2 Authority  
The results show that employees would likely not adhere to the ISP if their 
managers ask them for their password or give them permission to do what they 
want, even if that action is incorrect. Instead, in scenario 3, the result indicates that 
71% of employees would share their usernames and passwords with their managers 
in different circumstances, seeing as they believe that their managers have the 
authority to ask for and obtain them. 43% of employees would provide their 
managers with their password when the managers agreed to take responsibility for 
using employee passwords and 17% of them would perform the request if the files 
involved are not sensitive. This means that authority is followed more than ISP 
compliance (29%). 
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Furthermore, in scenario 1, 31% of employees would ignore the policy by asking 
for permission from their managers to send their confidential work files to a 
commercial email service, such as Gmail. 
4.3.3.3 Productivity (work pressure) 
Regarding the work environment, employees in scenarios 5, 10 and 11 are not 
willing to comply with information security when they are busy with work, seeing 
that they want to complete the work and complying with the ISP will be time 
consuming. In scenario 5, 25% of employees would only lock their computer 
screen and not the office door if they leave the office for a few minutes.  
In scenario 10, 33% of employees would disable the antivirus on their computer for 
a short time when they have privileges on their computers or by asking the IT staff 
to do it. Similarly, in scenario 11, 37% of employees would install software 
downloaded from the internet when they administrative privileges on their 
computers, asking the IT staff to do or asking the technician for their username and 
password, in order to install it themselves. 
4.3.3.4 Responsibility  
In scenario 5, 30% of employees say they would lock their computer screens, 
although they believe that it is not their responsibility to lock up the office or work 
area (doors, windows) during the working day because they trust people in the 
organisation to close doors and windows and not to try to access their computers. 
4.3.3.5 Curiosity  
Most organisations recommend their employees do not open emails attachments if 
they are not sure about the source of the message, but unfortunately they are often 
curious to open the attachments anyway and are not concerned about who it is from 
(Madigan et al., 2004). Although source information may be unreliable (the email 
may appear to come from a reliable source), it is nevertheless an important signal 
that users sometimes disregard, even when they do not recognise the source. In the 
current findings, in scenario 6, when employees receive an email that appears to 
have come from the administrator asking for username and password to perform 
some troubleshooting, 15% would reply to the sender to ask who they are. 
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Furthermore, in scenario 7, 10% of employees would click on the link to verify 
what is in an email when they receive one that appears to have come from an 
administrator asking them to go to a specific web link to confirm their personal 
details. However, the link may have a virus. 
4.3.3.6 Summary of human factors plausible distractors 
Trust, authority, productivity, responsibility and curiosity drive respondents to non-
compliance with information security policy, although they chose an incorrect 
action when they were under social, organisational and environmental conditions. 
Furthermore, work pressure may possibly force them to make a mistake and 
decrease their intention to comply with ISP. The results confirm that trust and 
authority appear to have a stronger influence than rules on non-compliance with 
information security policy.  
 Understanding factors of influence 4.4
In addition to the distractor (wrong) answers, eight questions were used to identify 
what participants believed influenced their ISP compliance and participants were 
asked to rate their level of agreement using a five point Likert scale from strongly 
agree to strongly disagree. The factors identified were: knowledge, response 
efficacy, subjective norms for organisation and/or manager, compliance, 
behavioural intentions, and sanctions and rewards. The purpose of this section is to 
understand whether participants’ scoring high or low in compliance hold different 
beliefs about why they behave the way they do. 
4.4.1 Study Analysis 
For each of the fourteen scenarios discussed above, participants were asked to rate 
eight influencing factors. A 2 (high/low ISP compliance) × 14 (scenarios) × 8 
(influencing factors) ANOVA was carried out to look at whether there were 
differences in the ratings of influencing factors for those with different overall 
levels of compliance across the different behaviour scenarios.   
The 503 participants were grouped into two groups (high and low compliance). The 
higher group scored from 8 to14 (N = 270) questions correct (i.e., they chose the 
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policy compliant answer) and the low compliance group scored from 1 to 7 (N = 
233), as shown in Table  4.7. 
Table  4.7: Employee group scores  
Participant’s group  
No. policy compliant 
answers 
No. of participants  
Participants scored high 8 to 14 270 
Participant score low 1 to 7 233 
 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was designed to determine how the entire 
collection of group means is spread out and compares that to how much those means 
might be expected to vary if they were all sampled from the same population (that is, 
if there were no true differences between the groups). The result, given as the F ratio 
specifies the ratio of how much variability there is between the groups relative to 
how much there is within the groups. ANOVAs with repeated measures (within-
subject factors) are particularly susceptible to the violation of the assumption of 
sphericity. Sphericity is the condition where the variances of the differences between 
all combinations of related groups (levels) are equal. Violation of sphericity 
(Mauchly’s test) is when the variances of the differences between all combinations 
of related groups are not equal. The violation of sphericity is serious for the repeated 
measures ANOVA, with violation causing the test to become too liberal. If 
violations of sphericity do occur, corrections (Greenhouse-Geisser) are used to 
produce a more valid critical F-value. 
4.4.2 Results: Influencing factors 
A repeated measures ANOVA was carried out for eight factors across fourteen 
scenarios, with a between-subjects’ variable of compliant answers (high or low). 
Mauchly’s test indicates that the assumption of Sphericity had been violated. 
Sphericity occurs when the variances of the differences between all group 
combinations are equal. When the condition is violated Sphericity must be 
estimated. Therefore, the degrees of freedom was corrected using Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of Sphericity; ε = 0.74 for the main effect of scenarios, 0.505 for 
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the main effect of the factors and 0.547 for the interaction effect between scenarios 
and factors (see Table  4.8). 
Table  4.8: Mauchly's Test of Sphericity 
Within 
Subjects Effect  
Mauchly's 
W 
Approx.   
Chi-Square df  Sig.  
 Epsilonb 
Greenhouse-
Geisser  
Huynh-
Feldt  
Lower-
bound 
Scenarios  .153 931.608 90 .000 .741 .758 .077 
Factors   .026 1811.006 27 .000 .505 .510 .143 
Scenarios * 
Factors  
.000 16953.248 4185 .000 .547 .610 .011 
 
4.4.2.1 Main effect of compliance level 
There was a significant difference (F (1, 501) = 14.20, p = 0.000) between the high 
(M= 4.165), and low (M=4.007) compliance score groups; however there was only 
a small effect size (r = 0.028).  This suggests that those who score well and badly 
hold different beliefs about how their behaviour is influenced, however that actual 
difference between the scores is very small. 
4.4.2.2 Main effect of scenario 
The result of a repeated-measures ANOVA test with a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction reveals that there is a significant main effect of scenario (F (9.633, 
4826.04) = 56.86, p = 0.000) with small effect size (r = 0.102). Table  4.9 highlights 
the mean agreement rating across the factors for each scenario. Thus the level of 
agreement with the influencing factors was different for different behaviour 
scenarios.   
Table  4.9: Means Factor scores for scenarios  
S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
M 3.86 3.92 3.84 4.03 4.07 4.12 4.13 4.07 4.21 4.14 4.15 4.20 4.25 4.16 
* Note: Scenario=S; Mean=M.  
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4.4.2.3 Main effect of factors 
The result of a repeated-measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
corroborates that there is a significant main effect with regards to factor F (3.54, 
1771.44) = 174.99, p = 0.000) with medium effect size (r = 0.259).  
Table  4.10 provides the mean agreement level for each factor. Participants most 
strongly agreed that knowledge (M= 4.37), was the reason for their behaviour, 
while they were least likely to believe that there would be sanctions (M = 3.63) if 
they did not comply.  
Table  4.10: Means for influencing factors  
Factors K RE SNO SNM C BI S R 
Mean 4.37 4.29 4.02 4.09 4.04 4.19 3.63 4.03 
*Note: K: Knowledge; RE: Response Efficacy; SNO: Subjective Norms Organisation; SNM: Subjective; Norms Manager; 
C: Compliance; BI: Behaviour Intention; S: Sanctions; R: Rewards  
The pairwise comparisons illustrated in Table  4.11, show a significant difference 
between the two means of each factor, for the majority of influencing factors. This 
suggests that participants felt as if each factor had a different level of influence on 
their choice of answers.  
Table  4.11: Difference between each two means of the influencing factors  
Factors K RE SNO SNM C BI S R 
K         
RE .084*        
SNO .358* .274*       
SNM 283* .198* -.076*      
C .329* .245* -.029 .047*     
BI .188* .104* -.170* -.094* -.141*    
S .744* .660* .386* .461* .415* .556*   
R .349* 264* -.010 .066 .019 .160* -.396*  
    *Note: p< 0.05; Bold: not significant; K: Knowledge; RE: Response Efficacy; SNO: Subjective Norms Organisation; SNM: 
Subjective Norms Manager; C: Compliance; BI: Behaviour Intention; S: Sanctions; R: Rewards. 
4.4.2.4 Interaction Effects 
The primary purpose of the repeated measures ANOVA is to explore the 
interaction effects between levels of compliance decisions, scenarios and 
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influencing factors. While a significant interaction was found between compliance 
level (low and high) and the scenarios (F (9.633, 6513) = 4826.04, p = 0.001) there 
was only a small size effect (r = 0.006) using Greenhouse-Geisser correction. 
Figure  4.5 illustrates how the mean agreement level for the influencing factors 
varied across the scenarios and between the two groups.  
 
Figure  4.5: Interactions between scenarios and compliance score (high and low) 
There was also a significant interaction effect between the influencing factors 
(mean across all the scenarios) and compliance score (F (3.536, 1771.44) = 5.069, p 
= 0.001) but again only with a small size effect (r = 0.010) using Greenhouse-
Geisser correction.  
Figure  4.6 illustrates the mean score for each influencing factor (across all 
scenarios). The pattern is generally the same for both groups (high and low 
compliance scores), however there are larger differences between some of the 
factors.   
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Figure  4.6: Interactions between factors and compliance score (high and low) 
The result of the repeated-measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
suggests that there is a statistically significant interaction effect between the 
scenarios and influencing factors (F (50, 24942.58) = 0.996, p = 0.000) with a 
small effect size (r = 0.019). Thus, this indicates that factors are rated differently 
depending on the individual scenario. However, it is clear from the graph the main 
effects are more compelling than the interaction effects. It is interesting to note that 
sanctions are consistently rated as the least influencing factor (see Figure  4.7).  
 
*Note: K: Knowledge; RE: Response Efficacy; SNO: Subjective Norms Organisation; SNM: Subjective Norms Manager; 
C: Compliance; BI: Behaviour Intention; S: Sanctions; R: Rewards  
Figure  4.7: Interactions between scenarios and factors 
There is no significant three-way interaction between compliance level, group 
factors and scenarios. The repeated-measures ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction explains that there is no significant interaction effect between the high 
and low scores of both groups, in relation to the factors and scenario F (50, 
24942.58) = 0.482 , p >0.05.  
4.4.2.5 Further investigation of influencing factors by scenario  
To more fully understand the relationship between the influencing factors and each 
individual scenarios a number of further analyses were conducted. Firstly, for each 
scenario a T-test was carried out to ascertain if there was a significant difference in 
ratings of influence factors between people who chose the compliant answer for 
that scenario, and those who did not. This analysis highlighted that different 
influencing factors were found to be significantly different in different scenarios. 
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This is summarised in Table  4.12. Those cells marked with “sig” highlight where a 
significant difference was found in the influencing factor rating between those who 
chose the compliant answer and those who did not.  
Table  4.12: Influencing factors by scenario 
Scenario  K RE SNO SNM C BI S R 
1   sig sig   sig sig     
2 sig sig  sig sig       
3 sig sig sig   sig sig sig sig 
4 sig sig sig sig sig sig sig sig 
5 sig sig   sig sig   sig sig 
6 sig sig   sig sig sig   sig 
7           sig     
8 sig sig  sig  sig   sig 
9 sig sig sig sig sig sig   sig 
10 sig sig sig sig sig sig   sig 
11 sig sig  sig sig sig sig sig 
12 sig sig sig sig sig sig sig sig 
13 sig sig sig sig sig sig sig sig 
14                 
Total  11 12 7 10 11 11   6 10 
*Note: K: Knowledge; RE: Response Efficacy; SNO: Subjective Norms Organisation; SNM: Subjective Norms Manager; C: 
Compliance; BI: Behaviour Intention; S: Sanctions; R: Rewards  
 
 
Following this, a step wise regression was undertaken for each scenario, the aim was 
to see which factors were useful in predicting if a person would choose the compliant 
answer or not.  Those factors that were significant in predicting the scenarios are 
presented in Table  4.13 . This highlights that the predictive factors vary by scenario, 
with response efficacy (belief that the behaviour will keep information secure) being 
the most frequent factor across the scenarios. Interestingly from this knowledge and 
sanctions are only part of a significant regression on one occasion and rewards are 
never part of the significant regression equation. 
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Table  4.13: Regression analyses for individual scenarios 
 Influencing factors 
 K RE SNO SNM C BI S R2 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE  
S1 
  
.07* .03 -.12** .03  
   .08** .03  
 
0.05 
S2  
 
  -.12** .03 .15** .04 .08* .04    
 
.09 
S3  
 
.14** .03 -.06* .03 -.07* .03 .13** .03  
   .19 
S4 -.12** .04 .18** .04 -.07* .03  
 
.11** .03 .13** .04  
 
.22 
S5   .16** .04 -.08* .03  
 
.15** .04 -.10* .04  
 
.08 
S6   .11* .04 -.07* .03  
 
  .13** .04 -.06* .02 .08 
S7  
 
   
     .04* .02  
 
.01 
S8  
 
.16** .04 -.12** .04 .17** .05 -.09* .04  
   .08 
S9  
 
.13** .03  
         .06 
S10  
 
.20** .03  
         .07 
S11  
 
.18** .04 -.12** .03  
 
.14** .04  
   .11 
S12  
 
.12** .04  
   .07* .03  
   .08 
S13  
 
.12** .02  
         .10 
*Notes: a) K: Knowledge; RE: Response Efficacy; SNO: Subjective Norms Organisation; SNM: Subjective Norms Manager; C: Compliance; BI: Behaviour Intention; S: Sanctions  
b) *P<.05; **P<.005  
c) Scenario 14 had no significant predictors; and Influencing factor 8 was never a significant predictor 
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A regression was also ran for the dependent variable of total correct answers for the 
average score of each influencing factor (see Table  4.14).  
 
Table  4.14: Regression analysis for average factor scores as a predictor of total questions correct 
 Influencing factor 
 K RE SNO SNM C BI S R2 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE B SE  
No. 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
 
All 
Scenario 
Average 
  .14** .05 -.10** .02         .17 
*Notes:  a) K: Knowledge; RE: Response Efficacy; SNO: Subjective Norms Organisation; SNM: Subjective Norms 
Manager; C: Compliance; BI: Behaviour Intention; S: Sanctions.  
b) *P<.05; **P<.005  
c) Scenario 14 had no significant predictors; and Influencing factor 8 was never a significant predictor 
 
 Summary of compliance influence beliefs 4.5
The aim of this section was to evaluate if participants who scored well and badly 
differed in their beliefs about the influence of knowledge, response efficacy, 
subjective norms for organisation and/or manager, compliance, behavioural 
intentions, and sanctions and rewards on their behavioural intentions to comply 
with organisational information security policy.   
This section has presented a number of analyses in order to determine the factors 
that have the most influence on employees’ compliance with ISP. The findings 
indicate that knowledge is the factor which employees believe is the reason for 
their choice of answer, while sanctions are thought to have the least influence.  
 Summary of the chapter    4.6
This chapter presented findings from a study of 503 employees in different 
institutions in the higher education sector in Oman in order to identify employees’ 
awareness and the factors they believe influence their behaviour. The 
questionnaires were divided into three sections: general questions, security 
questions and questions on influencing factors. Overall, 57% of participant answers 
were in line with policy. This means that approximately half of the time non-
policy-compliant decisions were being selected as acceptable responses with 
regards to security behaviour.  However, compliance level was not consistent 
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across all scenarios. For example, in scenarios 9, 12 and 13 high levels of 
compliant decisions were made, whereas other scenarios had very low levels.    
The results from the fourteen scenarios show that trust, authority, productivity, 
responsibility and curiosity are main influencing factors that prevent employees 
from complying with the ISP. The most influential factors are authority and trust 
(for example, more than two-thirds of employees would give their usernames and 
passwords to their managers and IT staff). 
The findings also confirm that participants believe that their behaviour is 
influenced differently by the eight factors investigated and their agreement that 
their behaviour was influenced by each factor varied across the scenarios. 
Knowledge is perceived to have the highest effect on employees’ intention to 
comply with an organisation’s ISP, whereas the presence of sanctions is perceived 
to have the lowest effect. The employee findings confirm the perceptions of the IT 
staff and system administrators reported in chapter 3, that knowledge is the most 
important for employees’ compliance with ISP and that because sanction systems 
were not present in these organisations the employees did not perceive sanctions to 
have a strong effect. In addition, this highlights the importance of not thinking of 
information security policy compliance as a single behaviour. Each behaviour (as 
illustrated by a scenario) needs to be considered individually for factors that 
influence it.  
Given that for each behaviour, different numbers of staff intended to comply it is 
important to understand how important the behaviours, where more staff do not 
intend to comply, are to IT staff. The following chapter presents a study which 
presented the scenarios to IT staff and asked them to rank their importance.  The 
same questionnaires that were used with the employees were given to the IT staff to 
draw out what behaviours (including non-policy-compliant ones) the people 
responsible for IT security considered to be acceptable in their own organisations. 
In addition, interviews were carried out to explore the reasoning underpinning the 
IT staff and system administrators’ views and their thoughts about why employees 
might behave in non-compliant ways.  
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Chapter 5: REVISITING IT STAFF AND SYSTEM 
ADMINISTRATORS’ PRIORITISATION OF POLICY 
BEHAVIOURS  
 Introduction 5.1
In the previous chapter, 14 behaviours were examined and it was found that more 
staff had intentions to comply with some behaviours and less with others. Given 
that some behaviours are less likely, it is important to understand a) how IT staff 
prioritise the 14 different behaviours and b) to find out whether IT staff condone 
the non-compliant behaviours. This chapter presents a study of 17 IT staff and 
system administration staff views of employee behaviour intentions and the 
importance they place on each behaviour. First, the study utilised the same scenario 
questionnaires presented to university staff in the previous study, and IT staff were 
asked to first identify the policy compliant answer then rank by level of importance 
for each scenario behaviour. In addition, participants were asked to select all the 
accepted behaviours in their organisations for each scenario or provide any 
alternative behaviour which would be acceptable. This would help to identify other 
acceptable behaviour which is not in the organisational ISP. This would suggest 
acceptance of some shadow security behaviours (Kirlappos et al., 2014), i.e., 
behaviours that have become accepted within the organisation but are not formally 
written into the ISP. 
This was followed up by a second stage which used semi-structured interviews to 
explore in more depth information, IT staff perception of the employees’ behaviour, 
intentions. In addition, the interviews aimed to identify barriers and motivations 
that technical staff believe influence employees’ compliance with their 
organisations’ information security policies.  
As shown in Figure  5.1, the results are presented in six main sections: ranking 
important employees’ behaviour, acceptable and unacceptable employee behaviour; 
information security incidents and reports; factors which affect compliance with the 
ISP; barriers to compliance with the ISP; and recommendation for successful 
information security management and increased employees awareness. Finally, the 
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17 IT staff and system administrators’ importance ranking was compared with 
results of the survey of 503 employees in Chapter 4. 
 
Figure  5.1: Structure of chapter five  
 Methodology 5.2
After receiving ethical approval from Northumbria University, 17 IT staff and 
system administrators agreed to take part and were given the same 14 scenarios as 
employees were given in Chapter 4 (four multiple choice) and interviewed using a 
one-to-one, face-to-face method. 
5.2.1 Participants 
17 participants from five higher education institutions took part in this study (see 
Table  5.1). Three of the participants from two organisations (A [1], and C [2]) also 
participated in the first study (Chapter 3). Therefore, participants were numbered 
from 1 to 17 in the second interviews. Organisation E was added because of the 
large number of participants in the survey study from this organisation (Chapter 4).    
Table  5.1: Organisations and participants  
No Organisation 
Number of 
Participants 
1 A (Large size, university) 4 
2 B (medium size, university) 1 
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3 C (medium size college) 6 
4 D (small size college) 1 
5 E (Large size college) 5 
Total                   5  17 
 
All the participants had a university degree and at least three years’ work 
experience. Of the 17 participants, six were Omani and the others were originally 
from other countries. These individuals are the persons responsible for network and 
information security in their respective offices or colleges and for that reason, so it 
was important to obtain detailed information from them.  
5.2.2 Procedures for data collections and analysis 
For this study, both quantitative and qualitative data were gathered via a 
questionnaire which used both open and closed questions. The questionnaire was 
administered first followed by the one-to-one interviews. The questionnaire was 
divided into two parts, employee behaviours in order of importance (see Appendix 
C) and highlighted the acceptable behaviours from each scenario. The qualitative 
aspect was administrated via a one-to-one, face-to-face session with the researcher. 
The interview procedure was the same as in the first study (Chapter 3) except that 
participants were allowed to hold the interview in either English or Arabic 
depending on their preference. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. The 
questionnaire and interview portions of the study were structured into steps and 
each step was divided into several sub-steps as below. 
I. Quantitative method:  
a. Each participant was asked to order the employee behaviour scenarios 
from most important (1) to least important (14). This time the 
scenario was presented with the ISP compliant behaviour included in 
the description and participants were asked to rank these employees’ 
behaviours in order of importance to the security of their organisation. 
The rankings for the employee scenarios were then totalled. This 
provided a ranked order of importance of employee behaviour. The 
purpose of this ranking was to find out which scenario behaviours are 
given top priority by IT staff and whether the ranking is consistent 
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across different staff. The ranking of security behaviours may help an 
organisation to focus on its priority areas to improve staff behaviour. 
b. Next, IT staff were asked to provide all answers that they would find 
acceptable for each of the 14 scenarios thereby highlighting whether 
they would accept non-policy-compliant behaviour. In addition, they 
were allowed to supply free-form text answers if they wanted to add 
alternative acceptable behaviours. The data were collected 
individually face-to-face. This provided scores for ISP compliance 
and for non-compliant options that they find acceptable.    
II. Qualitative method:  
a. After the quantitative task, participants were then asked to provide the 
reasons for their rankings and to explain how they had chosen their 
top five (most important) and bottom five (least important) 
behaviours.  
b. Participants were asked if employees reported information security 
incidents. Furthermore, the participants were asked what factors 
(knowledge, managers, co-workers, sanctions and rewards) they think 
influence employees to comply with ISP in their organisations and, 
where possible, to give examples from their own experience. This 
study identifies the barriers that IT staff believe influence whether 
employees comply with an ISP. 
c. Finally, participants were asked to rank the factors that they believe 
affect employee compliance intention in order of importance. These 
factors were rewards, sanctions, awareness, knowledge, and managers. 
This aspect allowed differences to be identified between staff about 
how to influence intentions and recommendations to be made that 
could help organisations to deal with these barriers in an appropriate 
way in order to improve organisations’ information security 
management and employee security behaviour.  
A framework analysis was used for the open answers to the questions (Ritchie et al., 
1994). Framework analysis was chosen for the analysis of the semi-structured 
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interview data because it is better suited to research that has structured questions 
(Srivastava & Thomson, 2009). 
 Results 5.3
The 17 participants were from different countries, organisations and positions and 
gave different views on some points and similar views on others into their 
organisations’ information security management. 
5.3.1 Ranking the importance of employees’ behaviour: 
Kruger and Kearney (2008) found that asking decision makers to rank security 
issues according to perceived importance led to “a better understanding of the 
relevance and importance of those factors influencing an ICT security awareness 
program” (p. 259). In this study all participants ranked employee behaviours in 
order of importance (Table  5.2) from most important (1) to least important (14). 
This provided a total importance score used to rank the policy behaviours.  
Table  5.2: Ranking the scenarios’ behaviours in order of importance to security  
Ranking the 
importance Employee behaviours in the 14 scenarios   
1
st
 7. Incident report (email asking for personal details ) 
2
nd
 13. Incident report (missing files) 
3
rd*
 9. Phishing email(email unknown source) 
3
rd*
 4. Sharing passwords (with co-workers) 
4
th
 6. Sharing passwords (with IT staff) 
5
th
 2. Creating a new password 
6
th
 8. Incident report (windows appear suddenly) 
7
th
 3. Sharing passwords (with managers) 
8
th
 14. Deleting shared files without authorisation 
9
th
 10. Disabling antivirus protection 
10
th
 5. Physical security 
11
th
 12. Not using email for commercial or personal purpose 
12
th
 11.Downloading software from the internet 
13
th
 1. Backing up confidential data 
               *Note: scenarios number 9 and 4 are same ranking level (3rd) 
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5.3.2 Reasons for ranking  
After participants ranked the policy behaviours they were asked for the main reason 
behind their ranking. Some participants reported behaviours to be important 
because those behaviours are frequently required in their organisations, as one 
participant said: 
These are most important because these scenarios regularly happen in the 
workplace [P13]. 
Note, none of the participants were willing or able to divulge numbers of incidents 
that had occurred, either because they do not keep logs or because they felt such 
information was too sensitive to share. Another key issue was whether or not the 
behaviour would compromise the organisation’s assets as two participants pointed 
out that:  
More important is the confidential assets and we are responsible [P8]. 
My selections depend on whether the wrong behaviour leads to access to the 
confidential data directly [P15]. 
Another participant suggested that computer access and network policies should be 
secured first (such as privileges to download and install software, disable antivirus 
and policies around creating strong passwords): 
For me one of the most important is the system security so system should 
come first then files then emails [P4]. 
5.3.3 Specifying the five most important scenarios  
The scenario ranked most important was one concerned with receiving and sending 
emails between users and outsiders (see Table  5.3). 11 participants ranked scenario 
7 (email communication) as the most important policy behaviour because most 
employees continued to repeat the same mistake and were putting the 
organisation’s information at risk. 
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Table  5.3: The five most important scenarios  
Security 
behaviour rank 
Scenario description  
1st 7. Said has received an email that appears to have come 
from an administrator asking him to go to a specific web 
link to confirm his personal details. He phones the 
administrator to report the email as it may be a phish. 
 
2nd 13. Bakhit has discovered that some files are missing 
from his computer and some changes have happened to 
his computer. He informs IT staff immediately. 
 
3rd 9. Badr receives an email with an attachment from an 
unknown source. The email says that the attachment 
should be opened which will get rid of the virus. He 
deletes the email immediately without opening the 
attachment. 
 
3rd 4. Ali is having a day off and refuses to give his co-worker 
his password in order to access an important email he has 
received. 
 
4th 6. Khalfan received an email that appears to have come 
from administrator asking him for his username and 
password as the IT staff want to perform some 
troubleshooting. He deletes it. 
 
 
Interview question: Why did you choose those behaviours as your five most 
important ones, and how did you choose which five behaviours were your least 
important? 
11 participants believed that emails are an easy way to trick users. As emails are 
the most common communication in the workplace, employees can get a lot of 
spam and phishing emails and viruses. The 11 participants ranked policy 
behaviours related to sending confidential data through emails as most important. 
As one participant said:  
I think most of it is concern on getting information from employees coming 
from other resources which are unknown. We [organisation] are getting 
attack from outside or spam emails coming because of those staff give this 
information [P2]. 
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In addition, another reason for ranking scenario 7 as the most important is that IT 
staff at any organisation are very important and should have knowledge of how to 
behave in a secure manner. One participant said: 
Related to information security, first administrators should know what they 
are doing then client side [P7]. 
The second highest ranked scenario concerned employees informing an 
administrator if files were missing from their computers. For example, one 
participant said: 
The second scenario about missing files that if any users have missed his files 
from his computer they have to inform the technical support if someone 
access to his computer by different account [P16].  
The third highest ranked scenario was to do with sharing passwords and receiving 
emails with attachments from an unknown source. Regarding unknown email 
sources one participant said: 
Because these [emails] are coming from outside and unknown email could 
bring viruses and asking for personal details and the password [P17].   
Regarding password sharing, one participant said: 
User has given his username and password to one of his trusted office 
colleague and maybe they deleted some files by mistakes, security is very 
concerned that you should not share your password to anybody [P3]. 
In addition, because of the consequences of sharing usernames and passwords, the 
participants ranked sharing password again as the fourth most important. 
Because of 1 to 5 (important scenarios) always related to the username and 
password of users. If someone took it will get all your personal data [P8]. 
5.3.4 Specifying the five least important employee behaviours 
Table  5.4 presents the scenarios that were ranked as least important to the security 
of the organisation.  
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Table  5.4: The five least important scenarios  
Security 
behaviour rank 
Scenario description  
10th 10. Ahmed is very busy and has a lot of work to do. He 
doesn’t disable the antivirus software even though he 
thinks it slows down his computer. 
 
11th 5. Sami works in his own office, and makes sure he locks 
the door, windows, and his computer’s screen takes time 
even if he leaves the office for a few minutes. 
 
12th 12. Noor never uses her work email for her own 
commercial purposes. 
 
13th 11. Hasan urgently needs to install some free software that 
he has downloaded from the Internet for work purposes. 
He waits until the technician has time to check this for him. 
 
14th 1. Adam wants to back up a confidential file. He does not   
email it to his Gmail account. 
 
 
Participants had different views regarding the least important policy behaviours. As 
one of the participants said:  
Based on the scenario on backing up confidential data there are a lot of ways 
to save data not only sending to the Gmail account especially if you are the 
owner of that data first save in your computer second in your own flash drive 
or CD and file server but it should be there passwords [P1]. 
One reason for the lower ranking is that this behaviour was believed to happen less 
frequently in the organisation: 
It happened less or it is not behaviour of our colleagues in our college [P6] 
Using an organisation’s email servers for commercial purposes was not seen as 
directly impacting information security. For example, one participant said:  
I have ranked these at the bottom because these behaviours are not 
connected to data directly like if someone uses his email for commercial 
purposes but might effect the work performance [P15]. 
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Some answers are ranked low because employees do not have privileges to disable 
the antivirus in the organisation network, and so it was perceived as not important. 
As one participant said: 
Now in the university we do not give the users privileges to disable or remove 
the antivirus. [P15]. 
5.3.5 Summary of ranking importance of employees’ behaviour  
The results show that the reasons for ranking scenarios differently were related to 
these being frequently occurring problems with a high perceived risk. Behaviours 
ranked low were those perceived as not being possible in an organisation or not 
directly relevant to security.  
The findings identified that the most important security compliance behaviours, in 
the opinion of the IT staff and system managers, were that employees should 
inform IT staff if there are any information security incidents such as emails asking 
for their personal data or password even it purported to come from IT staff, missing 
files from their computers, receiving email from unknown sources, and not sharing 
passwords with IT staff and/or co-workers. In comparison, Kruger and Kearney 
(2008) report six information security awareness areas that senior decision-maker 
ordered by importance. In this study they were ordered as most important 1
st
 was 
keep passwords and personal identification numbers (PINs) secret, 2
nd
 adhere to 
company policies, 3
rd
 use e-mail and the Internet with care, 4
th
 report incidences 
like viruses, 5
th
 be careful when using mobile equipment, and 6
th
 be aware that all 
actions have consequences.  
The rankings found in this study would be helpful for information security 
management in organisations to focus more on those behaviours at the highest level 
importance to reduce employees’ mistakes. 
 What employees do and IT staff and system administrators find 5.4
acceptable and unacceptable security behaviours? 
IT staff were asked to provide acceptable answers for each of the scenarios thus 
highlighting whether they would accept non-policy-compliant behaviour (they were 
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also allowed to add other acceptable alternative behaviours with free-form text). 
The overall findings reveal that IT staff and system administrators had a mean ISP-
compliance score of 81% as measured by what behaviours they deemed to be 
acceptable. 
Figure  5.2 shows that all IT staff and system administrators have different scores 
depending on different aspects of information system security in the 14 scenarios. 
Comparing the answers, they judged to be acceptable with the ISP-correct answers, 
100% of staff chose the policy compliant answer in scenarios 11, 12 and 13 which 
concerned incident reporting, downloading software from the internet and not using 
email for commercial or personal purposes respectively. On the other hand, only 53% 
of staff chose the compliant answer for creating new passwords and 59% for not 
sharing passwords with IT staff. Although more IT staff chose policy compliant 
answers than other employees, it is clear that even IT staff are willing to accept 
some non-policy-compliant behaviour.   
 
Figure  5.2: % IT staff and system administrators’ choosing information-security-policy-compliant 
answers  
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IT staff and system administrators were asked to select as many options as they 
would find acceptable for each of the 14 behaviour scenarios. In addition, they 
were asked to list any other alternative acceptable employee behaviours in their 
organisation or behaviours they deemed to be unacceptable. 
5.4.1.1 Passwords management 
A number of scenarios dealt with the issue of password management. Table  5.5 
highlights the percentage of IT staff compliance with the ISP on these sharing 
passwords.  
Table  5.5: Compliance around sharing passwords  
Scenario  Circumstances  
Share password 
with 
ISP-compliant 
behaviour 
% 
4 When employees are 
having a day off their co-
workers need to access an 
important email they have 
received in their email 
accounts. 
Co-worker Not give co-
workers their 
password 
82 
3 When manager is very 
busy and need to retrieve 
some files for employees’ 
accounts. 
Managers Decline the order 
and remind their 
managers that is 
not allowed. 
76 
6 The IT staff want to 
perform some 
troubleshooting. 
IT Staff Delete the email 
without replying 
to it 
59 
 
For scenario 6, ten respondents indicated intention to follow the information 
security policy by expecting employees to delete the email without replying to it. 
However, IT staff were also willing to accept non-compliant behaviour; four 
accepted their employees checking the email’s source and, if it appears to be valid, 
sending the information. In addition, three of them accepted employees asking who 
the sender was by sending an email and only one participant thought that 
employees should do what the IT staff had requested. A further two participants 
suggested that employees should inform IT staff about this email, and the same 
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number suggested that they should not give their email to any one and just one 
participant suggested that they should mark the email as junk and block the sender. 
In scenario 3, four IT staff accepted employees could give their password to their 
managers when managers ask. On the other hand, 13 IT staff indicated they would 
decline the order and remind their managers that is not allowed. 
In scenario 4, 14 IT staff were against sharing passwords between employees in the 
workplace when they were on holiday. However, two of them agreed that 
employees could give their passwords to their co-workers because their co-workers 
are trustworthy, with a further participant agreeing that employees could give their 
passwords to their co-workers to access to their email account if does not contain 
sensitive information. Three participants suggested in the free-form text that 
employees should send an email to their co-workers but not the password and one 
of them suggested that when employees ask for their password they should ask the 
manager first. 
- Creating a new password  
The lowest scores for policy compliance were in scenario 2 where only nine IT 
staff chose the policy-compliant answer (insisting that employees remember new 
passwords without writing them down, saving them in a mobile phone or telling 
anyone). Surprisingly, ten accepted that employees could use a password they have 
for another service but change one of the characters in it. In addition, four of them 
accepted that it could be saved in their mobile phone or computer and three of them 
accepted that employees could write it on paper and put it in their drawer until they 
remember it. One participant suggested that employees could write their passwords 
down then keep them in a safe place. In addition, two respondents gave further 
suggestions: One suggested that employees should remember their password 
because their organisation should have a system in which when employees forget 
their passwords they would be given a new one. The other participant added a 
suggestion of rules for employees to remember their password easily, such as 
combinations of initials and any digits from their mobile number or date of birth. 
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5.4.1.2 Phishing and virus threats: 
The results show that all participants chose policy-compliant answers for scenarios 
12 and 13 which concerned email usage and missing files from employees’ 
computers respectively (see Table  5.6). Similarly, in scenarios 8 and 9 which 
concerned viruses and receiving email from unknown sources, fifteen of them gave 
policy-compliant answers. The worst response rate in this group was scenario 7 
which showed that only twelve agreed that employees should follow the 
information security policy regarding personal details. 
Table  5.6: Phishing and virus threats  
Scenario Circumstance  ISP-compliant behaviour % 
12 Employees want to use their 
work email for their own 
commercial purposes. 
Not use their accounts for 
personal or commercial 
purposes. 
100 
13 Some files are missing from 
their computers and some 
changes have happened. 
Inform the IT staff immediately. 100 
8 Application windows start to 
move around on employees’ 
computers and many new 
windows suddenly appear 
Disconnect their computer from 
the network and inform the IT 
staff. 
88 
9 Opened attachment email 
which will get rid of the virus. 
Delete the email immediately 
without opening the 
attachment. 
88 
7 Personal details by login to 
specific web link. 
Phone the administrator to 
report the email. 
70 
 
In scenario 12, all IT staff believed that employees’ organisation email accounts are 
not for personal or commercial purposes. However, four participants accepted that 
employees could reply to their customers if they have personal businesses, but they 
should not sell products through their university email account. In addition, one 
participant accepted that employees could use their organisation’s email account 
just for people they trust and one participant accepted that employees could use the 
organisation’s email account for business purposes if they did not attach any files. 
The results show that in scenario 13 all participants suggested that when 
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employees’ files are missing from their computers and some changes have 
happened they should inform the IT staff immediately. However, two participants 
would accept employees not reporting missing files if the information they 
contained was not important. 
For scenario 8, 15 IT staff first accepted the policy-compliant behaviour of 
disconnecting their computer from the network and informing the IT staff when 
their application windows start to move around. However, they also agreed that 
employees should make sure that the antivirus software is on even though they are 
already infected. Eight IT staff accepted employees should log out of their account. 
In addition, four suggested that employees should call their co-workers over so 
they can witness what is happening. Two participants added a suggestion that 
employees should inform the help desk. 
15 participants in scenario 9 accepted the policy-compliant behaviour of deleting 
the email immediately without opening an attachment when it comes from an 
unknown source. However, one participant agreed that employees could reply to 
the sender and ask who they are and another participant believed that employees 
could forward the email to a co-worker and ask him what to do. In the suggestions 
and comments, three IT staff would advise their employees to inform IT staff about 
this case. 
In scenario 7, 12 IT staff accepted employees telephoning the administrator to 
report receiving an email asking for username and password which appears to have 
come from an administrator. In addition, ten respondents accepted employees 
deleting the email. By contrast, three IT staff accepted employees checking the 
email’s source and, if correct, clicking on the link, and two of them agreed that they 
should click on the link to check what is there which could release a virus. 
5.4.1.3 Technical security with privileges 
In this set of scenarios dealing with technical security for employees with elevated 
computer privileges a higher proportion of IT staff chose the security compliant 
behaviour (see Table  5.7). 
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Table  5.7: Technical security with privileges 
Scenario  Circumstance  ISP-compliant 
behaviour 
% 
11 Employees urgently need to install some free 
software that they have downloaded from the 
Internet for work purposes. 
Ask a technician to 
install the software 
100 
10 Employees want to disable the antivirus 
software in their computers when they are 
very busy and have a lot of work to do 
because they thinks it slows down their 
computers. 
Not disable the 
antivirus software 
94 
14 When the project is finished employees want 
to delete the files because they no longer 
need them. 
Ask permission from 
all the colleagues 
they work with. 
88 
 
For scenario 11, all 17 participants suggested that employees should ask IT 
administration to install the software to be on the safe side. In addition to policy 
compliant behaviour, four IT staff accepted that employees could install software 
from the internet by themselves, but they would have to make sure it had no virus. 
Furthermore, four agreed that employees could ask for a technician’s username and 
password to install the software by themselves and two of them agreed that 
employees should install the software immediately if they can.  
For scenario 10, 16 participants did not agree with employees disabling the 
antivirus software on their computers when they are very busy. However, two 
participants suggested that employees could ask the IT staff to disable the antivirus 
software for a short time and another one thought that employees should ask the IT 
staff to give them administrator privileges to save time.  
In scenario 14, 15 participants gave ISP-compliant responses, insisting that 
employees should ask permission from all the colleagues they work with on a 
project before deleting files upon project completion. 12 participants accepted that 
employees could delete the files but make sure they save copies onto their USB 
memory stick first even though they could lose the USBs or unwanted people could 
get them which creates a security risk. In addition, five IT staff would accept their 
employees deleting unimportant files and two of them agreed that employees can 
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go ahead and delete the files they have access to. Only one participant noted that 
the shared files do not belong to just one person to do whatever he/she wants 
because the files are owned by many people at the workplace. 
5.4.1.4 Backup confidential data 
In scenario 1, 11 (65%) of the participants, which was the third lowest score, 
agreed that employees should not send their confidential work files to third-party 
sites (e.g., Gmail), yet 9 of them were willing accept that their employees send 
confidential data to a Gmail account when they got permission from their managers. 
Five of them thought sending confidential files to a personal Gmail account in 
order to have more copies was acceptable and three thought it was acceptable to do 
this in order to send files to trusted colleagues. 
Six participants in the free-form text section added that it would also be acceptable 
for employees to send the email but should have password protection (two 
participants), save it in their organisation’s internal backup services (two 
participants), or save it on a flash drive and/or DVD (two participants).  
5.4.1.5 Physical security 
In scenario 5, a number of participants would accept non-compliant behaviour. 
Eight participants found it acceptable to lock their computer’s screen but not the 
office or work area (doors, windows). In addition, six participants accepted 
employees leaving their offices for a few minutes and not locking the door just 
their computer’s screen. Moreover, four IT staff accepted employees not locking 
their computer screen if their colleagues are in the office.  
5.4.2 Summary of acceptable and unacceptable employees’ behaviour 
IT staff were asked to select acceptable and unacceptable behaviours for each 
scenario not only to identify the level of policy compliance with the information 
security policy, but also to highlight other acceptable employee behaviours. 
Acceptable means that IT staff allow employees to behave in a way that is not fully 
compliant with the organisation’s ISP.  
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The findings show that IT staff and system administrators did not all know the 
compliant behaviour for the 14 scenarios. The highest percentage would look for 
policy compliance for incident reporting (missing files), and the least for creating 
new passwords and not sharing passwords with IT staff (10). This means that not 
all IT staff and system administrators have good knowledge when it comes to 
information security behaviour. Furthermore, they accept some alternative 
behaviours, a phenomenon Kirlappos et al. (2014) have called shadow security, or 
non-official policy. 
For example, nine of them would accept employees sharing their password with 
their managers if the manager agreed to take responsibility and to send confidential 
data to commercial email servers when they get permission from their managers. 
Ten of them would accept employees changing one of their password’s characters 
in order to create a new password for another service. These proportions are not 
small, and all organisations should make sure that all IT staff and system 
administrators understand and follow the information security policy properly and 
not just focus on their end users because the IT staff and system administrators 
make decisions related to information security management. In depth interviews 
with IT staff and system administrators were needed to explore the main threats to 
information security, their perspectives on organisational information security 
management and behavioural factors affecting employees’ information security 
behaviour. Section 3.5 and 3.6 are also extended to highlight the need for a 
comparison between IT beliefs and actual intentions, to establish whether those 
responsible for policy (IT staff) understand the effectiveness of that policy. 
 Qualitative data analysis of IT staff and system administrators’ 5.5
views on organisational information security management and 
behavioural factors affecting employees’ information security behaviour  
This section highlights four separate aspects of employee behaviour: types of 
information security incident and employees’ reporting, factors influencing 
employees to comply with an ISP, barriers to compliance with policies. Finally, 
recommendations are made regarding the development of an organisation’s 
information security strategy and to successful change employees’ behaviour to 
comply with information security policy. 
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5.5.1 IT staff and system administrators’ views on employees’ behaviours in 
information security  
All IT staff and system administrators agreed that human behaviour is very 
important in making an organisation secure. As one participant said: 
The system will become more secure if the behaviour of human will be 
applied meaning if that staff will follow strictly the security policies [P4]. 
Participants were asked to identify the main vulnerabilities that caused security 
breaches in their organisations, they believed that most security breaches happened 
in their organisation because of their employees’ behaviour not because of 
technologies and they were encouraged to train them to avoid such behaviours. One 
participant put it this way: 
If there are any breaches it is by human not the machine itself so humans 
they should be trained for the security thing [P10].  
All participants agreed that lack of awareness and knowledge in information 
security leads to security breaches, as expressed by participant: 
The employees are still not aware regarding to information security ... Many 
breaches happened because users do not have knowledge about information 
security [P12]. 
This is in line with our earlier findings in Chapter 3 in which the majority of IT and 
administration staff stated that the main problems of information security are a 
result of their users’ behaviours. 
5.5.2 Types of information security incidents and employees reporting 
behaviour  
The participants identified that incidents happened in their organisations because of 
their users and there are different ways to cause incidents. In addition, they were 
unclear whether employees know how, when and to whom they should report an 
incident.  
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5.5.2.1 Types of information security incidents   
The participants declared that there are many information security incidents that 
occur as a result of employee behaviour, especially via emails when they click on 
links, open attached files or open spam emails that have viruses. Email incidents 
are the most prevalent: 
Email is very common communication which is widely available and one 
person has more than one email address and they [employees] can get a lot 
of spam claiming that to get information [P3]. 
Sending important information such as usernames and passwords to phishing 
emails was common according to the participants who acknowledged that 
employees’ behaviour caused problems: 
Some of the employees are writing their passwords. Sometimes they are using 
their colleague’s mail to register in some phishing websites this is affecting 
mail server they receiving a lot of spams because of this [P6]. 
Users created incidents through their personal devices, such as their laptops, when 
they are authorised to disable their computer antivirus software: 
If some staff may feel that antivirus blocking something and they could 
disable that but in the domain level they cannot because it centralised but 
they are disabling it on their laptop which is not good [P11].   
The last incident we have faced last semester that one employee installed 
software from the internet and that software sends packets to breach our 
network … but we found that he installed it through his laptop which is out of 
our domain network [P12]. 
5.5.2.2 Employees’ reporting security incidents  
Participants indicated the types of security incidents reported by employees and 
reflected on the compliance intentions and awareness levels this reporting 
represented. Users have an important role to play in reporting a possible security 
incident before any major consequences of an incident occur. It is important for an 
organisation to make their employees feel responsible for security and be willing to 
118 
 
report information security incidents. This requires that the employees are not 
fearful of blame for mistakes.   
Three participants agreed that employees do not report information security 
incidents and 12 of them indicated that they report the incident after it happened. 
As one participant said: 
Both happened [incident reporting] sometimes [employees] report and not, 
but they report when the problem happened [P10].  
The IT staff hold different beliefs about why employees report incidents or not. 
Reasons that most employees do not report incidents include lack of knowledge 
about incident reporting and consequences of incidents (there are no sanctions 
associated with not reporting incident). 
Most of the time they [employees] did not report about the incident because 
they do not know if there is a problem or not but we discover the problem of 
that [P12].  
Figure  5.3 shows the participants’ views on employee behaviour around security 
incident reporting. Employees may report an information security threat either 
before or after an incident happened. Some employees did not report information 
security incidents and may have lacked appropriate knowledge or were not aware 
of the consequences of not reporting. 
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Figure  5.3: Employees' behaviour threat reports  
 
Most of them [employees] reported after the incident happened because they 
do not know the effects [of the incident at the time] [12]. 
Some employees never report an incident until the incident makes their work 
difficult.  
If there is incident that makes them struggle with their work they will report 
it other than that they will never report. Usually they report after it happens 
[P6].  
Employees reported information security incidents after sending important 
information in response to phishing emails such as username and password or 
personal details.  
Most of employees report to us after replying to phishing emails [P1]. 
When employees are late to report an incident, the time required to fix the problem 
is increased. 
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Most employees reported the incidents after it happens and this cause us [IT 
staff] more time to solve the problem [P15]. 
5.5.2.3 Solutions and lessons learnt from incident reports  
Rader et al. (2012) found that most people have learned lessons from their friends 
and families’ stories of information security incidents and that this can increase 
security behaviour when making data decisions. In addition, employees sharing 
stories of negative experiences indicate that self-efficacy may well be a strong 
determinant (Conway et al., 2017). In this study the IT staff discussed some 
solutions for organisations and their employees when faced with information 
security threats. Most participants send an announcement to all employees through 
email and mobile devices to avoid a repeat of a problem once it has been 
discovered by employees reporting the incident to the helpdesk or IT staff finding 
the problem. 
We [IT staff] are experiencing the email phishing they send to the help desk, 
in the past they reply but now through the awareness by sending messages 
through mobile and emails to the staff if you receive this kind of email do not 
reply [P1]. 
When users discover there is a security threat from inside or outside of the 
organisation they should inform responsible people in security before an incident 
happens. Participants believed that the best way to make employees aware that they 
need to inform their IT help desk and/or system administrators is by sending emails 
to them. 
Before they [employees] informed us after the incident but because of our 
awareness through sending emails to make them aware about malicious 
emails they now delete and inform us before doing anything [P13]. 
IT staff also thought it was important to have consistent ways of dealing with new 
and/or existing staff, and they should be told immediately. 
We need some procedures and policy to know who are joining and leaving 
the college to delete or add new accounts [P9]. 
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Some participants took the opportunity of an information security incident caused 
by employees in the workplace to create a lesson for employees, so they could 
warn all employees about that incident, tell them how to avoid it in the future and 
remind them of the policy.  
Incidents help them [employee] as lesson and we send them a message that 
or we convince them by saying to them that you put your organisation to this 
risk because of your behaviour [P15]. 
Another participant pointed out that employees would know the information 
security policy after the incident happened to them: 
Most of organisation, the policy is there but nobody have the time to read 
that policy so they will came to know the policy when incidents happened 
[P10]. 
One participant pointed out that an incident, even though it happens to someone 
else, could be a lesson for anyone in the organisation:  
From my experience other way around that a friend who has victimise by 
scam he experience scam and he lost a lot of money. I think that negative 
behaviour of colleague helps me to change my behaviour regarding 
information security policy [P2]. 
Making people aware of incidents provides good lessons for employees, reduces 
the likelihood of repetition, and avoids the consequences their co-workers have 
experienced, such as loss of money, time, or important information. Organisations 
need to have a strategy to increase information security management and awareness 
of their employees to reduce mistakes and avoid all these consequences.    
5.5.2.4 Summary of employees’ incident reporting in information security  
The interviewees indicated that there are a number of incidents caused by human 
behaviour rather than technology. The most common problem was said to be 
responding to emails in the workplace. Participants noted that there was a lack of 
security incident reporting by employees.  Most participants indicated that 
employees only reported a problem if they experienced a noticeable consequence 
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with their work.  IT staff did not believe that very many employees would report a 
mistake without experiencing some consequences. 
5.5.3 IT staff and System administrators’ views on individual behavioural 
factors affecting information security  
The purpose of this part is to understand the factors that IT staff believe influence 
employee ISP compliance. Understanding these factors could lead to improved 
compliance levels in the higher education institutions. All participants were asked, 
from their experience, what factors (knowledge and awareness, managers and co-
workers, and sanctions and rewards) they believe influence employees compliance 
with the organisation’s ISP. Participants were prompted with the same eight factors 
(except response efficacy and behaviour intention) across 14 scenarios from the 
questionnaires as explored in the previous chapter. 
5.5.3.1 Knowledge and awareness roles in information security 
Interview question: Do you think knowledge would change employees’ behaviour 
positively or negatively? Do you have experience or examples of where you have 
seen knowledge change users’ behaviour positively or negatively in specific 
security areas? 
The importance of Knowledge: Participants were asked if they believed that 
improved knowledge would change employees’ compliance with the ISP and all of 
them agreed that it would change positively. In addition, 13 of them brought 
examples from their own experience. One participant mentioned that an employee 
who has knowledge will avoid any phishing emails from hackers and one without 
knowledge would become a victim. 
Understanding consequences: All participants linked employees’ information 
security awareness to their knowledge of the consequences of their behaviour when 
they were asked if knowledge would change employees’ behaviour. As one 
participant put it: 
Yes definitely, if they [employees] know the hazards the knowledge will help 
protecting the environment [P6].  
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Another participant said: 
 Positively, if the staff knew what will be the effect [of their behaviour] [P4]. 
Others agreed that knowledge would allow employees to avoid security incidents, 
as one participant put it: 
Giving knowledge to employees is very important to prevent these incidents 
[P2]. 
Another participant said:  
Yes, if the person is educated and aware and qualified that would help. The 
person should have the ability to develop himself and really the education 
and guidelines and what they should do and not do and what is wrong and 
correct action would help even by training [P16].    
While this is a rather naïve view of the participant, it reflects the belief of IT staff 
that knowledge by itself can prevent harm. 
5.5.3.2 Managers and Co-workers 
Employees’ compliance behaviour may be influenced by their managers’ and/or 
co-workers’ reactions to the policy. The respondents were asked how managers and 
/or co-workers change employees’ behaviour positively or negatively with 
examples they have experienced.  
Managers are the decision makers in their department and they have more 
privileges and rights than other employees do. This study attempted to explore 
managers’ roles in changing their employees’ behaviour (positively or negatively).  
15 participants agreed that managers who have knowledge about the ISP are a 
positive influence on their employees to comply with organisational information 
security policy, as one participant said: 
Yes [positive effect], if the managers understand and practise the ISP for 
themselves first. And he added that:  It depends on the knowledge and 
privileges of the managers in the network [P16]. 
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If instructions come from a manager/superior it was thought more likely that 
instructions would be followed: 
Yes, it is happening the hierarchy of the administration it has to go from up 
to down and how important is data and how important is the security policies 
[P2]. 
Another participant confirmed that: 
Yes, actually for any organisation happened from the top to the bottom. From 
the top - if follow the policies down employees definitely do but if the top not 
follow, the staff also says if my boss is not following they say why I need it, 
this is the reason we sometime we face it like if we ask them sometime to do 
they say my boss not doing why I should do [P10].  
One participant pointed out that a manager could influence employees in the same 
department:    
To comply with ISP especially if he is manager he could convince his 
employees in his department [P15].   
One participant suggested that information security threats would be reduced when 
managers work with their team to reduce the risk of information security:  
We [IT staff and system administrators] have faced many spamming emails 
and flooding and many problems. Then the head of the university team work 
on the security then the problems reduce to 80% [P12]. 
On the other hand, he added that an older manager has a negative effect on ISP 
compliance in their department: 
It depends to the manager if that position taken by someone who is from the 
oldest I do not think so because they do not care about information security 
and he cannot implement awareness and ISP [P12].   
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One participant suggested that managers could motivate their employees to follow 
the ISP when a member of IT staff has a good suggestion to a manager regarding 
security: 
It depends on the head of department how he can to handle the staff. For 
example, for me if I have a good suggestion and the manager not agree with 
my suggestion and if he not agrees it will be negative. But if I have 
suggestion and the manager agrees and implements this suggestion it is 
positive [P8]. 
Only one participant thought that managers do not have that big an effect on their 
employees’ compliance with the ISP: 
Sometimes we [IT staff] ask managers in the colleges to do guidelines about 
information security but they [employees] did not practice it so that means 
that they do not have that big effect [P5].  
Participants reflected not only on the departmental level, but also at institution level. 
For instance, one participant said: 
We [IT staff] find it that one college are adhere to ISP and other not because 
of their managers [P14].  
Another participant said: 
Some colleges are following ISP and others not because of the relationship 
between the IT centre and the managers. If the manager or the dean are good 
in IT and attend the security awareness, because we are conducting 
awareness to the managers and top positions they will have good response 
and his employees try to follow the best practice of the protecting data [P15]. 
Participants believed that IT managers practised more compliance with the ISP 
than other departmental managers and insisted on more compliance from their staff.   
One participant said: 
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The managers in the IT department always are practising ISP more than 
other department such as administrative department because they don’t have 
background about security [P16].  
Another participant said: 
 For example, IT department has strict policy to not install any program 
which is not licenced [P1]. 
While differences in ISP compliance may be due to job roles, these quotes show 
that IT staff in these organisations believe that knowledge is the crucial factor. 
- Authority and enforcement  
Another reason why managers are very important in changing employees’ 
behaviour is that they are authorised to implement the ISP in the department and 
are responsible for ensuring that employees follow policy, and can effectively 
block any suggested changes. As one participant said: 
Sometimes if the authority did not give any support to worker, even when we 
[IT staff] have good ideas for security and we did not have approval from the 
managers we cannot do anything [P4].  
Another participant said:  
We [IT staff] cannot implement [ISP] until managers do that, if manager will 
not do staff will never do [P10]. 
Participants thought that managers should be a good example to their employees. 
When managers comply with policy, participants thought that employees would in 
turn be more likely to comply (and vice versa). As one participant said: 
If the managers are following ISP and if they are enforcing it to their 
subordinates then it gives positive feedback from their employees too as well 
as managers do because if the manager is not care so why would the 
employees care [P2]. 
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- Communication with managers  
The line of communication for most education organisations to implement a policy 
is to go first from information security management to managers of departments 
then to employees. The majority of participants agreed that communication 
between them and managers of departments and employees is a vitally important 
factor to enforce compliance of organisational ISP. As one participant said: 
If sometimes we [IT staff] want to make decision we have to follow the rules 
and procedures for some information we have to inform team leader the head 
of section then head of department this is the hierarchy level we are still 
maintaining [P9].  
5.5.3.2.1 Co-workers’ roles in information security 
Participants were asked whether they believe employees’ ISP compliance 
behaviour would change other employees’ behaviour positively or negatively in the 
same organisation. Ten participants agreed that employees could be affected 
positively if their co-workers follow the ISP and have knowledge about security, as 
one participant said: 
Yes, they have positive impact especially when there is some employees’ 
neglecting at duty and working with other who is complying with ISP they 
will affect them positively [P13].  
And another participant said:  
Yeah, it affects co-worker also because human nature is learning from the 
experiences. It helps if one to two in every room strictly complies with the 
policies the other people start to do that behaviour also [P10]. 
Sharing knowledge between employees in the workplace is a very important factor 
for success in information security compliance. Some employees don’t have 
knowledge of how to deal with information security problems and they can avoid 
mistakes when they ask their co-workers who have knowledge.  
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I believe so it will help others [employees] because once a person who has 
experience of those things [information security] they share it to their 
colleagues [P2]. 
Employees are willing to learn from each other, especially if someone has 
knowledge about security: 
Yes, they [employees] will be affected positively because nowadays people 
are trying to learn and avoid problems and employees will learn from the 
person who has knowledge and we found that has advantage they are 
cooperating to teach each other in the college [P12].  
On the other hand, a few participants thought that employees would affect each 
other negatively because they learn unacceptable behaviours from each other to 
avoid spending time in security structures or they do not have skills to practice 
securely.  
Negatively yes will affect but positively rarely. I have seen they giving advice 
to write the password and you can save it in mobile and disabling the 
antivirus [P6].  
Participants agreed that employees follow each other due to friendship without 
knowing if they comply with the ISP: 
Yes they [employees] will follow each other’s by not following ISP but they 
are copying their friends. For example, replying to the emails and they ask 
each other if those users will ask his friend if he replies to that message then 
he will reply without knowledge [P1]. 
 Let say some employees do not know to do something then they [co-workers] 
will tell him click this and they will follow because this is about knowledge if 
you give them things and new information they will follow [P17]. 
However, another believed it would depend on the awareness level of the 
individual. For instance, when one participant was asked if seeing someone writing 
a password on paper would affect other employees’ behaviour he said: 
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It depends to the person some people use to them [passwords] this is not 
security threat depends on the awareness and habit [P17].   
The fact that employees are more likely to ask their colleagues for advice than IT 
staff can cause problems. IT staff are left to try and explain that the employee’s 
friend gave the wrong advice: 
Yes, it has positive effect as lessons. For example, about antivirus, if the first 
one is asked for exception to do the disable then they [employees] come to us 
[IT staff] and we convince him that antivirus not slow down his computer 
process and clean his system from viruses and we have done configuration in 
his system then he [employee] informed his friends [co-workers] about that 
then they come to us for help or any action regards to IT [P15].  
5.5.3.2.2 Summary of managers’ and co-workers’ findings 
The results demonstrate that managers and co-workers are judged to have an effect 
on employees’ compliance with organisational ISPs. 15 participants agreed that 
managers have a very an important effect on their employees’ compliance and ten 
of them agreed that employees follow their co-workers’ behaviours rather than 
referring to policy.  
Managers of departments and colleges have more authority than IT staff to enforce 
the policy. They also serve as role models and can be a good example to their 
employees and have information security knowledge and good communication 
with information security management and their employees. In addition, it was felt 
that colleagues influence each other positively and negatively depending on their 
knowledge and awareness. Any incident could serve as a lesson for other 
employees to learn from when it is communicated to all employees to avoid it 
happening again in the future (Tatu et al., 2018).  
5.5.3.3 Sanctions and Rewards 
Sanctions and rewards at any organisation could influence ISP compliance. To 
explore IT staff and system administrators’ experience of sanctions and rewards 
and their influence on employees’ security behaviour participants were asked two 
separate questions.  
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In terms of sanctions, 13 participants believed that when organisations use 
sanctions, employees’ ISP compliance behaviour would improve. However, most 
of the organisations studied did not practice this. All organisations have 
punishment rules but the problem was seen to be that they do not apply them. 
When participants were asked if sanctions by their organisation would motivate 
employees to comply with their organisational ISP one participant said: 
 Yes, I believe it will effect positively if you punished one employees the 
others will follow the policy. We have the rules of punishment but not 
implemented [P12].  
And another said: 
Yes, I believe it will effect positively. I do not have experience on enforcing 
sanctions but for my personal opinion having sanctions to the users would 
force them or changes their behaviour on security policy [P2]. 
Participants from several organisations believed that sanctions should be used in an 
organisation and they suggested different options for an organisation to force 
employees to comply with the ISP.  
Of course, they [employees] will follow security policies if there is a sanction 
for example for sharing password they should give them three warning [P1].  
As in the education sector I prefer to be sanction and it should be depending 
on the level of the behaviour of the employees [P16]. 
IT staff were aware that staff would require education and awareness before 
implementing a sanction, as exemplified by two participants: 
Yes, I believe it will effect positively. We [IT staff] have to do the awareness 
and educate them that there will be sanction for misusing of devices and data 
in the workplace [P5]. 
Yes, positively, when employees know what is the consequence in doing 
anything [P8]. 
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IT staff believed that the ISP would be followed by employees if there was a 
punishment and, conversely that they would ignore it if there is no punishment. 
They will neglect to follow as one participant said: 
Sometime if we [IT staff] apply strict policy sometimes they neglect, they will 
say this time if I do not do it there is no issue but if there is punishment then 
definitely they will follow [P10]. 
A few participants believed that sanctions would have no effect on employees’ 
compliance behaviour: 
Punishment will not change users’ behaviour we have to educate and train 
them [P7]. 
No [effect on employees]. The punishment as since of denial of services yes, 
but extreme punishment, No I do not believe [in punishment] [P6]. 
Some participants provided examples of when punishment had been seen to work 
for an individual: 
Sometimes there is abused of using computer by sending bulk of emails from 
one computer then we [IT staff] inform the person about that then we 
terminated his account then he responds positively and try to avoid same 
problem [P15].  
An example was also provided of when the sanction was announced to other 
employees in same organisation to encourage them to follow the guidance: 
I will give you an example, before the staff doing the exams so we have told 
them you have to save that files in this location but he did not save it and he 
lost all the files so that exam was gone and no one know where it is, student 
were saying we give him and we ask the staff where did you save the files and 
he said I put it in the desktop then we said we told you have to save it in that 
location so you are responsible then the management decided what action to 
do then we announced it and definitely it affect [P10]. 
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5.5.3.3.1 Rewards in information security 
Participants were asked if rewards would change employees’ behaviour positively 
or negatively. Only eight of the participants said that rewards would help to 
encourage employees to follow ISP as one participant said: 
Yes, it is 100% that should be [rewards] by the HR if you are not 
encouraging the employees after some time the employees will lose interest 
and they loss everything but if you encourage them then definitely they will 
do [P10].  
Suggestions were made as to how the rewards could be structured to motivate 
employees to comply with their organisational ISP. 
Before we [IT staff and system administrators] apply for some rules and no 
one [employees] are following after that with co-operation with other 
organisation, people how follow this we will make a draw and will give them 
some gift first time some people came and second time when we announced 
20% people come third time when we announced 50% people come. They go 
for that document and follow the rules [P10]. 
Another participant suggested that rewards that recognise performance (such as a 
certificate for those who follow the ISP) would help to motivate employees to 
comply with the ISP. One participant suggested:  
Yes, it will affect positive when the management reward or give credit to the 
person. ... They [management] give certificate for precautions when 
employees’ performance is better and that will motivate employees [P8]. 
However, the half of the participants felt that rewards would have no effect:  
Reward system I think it is not affected [P3]. 
No that [reward system] is their deity and this is protecting for them 
[employees] and they have to follow that policy [P4]. 
 A few participants indicated that sanctions and rewards do not exist in their 
organisations or are not a big issue. For example:  
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Since we [organisation] do not have punishment we do not have rewards in 
the system [P6]. 
I think it [reward] has positive affect sometimes. We do not follow this as big 
issue [P15]. 
Only one participant believed that rewards for employees who follow the ISP 
would have a negative effect on others: 
The security is very important especially in admission and registration 
department. To motivate the employees to comply with ISP from my opinion I 
am afraid that reward will be competition between users on the rewards and 
it could be it is a negative effect [P16]. 
Another participant suggested that rewards have a positive effect just on the IT 
staff and system administrators who create the ISP and working in IT staff as he 
said: 
Yes, it will effect for the developers who are updated and brings ideas for ISP. 
But if one person updated and producing a new ISP ideas and then his 
suggestions is not accepted or been ignored that will stop him to bring 
suggestions and this will effect negatively [P13].  
The same participant continued, suggesting that the reward would be if the 
organisation accepted his idea in security environment:  
When organisation is accepted staff suggestions regarding secure 
environment that is the reward instead of gift or certificates [P13].  
5.5.3.3.2 Summary of sanction and reward factors 
All participants were asked about the impact of rewards and sanctions on 
employees’ compliance behaviour. The results show that most participants believed 
that sanctions would be effective. In addition, almost half of them agreed that 
rewards could also be effective. A few of the participants agreed that sanctions and 
rewards may have a negative impact on employees’ compliance behaviour. Despite 
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these beliefs it does not appear to be the case that rewards or sanctions are 
implemented within the majority of the organisations studied.  
5.5.4 The main barriers to compliance with the information security policy 
Several barriers that hinder employees’ compliance with their organisation’s 
information security policy were identified under two main themes: organisational 
culture and employee culture barriers. Each theme includes several discrete aspects 
that can impede employees’ compliance.     
5.5.4.1 Organisational culture barriers   
The participants indicated several aspects that can substantially inhibit employees’ 
compliance with the ISP.  
a. Lack of awareness of threats and consequences of non-compliance  
11 participants indicated that employees are not aware of the ISP because their 
organisation does not provide training or awareness programmes for them and that 
this can lead to increased security breaches: 
We do not have that much awareness in the college especially in the security 
or in the way of dealing with security problems [P6]. 
Users do not know about security just he open what he want to open. 
Knowledge and awareness in our organisation is very weak [P12].  
Participants suggested that employees should be aware of the threats the ISP is 
designed to protect against and the consequences of not complying with it: 
As long as it is clear to the staff the advantage and disadvantage of the 
security will help to comply with ISP [P8]. 
If they [employees] know the hazard or the effect of their action definitely 
they are not going to do it [P6]. 
Number one is the knowledge by employees has a knowledge it would give 
them adequate information regarding of the dangerous or the threats of not 
following information security policy [P2]. 
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- Infrequent information security awareness campaigns  
Three participants mentioned that their organisation has an information security 
awareness campaign and training for their users, but that it is not effective when it 
happens just once. Training, which helps them to stop making mistakes, needs to be 
regular and evaluated for its effectiveness.  
It [information security awareness] should be ongoing process and should 
not stop whenever it stop people will not do it and will forget it [P10]. 
Also, the training should be continually repeated as security awareness is an 
ongoing activity [P2]. 
Awareness seminars should be regular which has done one year before but 
that is mean not enough which is not possible for organisation to conduct 
awareness programme for three months it should be small teams in 
departments at least once in the month or twist and it has to be streamlined 
[P3]. 
b. Managers’ behaviour, attitudes and communication  
The second main barrier to compliance with the ISP was the managers’ behaviour 
and attitude. When managers do not understand the advantages and disadvantages 
of the ISPs, are not persuading employees to follow them, are failing to 
communicate and do not follow the ISP themselves, the employees are less likely 
to comply:  
Knowledge and manager have positive effect on employees’ behaviour to 
comply with ISP. The manger should have knowledgeable about security 
policy, because the manager forcing employees without knowledge what is 
advantage and disadvantage will be useless [P8].  
[Managers] should force the staff to follow the policy and the managers 
should follow the policy then the staff will follow also.  We have the policy 
but there is no strict implementation of the policy from the higher-ups 
(managers) there is no supporting that is why security is not strong [P4] 
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Lack of seriousness of compliance with information security policy from the 
small management to top [P13].  
Lack of awareness and there is communication gap between one department 
to another department and from higher position [manager] to lower position 
[staff] [P4]. 
c. Information security policy  
Participants pointed out that when the ISP is difficult to understand, does not cover 
all required behaviours, gets in the way of productivity or prevents employees 
doing things the way they want to, then employees would be less likely to comply: 
If the policy is not clear for them and if the policy blocking their process [at 
work time] and they did not know what the effect of that policy is [P1]. 
Work pressure makes employees to not follow the ISP [P12]. 
They [employees] want everywhere shortcut if they follow the policy they will 
go for long run [P7]. 
We have ISP but it is not related to the behaviour for example if the staff 
want to access to the internet what they have to do [P8]. 
The organisation should cover everything in the security and continues to 
aware their employees [P14]. 
If we [IT staff] do not give the proper explanation [about ISP] they 
[employees] will be angry and they will not meet their understanding [P11]. 
The culture her that they [employees] are feeling information security 
something like limitations stopping them do what they want to do [P5]. 
Another participant pointed out that if employees had to take responsibility for their 
actions, then they may be more likely to comply with the policy: 
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The hackers say that we are supporting email and send me your [employees] 
username and password to do the rest and because users not sign for 
password responsibility they do not care about it [P14]. 
d. Lack of security organisation  
An organisation needs to have information security staff to follow up the work and 
observe employees’ behaviour relating to security. One participant thought that this 
is a problem with most organisations as they do not have sufficient staff for 
information security. 
Actually we have a plan for the awareness but you have to get staff for 
information security [P15]. 
e. Technology and hardware  
Old technology may be slower than employees like and employees may disable 
security software to speed up their system. Participants identified not keeping 
technology up to date as a potential barrier to security compliance.  
We [organisation] have to upgrade our software and hardware because for 
person disable his antivirus because of slowing the computer because if the 
computer upgraded the employees will not disable their antivirus when they 
are busy [P3]. 
f. Lack of sanctions and rewards  
Some participants mentioned that when there are no sanctions or rewards in an 
organisation that employees would be less motivated to comply with the ISP. For 
example: 
There is no punishment and motivation [P12]. 
5.5.4.1.1 Summary of organisational culture barriers  
In this section, several organisational culture barriers to employees’ compliance 
with information security policy are identified. IT staff and system administrators 
indicated that they believed the main barriers were: 
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 Organisations not providing regular awareness and training programmes 
that clearly illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of following the 
ISP and not evaluating the effectiveness of these programmes.  
 Top management and middle managers not understanding information 
security policies and not complying with them. In addition, lack of 
communication between them with information security management and 
their staff and not enforcing policy on their employees.  
 Information security policies and behaviour guidelines which are not 
available, difficult to understand or do not cover important behaviours.  
 Lack of security staff. 
 Old and slow software and hardware. 
 Lack of sanctions and rewards for security behaviours. 
 
5.5.4.2 Human behaviour and culture influencers 
There are several human factors that could influence employees’ non-compliance 
with their organisational ISP. These include trust, bad habits, misunderstanding the 
security policy, lack of interest, lack of security skills and work pressure.  
a. Trust  
Most participants suggested that trust between all staff in the work environment is 
the main problem for security. There is a culture of trust which means that staff 
may leave a door open when they leave their offices, would not lock their screen if 
they leave the computer (if other staff are in the room) and may share usernames 
and passwords: 
The main reason of not following ISP is our culture because we [all staff at 
organisation] feel that we have trust each other. It is difficult to say no to our 
co-workers if they ask to access to your computer or use your password 
[P15].  
We [IT staff] do find that incidents where users attempt to share information 
with friends which is good for them but not good for organisation. We inform 
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the employees not share their username and password even with their boss 
and security policy is this and that [P3].  
They [employees] share username and passwords with their co-workers 
because of trust [P12].  
Because it depends on the culture here like locking the door window 
especially there are more than one employees in on office and the society is 
trusted in the university culture [P17]. 
b. Bad habits  
A few participants mentioned that employees are not complying with the ISP 
because of bad habits. One asserted that employees should change their habit to 
comply with ISP:  
Time is not the factors of following the procedures it is meter of habit and 
change your habit [P6].  
Another participant, when asked about the main barriers to employees complying 
with information security policy, said:  
They think it is the habit and culture [P17]. 
Employees do not close their doors when leaving their office and one participant 
admitted that even he does not close his office when he leaves for a short time such 
as for coffee. 
Further one is physical security, usually happened by not closing the doors 
even myself not locking the door when I go for coffee or for breakfast. Most 
employees leave the doors open and there is no screen saver in their 
computer [P13]. 
c. Lack of interest  
Some participants indicated that one of the barriers to compliance was lack of 
interest as one participant said: 
Because of personal interest for example you want to open YouTube [P8].  
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Another participant said: 
You know that each user has his own computer and connected to the internet 
and he has free to do what he wants to do [P5]. 
One participant thought that employees are not taking ISPs seriously because they 
will not lose any money: 
Some employees take ISP as not serious issue in the college because they are 
not going to lose money or something that important as they think [P14]. 
d. Lack of security skills 
One participant pointed out that when employees created a strong password and 
they came back from a long holiday then they forgot their password. 
We [IT staff] are facing problems [from employees] about strong password 
especially after long holidays also the password if it is strong it should be 
changed every six months [P13]. 
Another participant indicated that some employees do not have basic IT skills such 
as searching for deleted files in their own computers. 
Employees do not have skills to search for deleted files and when they told us 
that they lost their files we find that he deleted it mistakes or he did not know 
where he moved it [P14]. 
5.5.4.2.1 Summary of behaviour barriers  
To summarise the findings regarding behaviour barriers to compliance with 
information security policies, several reasons were highlighted:  
 High trust between users can lead to failure to comply with organisational 
information security such as sharing password and leaving their office’s 
door open when they leave for short time. 
 Bad habits. 
 Lack of understanding of the benefit of complying with the ISP. 
 Lack of interest in security issues. 
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 Lack of information or security skills. 
5.5.5 Information security management and recommendations  
After the obstacles and factors that influence employees’ compliance behaviour 
were identified, participants were asked to give their opinions and 
recommendations to information security management to raise the employees’ 
behaviours and awareness and organisational security environments.  
5.5.5.1 Ranking important factors to help employees to comply with ISP 
Participants were asked to rank the influencing factors in order of importance to 
motivate behaviour to comply with organisational ISP such as knowledge and 
awareness, managers, information security policy, culture, sanctions and rewards. 
Figure  5.4 shows the order in which the factors were ranked. The results indicate 
that the participants consider the most important factor to be knowledge and 
awareness and the least influential to be a rewards system. 
                             
Figure  5.4: IT Staff ranking of important factors for employees’ behaviour 
All participants agreed that the most important factor is knowledge and awareness 
and therefore the organisation should educate and explain to employees why the 
ISP is important to follow. Security management should inform all employees 
where and what is their ISP and how important it is by conducting seminars.  
Any employees should be informed about what are their policies available in 
the organisation especially regards to the security and how important data to 
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this organisation and how important they reliable to securer their 
information that should be some seminar kind of workshop for administrators 
and employees [P2]. 
One participant mentioned that all the above factors collectively influence 
employees’ behaviour: 
All of these factors [knowledge, managers, sanctions and rewards] are 
related to each other and work together [P15]. 
5.5.5.2 Recommendations to improve information security policy compliance 
Two recommendation themes were identified: information security management 
requirements and employee security behaviour. 
5.5.5.2.1 Information security management requirements  
The participants provided various recommendations about how to improve 
compliance behaviour to reduce security incidents by improving information 
security management in the following areas.  
a. Awareness requirements  
All participants believed that employees’ security compliance would improve with 
more information security awareness and they specified that knowledge, training, 
education and manpower resources to deliver the training are the most important 
factors for successful compliance with the ISP.    
- Knowledge, training and education  
Participants identified several solutions to raise security awareness and educate 
employees to comply with organisational ISP including that organisations should 
train their employees through workshops and explain to them what the effects 
would be if they do not follow the ISP. For example:  
Firstly is again I would provide knowledge awareness to the employees by 
providing trainings workshops and giving them examples or ideas that 
information security policy is very important that it should be followed [P2]. 
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First they [employees] should be aware of that policy and what is the affect if 
they did not follow [P11]. 
Yes, educate means we have to give some security training, seminars. We 
have to explain and train them it is education purpose we have to educate 
and give the solid training needed [P7] 
The organisation should have a strategy for differentiating between employees who 
read the ISP and have knowledge about security and those who don’t. One 
participant expressed it this way:  
 For a new staff when they join the university they should read the policies 
and the regulations of the university but if someone has a knowledge and 
reading them what he has to do and what we have to do [P14].  
- Information security team  
Participants recommended that each organisation should have an information 
security team with representatives from different departments.   
There should be small committee [information security team] in different 
department of the organisation because it is very difficult for the 
organisation to understand all employees accessing the computers and doing 
all the works in the computer [P3]. 
It would be the role of this information security team to communicate the 
importance of security to the departments. As one participant said: 
As we are information security [staff] in the organisation the one who are 
responsible about availability, confidentiality and integrity of data in the 
organisation and anything could affect the data which is our priority [P15]. 
- Continuous awareness  
Participants believed that awareness and training should be carried out regularly to 
maintain the employees’ knowledge of best practice.   
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After period of time for example semester circulated like emails also should 
be there panels and some activity should be done so they [employees] will be 
aware and recall what the policy says about it. So the awareness should be 
continuous. … Awareness in the beginning and continues of awareness and 
sanctions [P14]. 
For example, there is email every six months spread to all employees about 
awareness for example password sharing or do not give it even to the 
administrators or their managers [P10]. 
- Methods to increase awareness  
IT staff suggested different methods they have tried in order to maintain their 
employees’ awareness about sending emails, putting information online and having 
face-to-face discussions about specific issues. Some suggestions for how to 
improve awareness provision were given. Examples are provided in the quotes 
below. 
We have to encourage employees through occasion meeting and emails [P9]. 
In the past they reply to spam emails but when we aware them through 
emails they are becoming better [P13]. 
When we are getting many problems from one department because of 
particular issues but we explain to them [employees] this is the scenario and 
this is the affect then the number of incidents is decreased [P4]. 
We [IT staff] explain it to them [employees] that make sure you do not do it 
again when you receive these emails their behaviour changes by next 
incident they receive the same request from the sources and unknown sources 
they informing us do we answer this or do we need to follow this link so it 
helps a lot if they proper information [P2]. 
Some staff from science department they are not familiar with IT skills and 
we are providing training online at E-learning after that they are good and 
they do not repeat the mistakes [P9]. 
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We have to have something more about security awareness programme or 
something centralised, awareness video or awareness instructions in our 
college website E-learning even though it is available in the internet we have 
to customize and keep it in to understand according to which one we are 
implementing of policy in the organisation [P11]. 
IT staff should consider employees’ reaction when they establish a new security 
system. Therefore, any awareness training must provide clear explanations of why 
employees must follow policy: 
We [IT staff] have the device to implement the policy hopefully not access 
this and that in case the security aware about that things to implement the 
policy up-to-date and then to avoid our staff feeling bad we have to give 
proper explanation in our website then they can understand so they will be 
happy to implement the security nicely [P11]. 
- Skills  
Participants agreed that all employees should have appropriate knowledge and IT 
skills. They mentioned some examples of information security skills such as 
creating a strong password for their folders and files. One participant highlighted 
that they had insisted on the use of long passwords but that this had caused some 
problems for staff. 
Other participants offered some examples of how employees could create long 
passwords and remember them easily. 
Before we [IT staff] are using only very minimal numbers of password 
accepting short password for employees now we [IT staff] implemented the 
ten characters password and some employees are having difficulties because 
sometimes they forget the password then we let them to change the password 
based on our requirements from that time the behaviour of that employees 
change by securing their computers [P1].  
For example everybody should have ten characters for their password for 
security purpose maybe they do not like it but I do not know here but in basic 
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if you introduce the knowledge they will accept it but this one takes time 
[P17]. 
Another participant discussed how they had to change employees’ behaviour to 
prevent passwords being saved in a file.  
It does happened when some incident happen then we [IT staff] came to know 
after we arrange training for them then they beneficial that they are keeping 
how they are storing their data, how they are putting the password in the 
folder [P10]. 
b. Effect of managers  
The majority of participants suggested that managers have a strong effect on 
employee ISP compliance. The manager is an important communication link 
between IT security and staff behaviour, influential in determining that staff attend 
training and which rewards could be available to employees. 
I will mention the ongoing training or ongoing rewards which is more 
attractive for the staff which are coming from the managers [P10].  
They also felt it was the managers’ responsibility to monitor compliance and 
correct any non-compliance, making sure the employee is aware of the 
consequences of non-compliance.   
If the manager is seeing he has to call that guy and tell this password is 
important and if someone has your password from outside they can access to 
our server [P7]. 
The managers should observe their employees behaviour [P16]. 
The manager is the key communication between the technicians and his 
employees [P12].  
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c. Information security policy  
According to the participants, the information security policy and guidelines should 
be documented, understandable and available to everyone in the organisation but 
believed they were not accessible to the users in the organisation.  
The policy should be available and enforced to follow and even the physical 
security so they [users] have to feel serious about policy [P15]. 
For security we have to educate [employees] then it will come to the 
knowledge then we have to think about policies one by one and place it [P7]. 
d. Sanctions  
Some participants thought that if the organisation has ISP education in place and 
staff do not follow the policy, then it would be acceptable to enforce sanctions 
against employees.  
When you punish a person without knowledge and awareness is difficult but 
you could educate him and when you see that he is still repeating the mistake 
you might use the sanction with him and that could solve the problems [P5]. 
One of the sanctions suggested is disabling users’ accounts:  
The administrator should not ask for the username and the passwords of the 
users under any circumstances accept if he [employee] has done some 
mistakes and I can disable his username and password to access to the 
organisation [P16]. 
They also point out that telling others about the behaviour and the sanction could 
prevent others from repeating the same mistake:  
The sanction is when we announced that for one user he has done this and 
that would be a lesson to others that we are observing them that would help 
to stop this type of behaviour [P16]. 
However, another participant pointed out that sanctions, without an understanding 
of the risk they are creating, are not likely to be effective: 
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If you are forcing them [employees] to do or giving them sanctions but they 
do not understand why you are providing this sanctions or why you need 
them to follow this policy the first thing is educating them to understand the 
risk involve following ISP that’s why knowledge then you can implement 
policy and then you can have your sanction [P2].    
5.5.5.2.2 Social issues effect on human behaviour  
The majority of participants suggested that organisations should recognise social 
issues such as habits, trust, satisfaction and responsibility as important factors to 
motivate employees to comply with the ISP.   
- Trust  
Participants brought up the issue that employees place trust in other people over 
following the ISP and believed that overriding this behaviour would be difficult. 
One of the solutions of changing the culture by awareness and make them 
trust the policies but employee would say this is my friend and I know him but 
about using the system no, I should not use his system [P15]. 
 They [employees] should not trust anyone about username and password. Of 
course, most employees in IT department when we ask them that not allow to 
do they follow but after one or two semester they go back and do the same 
mistake [P12]. 
- Taking Responsibility  
One participant agreed that awareness of and understanding the culture is very 
important in changing employees’ behaviour security for the better. They indicated 
that an organisation is responsible for making their employees aware of what is 
required of them, but that each employee must take responsibility for their own 
compliance. 
Awareness by educating people and second they should know that they are in 
work and they have to do it by computer then they have to use it with aware 
not for personal use and in proper way to finish the job…..ISP should be 
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known for everyone, and then they will know that they are responsible for 
their actions and comply with ISP [P13]. 
5.5.6 Summary of managers’ ranking of effects and recommendations 
The participants provided the following order of importance for factors that could 
improve employees’ compliance with the ISP: accurate knowledge, training, 
education, managers, information security policies and guidelines, understanding 
employees’ social issues, punishment and then rewards.  
All participants recommended that organisations should educate and train their 
users in information security covering areas such as how to create strong passwords, 
report security incidents, check email sources, backup confidential data, use 
antivirus software and to be aware of transferring information and so on. After that, 
they should make sure that their users understand what the consequences of poor 
behaviour are for themselves and their organisations and introduce appropriate 
disciplinary procedures covering non-policy-compliant behaviour.  
Moreover, participants suggested that managers’ enforcement and communications 
with information security management and employees are very important factors in 
ensuring policy-compliant behaviour. Organisational information security policies 
should be documented, reachable and understandable for all users. Finally, the 
results indicate that human social influence is very important in influencing 
compliance.  
 Comparison of employee survey with IT staff and system 5.6
administrators 
The first aim of this section is to compare IT staff and system administrators’ ISP 
compliance with the results found in the employee survey (Chapter 4) and to order 
the behaviours by importance (as ranked by the IT staff). This comparison will help 
to understand the order of importance of behaviours and the relationship between 
what IT staff will accept (out of policy) and staff behaviour. The second aim is to 
explore if non-compliant answers IT staff and system administrators’ find 
acceptable are behaviours chosen by staff.  
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Both groups were provided with the same set of scenarios in a questionnaire for 
evaluating their security awareness, but employees had to select only the answer 
they believed to be correct while IT staff and system administrators were asked to 
provide more than one option if they found other non-policy-based options to be 
acceptable. 
Table  5.8 shows the scores from of the employees and IT staff and system 
administrators sorted by the rank order given by the IT staff and system 
administrators (1
st
 to 14
th
). 
5.6.1 Comparison of employee scores with IT staff and system administrator 
scores 
Analysis of the results shows that the IT staff and system administrators had a 
mean ISP-compliance score of 81% while employees had a mean of 57%. This 
means that IT staff and system administrators are more aware of how to comply 
with the ISP than employees by a large margin. In general, the results in Table  5.8 
show that the IT staff and system administrators in all scenarios are scored higher 
than employees’ compliance scores accept in scenario 3rd, they are equal. 
Surprisingly, that the both group employees and IT staff are scored very low in 
scenario 1
st
 as it is the highest important employees’ behaviour.  
Table  5.8: Comparison between employees’ answers and IT staff and systems administrators ranked 
in order of importance 
Importance 
Ranking 
Scenario Employee 
scores % 
IT staff and 
System 
administrators’ 
scores % 
1st  7. Incident report (email asking 
for personal details ) 
33 71 
2nd 13. Incident report (missing 
files) 
94 100 
3rd 9. Phishing email(email 
unknown source) 
88 88 
4th 4. Sharing passwords (with co-
workers) 
65 82 
5th 6. Sharing passwords (with IT 
staff) 
31 59 
6th 2. Creating a new password 51 53 
7th 8. Incident report (windows 57 88 
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appear suddenly) 
8th 3. Sharing passwords (with 
managers) 
29 79 
9th 14. Deleting shared files 
without authorisation 
62 88 
10th 10. Disabling antivirus 
protection 
67 94 
11th 5. Physical security 41 71 
12th 12. Not using email for 
commercial or personal 
purpose 
80 100 
13th 11.Downloading software from 
the internet 
63 100 
14th 1. Backing up confidential data 35 65 
 
The results in Table  5.8 illustrate that less than 80% of IT staff and system 
administrators provided compliant answers for four scenarios (1
st
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 14
th
); 
while 36% of employees chose the compliant answer in these same scenarios.  On 
the other hand, 80% of IT staff and system administrators chose compliant answers 
in seven scenarios (2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 9
th
, 10
th
, 12
th
 and 13
th
) compared with an average of 
60% of employees. That means the level of employees’ behaviour (in eleven 
scenarios) may be influenced by level of IT staff and system administrators.  
The number of IT staff and system administrators who would accept non-compliant 
answers ranges from 6% on scenario 3
rd
 to 88% in scenario 7
th
, indicating that for 
some behaviours very few alternatives are acceptable, but for other behaviours, 
non-compliance is acceptable to IT staff. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be 
related to the importance of the behaviour.  
Figure  5.5 shows the relationship between the IT staff and system administrators’ 
scores and employees’ scores by scenario using the same rank order).  
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Figure  5.5: Comparison between employees’ compliance with ISP and IT staff and systems 
administrators ranked in order of importance 
Incident reporting (email asking for personal details) is the most important 
information security behaviour and backing up confidential data is the least 
important to IT staff. The results show that for the most important behaviour only 
33% of employees show policy-compliant intentions.  
Scenarios ranked 1
st
, 4
th
, 5
th
, and 7
th
 in both groups have big differences in 
compliance scores. Despite 1
st
 being the most important behaviour for IT staff and 
system administrators only 71% of them agreed that employees should phone the 
administrator to report a phishing email (with only 33% of employees indicating 
they would likely do so).  
Regarding sharing passwords between employees (fourth most important) and 
sharing with IT staff (fifth most important) both groups have scored differently. 82% 
of IT staff and 65% of other employees would not share passwords with colleagues 
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but only 59% of IT staff and 31% of employees would not share with IT staff.  
These scenarios highlight a big issue with sharing passwords with IT staff. Trust 
between employees and IT staff to share password is a major barrier to compliance 
with the ISP.  
In contrast, there are a number of similarities in scores in the scenarios ranked 2
nd
, 
3
rd
 and 6
th
. The incident report (missing files) scenario is the second most important 
behaviour to IT staff and system administrators and they scored 100% compliance 
and employees scored 94% which is the highest employee score. This may be a 
result of this outcome (lost files) directly affecting productivity in the past.  
Compliance intention was also high for the 3rd most important scenario, with both 
groups having 88% compliance in the phishing scenario (email unknown source).  
While creating a new password was the 6
th
 most important behaviour only 51% of 
employees and 53% (9/17) of IT staff and system administrators would comply 
with the rules around creation of new strong passwords.  
In scenarios ranked 1
st
 and 8
th
 both groups scored low for ISP compliance 
compared to other scenarios; employees scored less than 42% and IT staff and 
system administrators scored less than 80%. For instance, only 29% of employees 
and 79% of IT staff agreed that employees should not share their password with 
their managers with the remainders indicating they would share their password. In 
this case, the managers’ authority seems more important than compliance. In 
addition, because of trust and lack of responsibility in physical security, IT staff 
scored 70% (which is low compared to other scenarios) with employees scoring 
41%.  Furthermore, the backup of confidential data is given a low importance and 
both groups scored less when compared to other scenarios; IT staff scored 65% and 
employees 35%, which may indicate that employees and some IT staff do not see 
back up confidential data as a security task.  
On the other hand, IT staff and system administrators scored high in the 13th, 12th 
and 10th ranked scenarios because bad behaviour of employees in these scenarios 
can lead to employees’ computers becoming infected with viruses and it will then 
take time to remove them from the organisation networks. For example, IT staff 
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scored 100% in the downloading software from the internet scenario compared 
with only 63% of employees. Also, both groups scored high in not using email for 
commercial or personal purposes (IT staff 100% and employees 80%) and the 
antivirus scenario (IT staff scored 94% and employees 67%).  
5.6.2 Comparison of employees scores with IT staff and system administrators’ 
scores non-ISP-compliant acceptable behaviours 
As mentioned above, the IT staff were able to select more than one acceptable 
behaviour option. This section looks at the most popular non-policy-compliant 
answers given by IT staff and the percentage of employees selecting the same 
answer. This gives an indication of “shadow security” (behaviours which are 
accepted even though they are not the behaviour documented within the ISP). 
Figure  5.6  shows that more than 50% of IT staff accepted alternative behaviours 
for six scenarios (1
st
, 6
th
, 7
th
, 8
th
, 9
th
 and 14
th
) while all employees scored less than 
50% in these behaviours. 
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Figure  5.6: Comparison between employees and IT staff and system administrators in acceptable 
non-ISP-compliant employee behaviours 
The results show that 15 IT staff and system administrators was the highest number 
to accept a specific employee behaviour which is non-compliant with the ISP. This 
occurred in the virus scenario in which many new windows appear on an 
employee’s computer screen. IT staff found it acceptable to check the antivirus 
software is switched on and 29% of employees selected this option rather than the 
compliant answer. This indicates an assumption that the antivirus software will 
work even when the computer is compromised. 
Ten IT staff accepted employees using the same password they use for other 
services as long as they change one of the characters in it; 31% of employees 
selected this as the correct answer. This action does not comply with the ISP but it 
is an easy way for employees to remember passwords. Furthermore, the same 
number of IT staff accepted employees’ behaviour when they delete an email that 
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appears to have come from an administrator asking them to go to a specific web 
link to confirm their personal details while only 10% of employees think that is the 
right behaviour. This is a secure action to delete the email but employees should 
inform their IT security management about it to avoid the incident happening to 
other employees on same network.   
Regarding the physical security scenario, five IT staff and 30% of employees 
believed that employees do not have a responsibility to lock the doors and windows 
of their offices when they leave, and that they should just lock their computer’s 
screen.  
Five IT staff accepted that employees could send their username and password to 
IT staff for troubleshooting purposes after checking the source of the email 
requesting them to do so while 47% employees believed this to be an appropriate 
action.  
12 of the IT staff accepted that employees could delete the files of a project without 
asking permission from their co-workers working on those files when project is 
finished as long as they save copies onto their USB memory stick while only 28% 
of employees selected this answer. This may be because it is not seen as a security 
task, and that the action is reversible, as there is a copy on a USB. Of course, USB 
security is another issue.  
In the 8
th
 and 14
th
 ranked scenarios nine IT staff accepted that employees should 
share their password with their managers when their manager agrees to take 
responsibility and that employees can send a confidential file to their commercial 
email account when they have permission from their managers. Both of these 
scenarios are associated with managers and more than half of IT staff trusted 
managers, this causes employees not to comply with ISP. In addition, 43% and 35% 
of employees respectively chose these behaviours.  
26% of both groups agreed that employees can install software programs 
downloaded from the internet by themselves for work purposes as long as they 
ensure it is virus-free. However, it is not always straightforward to ensure software 
is virus-free and so this should be the responsibility of the IT staff. Four IT staff 
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agreed that employees could use university email to reply to their customers for 
commercial purposes while 12% of employees agreed.  
5.6.3 Summary of comparison of employees and IT staff and system 
administrators 
This section analysed the results by comparing the employee and IT staff survey 
results. In all scenarios, all the IT staff scored more than or equally to employees’ 
scores which indicates that IT staff were more aware than their employees of the 
compliant answer, but that even among the IT staff there was not 100% awareness, 
and IT staff found some non-compliant behaviours acceptable.  
The findings show that the importance of behaviours (as ranked by IT staff) did not 
correlate with ISP compliance as both neither groups’ performance matched the 
importance of the behaviours. In addition, IT staff and system administrators 
accepted some non-ISP-compliant behaviour by employees, such as sharing 
passwords between employees and managers, creating passwords similar to 
previous ones, saving confidential data on commercial email servers, not reporting 
incidents, and not asking for permission to delete project files.   
Trust appears to have the most influence on employees’ non-compliance with the 
ISP in most of scenarios. The results indicated that the authority of managers is 
believed to have a strong influence on both employees and IT staff in failing to 
comply with security policy.  
 Summary of chapter    5.7
This chapter has summarised the results of the study of 17 IT staff and system 
administrators from different organisations. Employee behaviour is influenced by 
several factors each with a different level of importance. This would help the 
organisation to prioritise poor behaviours in order to avoid information security 
incidents and increase ISP-compliant behaviour.  
The results identified organisational and cultural barriers that could prevent policy-
compliant behaviour. However, to reduce the threats of information security 
breaches in an organisation, information security awareness is very important 
factor (Akhunzada et al., 2015; Caputo et al., 2014).  
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In the current study, the qualitative results suggest recommendations for 
information security management: enhance the information security awareness and 
change employees’ behaviour to comply with information security policy. Finally, 
the two survey results (IT staff and system administrators’ data analysis and the 
employees’ data analysis in Chapter 4) were compared and found that the level of 
employees’ security awareness is influenced by IT staff and system administrators’ 
security awareness. The next chapter presents a qualitative study with employees in 
focus groups discussions to explore their views on the scenarios used in this 
research. 
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Chapter 6: EMPLOYEE FOCUS GROUPS INTERVIEWS 
 
 Introduction  6.1
In Chapter 4 (employee questionnaires), employees in several colleges and 
universities in Oman completed a questionnaire to assess how they would advise 
third parties to behave in various cyber security scenarios and explore the 
importance of the factors that could affect employees’ behavioural intentions 
regarding ISPs. The results revealed that some parts of an ISP were more likely to 
be followed than other parts and that authority and social influence were believed 
to be particularly influential on likely behaviour. The aim of this follow up study is 
to explore in more detail the reasons behind these decisions and why other non-
compliant behaviours may be considered, and to identify why different factors may 
influence their behavioural decisions in context.  
A series of focus groups was conducted with employees in one institution in Oman. 
The following questions were addressed: 
a) What are the reasons behind the results in Chapters 3 and 4? 
b) What is the employees’ understanding of the ISP and their level of 
information security awareness?  
c) What role does the information security policy play in these decisions 
now and in the future? 
d) Given specific situations, how do staff believe they should behave and 
why? 
e) What factors do staff believe influence their behaviour to comply or not 
with the ISP and why? 
f) What advice do employees recommend for the ISP and an enhanced 
information security environment?  
 Methodology 6.2
The focus group method was used to understand participants’ ideas, with the aim of 
understanding the motivation behind their behaviours and thoughts, and moreover, 
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to explore the justification behind their behaviours and thoughts. The focus groups 
were conducted in an informal and relaxed setting (Heary & Hennessy, 2002). 
Krueger (1994), defines focus groups as “a carefully planned discussion designed 
to obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, nonthreatening 
environment” (p. 6).  
6.2.1 Focus groups interviews  
In this study, data was collected through focus groups discussions. The questions 
were grouped in two parts. The first group of questions was based on six different 
scenario questions to encourage discussions to explore employees’ information 
security awareness and justification for compliance or non-compliance with their 
organisation’s information security policy. In this section, six new indirect 
scenarios were formulated to explore with employees issues around sharing 
passwords, social engineering, physical security, backing up data, incident reports 
and disabling antivirus protection.   
The second group of questions considered the availability of information security 
policies, employee understanding of security policy and compliance with their 
policy, the factors that influence compliance intentions and employees’ 
recommendations for writing security policies and improving compliance.  
6.2.2 Participants and the college: 
After receiving ethical approval from Northumbria University (See appendix A 
fourth study), 21 participants (6 females, 15 males) with an average age of 40 were 
recruited via email. Empirical data were collected through four focus groups 
discussions within a single college in Oman but in two different departments (two 
groups from the Information Technology department [ITG1 and ITG2] and two 
groups from the Engineering department [ENG1 and ENG2]). The four groups 
comprised lecturers, coordinators and secretaries. This college was involved in all 
the three studies in this research and provided 181 participants in the second study 
(see Table  4.2).  
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The participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups, resulting in three 
groups of five participants and one of six, seeing as Hoppe et al. (1995) 
recommended that a focus group should comprise four or five members to 
guarantee at least three “talkers”. Each participant had more than three years’ 
experience working at the college and was in possession of at least a bachelor’s 
degree. The only inclusion criterion required was to be an employee at the college. 
There were no exclusion criteria.  
6.2.3 Procedure 
Upon arrival at the focus groups venue participants were briefed and asked to 
complete an informed consent sheet. Participants were organised in a circle around 
a voice recorder to encourage discussion. The investigator then introduced the 
structure of the focus groups to participants, outlining two distinct types of 
questions that would be covered: understanding the information security policy in 
general and answering questions concerning information security compliance 
scenarios (see 6.2.1 focus groups interviews). The investigator then proceeded to 
ask the discussion questions. Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes. The 
English language was used in the interviews at the request of the participants as 
they were from different countries (India, Oman and Philippines). 
 Results 6.3
The results are discussed in two sections. First, the results of the discussions of the 
six different scenario questions: sharing passwords, social engineering, physical 
security, backing up data, incident report and disabling antivirus protection are 
explored and analysed. Second, the results of the discussion questions around 
general security policy information, factors that influence employees’ compliance 
with policy and recommendations for success of the information security 
environment are presented. 
6.3.1 Scenario questions results 
The six scenarios dealt with information security issues such as sharing passwords, 
social engineering, physical security, backing up data, incident reports and 
disabling antivirus protection. To measure their application of knowledge in 
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relation to information security, participants were asked what a third party 
(employee behaviour) should do in each scenario. Participants were then asked 
what they should do if they were in the same situation in order to directly measure 
their behavioural intentions. Each focus group discussed each scenario following 
the same steps.       
Scenario 1:  Fahad’s manager has forgotten his password and needs some important 
files. He asks Fahad for his user name and password so he can continue 
to work. What should Fahad do? 
In response to this scenario some participants from the engineering groups said that 
the employee should give his user name and password to their manager. 
Engineering group 1 (ENG1) and engineering group 2 (ENG2) both pointed out 
that this relies on trust in the manager, while one participant pointed out that they 
would limit the time that the manager had access to the account by changing the 
password after the manager had the required files.   
In ENG2, fewer participants agreed that Fahad should share his password, instead 
they suggested that they could log in on the manager’s behalf and allow him to use 
the system. For example: 
He cannot share any password with anyone but still if manager is working 
with him he can open the machine and the manager can work no need to 
share the password [P1, ENG2]. 
The ITG1 group was categorical that a password should not be shared, not even 
with a friend:   
If there is security policy in the organisation it will strictly say that your 
username and password should not be shared with other people and you are 
the only one responsible for your identity in the network so they should not 
share even with the management [P2, ITG1]  
And that the manager should go to IT to get access in the proper manner. However, 
in ITG2 opinions were split; one participant recognised that their files were needed 
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when they were not present and so could give personal access credentials to the 
replacement.  
When asked what they themselves would do in a similar situation, responses varied 
from passing the responsibility to provide access on to an IT technician while one 
participant did say that this would be a breach of protocol: 
For me I will not give him my password even if he is my manager because we 
follow protocols and those protocols say you are responsible for your 
passwords. [P5, ENG1]. 
When asked if the situation would be any different if it was a co-worker asking 
rather than a manager, participants in ENG1 and ENG2 said it would depend on the 
situation and the trust they have in the person asking.  
When asked how they would respond to an administrator asking for a user name 
and password, they said they would not provide it, and would suspect that they 
were being tested to see if they were adhering to the stated protocols: 
I will not give him and I will ask him to type what he wants to get and IT 
technician normally do not ask for username and password if they do that 
maybe for the test employees awareness [P4, ENG1].   
ITG2 point out that if data is compromised it would be a problem and that if an 
administrator used another staff member’s password it could even be considered as 
a crime.   
In summary, the engineering department groups seemed to be aware that sharing a 
password with a manager would be inappropriate, but that having trust in a person 
making the request might encourage them to breach policy.  However, the IT 
department groups indicated they were less likely to share stating that a password 
should never be shared with anyone and that anyone who has forgotten their 
credentials should regain access by contacting IT administration. This was also the 
case for sharing with co-workers or administrators.  
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Scenario 2:  Ali has received an email that appears to have come from an IT 
technician asking him to go to a specific web link to confirm his 
personal details. What should he do? 
In response to scenario 2, all participants in ENG1 agreed that Ali should not 
follow a link to provide personal details. The reasons for this included that it may 
be spam and memories that following a link had resulted in a virus in the past for 
staff. However, participants in ENG1 and ENG2 did consider that if they could 
verify the legitimacy of the request by phoning IT then they would follow the 
instruction.  
However, participants in ENG2 were less hesitant and felt that it could be a 
legitimate request: 
If he is a technician person working so we can go to that website if it is 
required by the college like if we need to update our data [P5, ENG2].   
ITG1 staff agreed that if staff verify the technician’s request by phone then they 
can send the details stating that it is IT’s responsibility to check the source email 
and whether it comes from technician or not. However, ITG2 suggested the email 
should be deleted and no personal information should be given. P5 (ITG2) pointed 
out that they have received an email from administrators telling them not to answer 
this type of email. 
In summary, it became apparent that participants were not in agreement about 
whether this would be a legitimate request or not. Although some clearly knew the 
policy and had experienced problems. This finding is in line with the survey result 
that 40% would be suspicious and phone IT. This suggests that organisations not 
only require a security policy, but they must also ensure that staff are aware of 
normal forms of communication within the organisation, and that such processes 
are implemented consistently.  
Scenario 3:  Noor works in her own office, and she is going to the staff room for a 
short tea break time. What she should do? 
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Three participants in ENG1 agreed that Noor should turn off her computer screen 
but that it would not be necessary to shut the door. One participant in ENG2 
suggested it was not necessary to lock the computer or the door, as you should have 
nothing personal on your computer. However, other participants in ENG2 had 
experienced an office breach where a student had stolen an exam paper from an 
office and so were more cognizant of the need to lock the office door.  Participants 
agreed that the office door does not need to be locked if staff are mindful of locking 
important papers in filing cabinets.  
When asked about what they would do if they were in Noor’s position, they said 
that if they were alone or the last one out they would lock the door. 
The IT department groups were adamant that the computer should be locked when 
leaving the desk and the office door should be locked any time the office is empty. 
In summary, this scenario again pointed to trust in other people influencing people 
to behave in a less secure manner, unless they had personally experienced a breach 
of that trust.  As was similarly shown with this scenario in Chapter 4, not everyone 
felt physical security was necessary.  
Scenario 4:  Ahmed wants to backup important files for the institution. When he 
works at home he does not have access to the institution’s network – 
what should he do? 
Participants in all groups agreed that Ahmed should back up important files, but 
that this should be on the hard drive or the college network and not on a 
commercial server such as Gmail if it is important/sensitive/confidential. However, 
it is permissible if the file is not important (or personal) – this raises the question of 
the reliability of staff assessments of a file’s sensitivity.   
In summary, participants were aware that they should not use personal email via 
commercial servers to back up sensitive data. However, there is a security 
weakness as they were willing to use such a process for documents they deemed 
non-sensitive. The process by which a document is classified as not being sensitive 
should therefore be made explicit within the organisation and not left to individual 
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opinion. In the questionnaire findings in Chapter 4, 30% of staff selected the option 
of sending files to their personal accounts with a further 31% asking their managers 
permission to do so. This raises an issue for the clarification of the sensitivity of 
documents.  
Scenario 5:  Soliman’s computer is behaving strangely. He is worried that his 
computer has a virus. What should he do? 
Participants in ENG1 and ENG2 suggested that Soliman should immediately take 
the computer to a technician. ENG1 suggest this will mean getting it reformatted 
and the software updated, while ENG2 suggest they would leave it to the technician 
to decide what to do. The groups said that in the same situation they would do the 
same thing they advised Soliman to do. 
IT groups emphasised the importance of immediately cutting connection with the 
network with the ITG1 group suggesting this should be followed by logging off, 
then calling the technicians.  The ITG2 suggested that the next step was to back up 
data and then scan the disk. This first act of cutting the connection was not 
recognised by the engineering groups.  
In summary, most participants were aware that they should get their computers 
checked if they are worried they have a virus, but they were not in agreement about 
the exact order of steps to take and the necessity to disconnect from all networks 
immediately to prevent further spread. These steps should be made explicit to all 
employees and regularly communicated. The questionnaire findings in Chapter 4 
suggest that 57% of staff would carry this out in the correct order.  
Scenario 6:  Mona’s computer is slow and she feels that the antivirus software is 
slowing it. What should she do? Should she disable the antivirus? 
Participants in three groups (ENG1, ENG2 and ITG1) said that Mona should not 
disable the antivirus. Instead they suggested that she should call the technician to 
have the software updated, or choose different antivirus software, or simply be 
more patient. However, the ITG2 group discussed disabling the antivirus 
temporarily if Mona needed to get on with work fast.  
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IT department staff stated that staff should update all software immediately and run 
a scan. There was a difference of opinion between engineering staff and IT staff in 
this situation. The engineering groups wished administrators to take responsibility, 
while IT staff took responsibility themselves.  
In summary, participants were aware that they should not disable antivirus software 
but should take some exploratory measures such as updating software to see if this 
would improve the situation. This is in line with the questionnaire findings where 
70% of staff intended not to disable the antivirus.  
6.3.2 Policy and behaviour results 
This section presents analysis of the second group of questions and is divided into 
three parts: information security awareness, ways of influencing information 
behaviour and advice to inform an updated information security policy.   
6.3.2.1 Information security policy awareness 
Table  6.1 highlights a lack of awareness of the existence and/or contents of an 
information security policy within the organisation. Only one group (ITG1) stated 
that an information security policy exists within their organisation. They 
acknowledge that they have not read it in its entirety, but that parts of it are 
communicated to them via email. It may be that other groups do not recognise that 
the information about security which they receive via email forms part of an 
overarching policy. Participants were also unable to say where they had acquired 
any security behaviours via a policy. 
Table  6.1: Information security awareness result 
                     Group  
Question ENG1 ENG2 ITG1 ITG2 
Are you aware that a policy exists? No No Yes No (but 
will in 
future) 
Have you read the policy? No No Yes No 
Point out that they receive emails telling 
them what they should do in different 
situations, when different threats are 
No No Yes No 
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observed by the organisation. 
Have you read other institutions’ 
information security policies?  
No No Yes No, point 
out that at 
Google, 
just tick 
the box to 
say you 
have read 
it. 
Provide explanation for where they find 
information security knowledge 
No No Yes No 
 
Those in ITG1, who had read the ISP, stated that it gives good guidance on what 
they are expected to do. However, they pointed out things they did not like about it:  
 Prohibits some services they would like to use 
 Does not allow all IT needs to be fulfilled 
 Prohibits some staff from installing software 
 Forces staff to do things they don’t want to, for example, disconnecting 
from the internet for an extended period of time 
6.3.2.2 Ways of influencing behaviour 
Regarding ways in which employee behaviour was influenced, a number of 
suggestions were made.  First, some pointed out that their behaviour is often 
influenced by the interpersonal trust they have with the person requesting the 
behaviour. This can be positive (if the requester is promoting secure behaviour) but 
it can also be negative (e.g., a manager asking for something which is against 
policy).  Participants also pointed out that work overload could lead to non-
compliance, particularly if the policy got in the way of efficiency (ENG1). 
Participants suggested that to improve behaviour, the policy should be:   
 more readily available (ENG1) (e.g., on the notice board for everyone to 
see); 
 employees should be regularly reminded (ITG1) via email about specific 
behaviours (e.g., update passwords, and at the beginning of each 
academic year to ensure everyone is aware and up to date);  
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 compliance should be monitored and enforced (ITG1, ITG2).  
When asked if they follow advice they have been given at work, participants 
(ENG2) remembered that they had been asked not to open spam email, but 
admitted that they may forget advice when under pressure at work.   
6.3.2.3 Advice to inform an updated information security policy 
Participants were asked what advice they would offer when writing a new security 
policy. The results are provided in Table  6.2. The focus of their advice was not to 
respond to suspicious emails and ensuring that the policy is kept short.  
Table  6.2: Advice to offer in writing an information policy 
Advice Group 
Think before you click because people click on a 
link which came from email without thinking and 
that will affect the computer. 
ENG1 
Employees should know the importance of the 
information security policy otherwise they will not 
follow the policy  
ENG1 
Employees should not respond to any unknown 
mail or unknown link which is delivered in your 
mail or whatever. 
ENG2 
Do not use any link which does not have any https ENG2 
Keep it short, people do not read long policies ITG2 
Participants were also asked for suggestions on how to improve security behaviour 
in the organisation. Suggestions ranged from improving the way the policy is 
developed, communicated and enforced to suggesting that the organisation should 
look at the way it treats its employees in general to foster loyalty and to provide 
sufficient support to ensure that workload is not negatively influencing behaviour, 
and how support can be provided in a timely fashion. The following suggestions 
were made:  
a) Involve staff in writing the policy (ITG1) 
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b) Implement a good awareness campaign, kept up to date and regularly 
communicated – why behaviours must be adopted, results of not adopting 
(ENG2, ITG1, ITG2) 
c) The organisation must show that they are serious about compliance 
(ENG1) 
d) Monitor that the security policy is being followed (ITG2) and ensure that 
staff are aware of the consequences of not following policy (ITG1), 
although it is unclear if this means potential security consequences or 
actual personal sanctions for non-compliance.  
e) Top management must be seen to follow the policy (ITG2) 
f) Facilitate loyalty to the organisation (ENG1) as one participant said: 
o Also the employees should be very much loyal to the institution they 
are working with so in terms of awareness, any information can be 
leaked when there is no loyalty and when the management does not 
treat employees well, there is a chance their employees will leak the 
information [P1, ENG1]. 
g) Provide sufficient IT resource so that this does not become a bottleneck 
which staff then try to find ways round (ENG1)  
 Discussion 6.4
 The focus group interviews with employees presents several opportunities to 
explore employees’ information security awareness by means of understanding 
their organisation’s ISP and the influencing factors that enhance and/or are barriers 
to complying with the ISP. This discussion is divided into two sections to explore 
factors that influence compliance with the ISP by comparing the employee survey 
and findings from the focus groups interviews and recommendations for successful 
information security behaviour.    
6.4.1 Employees’ understanding of their ISP and their views on compliance  
This section focuses on the questions that investigated employees’ information 
security awareness and their application of knowledge in the organisation. In 
addition, it explores factors which influence employees’ behaviour and the 
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recommendations they made to enhance employees’ security behaviour and make 
an appropriate ISP which could then lead to a successful information security 
environment. 
The findings from the focus groups interviews show that employees believed that it 
is very important for the ISP to be available and updated in their organisation. In 
addition, all the interviewees showed their understanding of the policy which came 
from their organisation through emails and given that complying with policy is 
exceedingly important.     
6.4.1.1 Comparison between employees’ survey and focus groups interview 
findings    
In this section comparisons are made between the focus groups findings and those 
of the studies in Chapters 3 and 4. Table  6.3 compares the focus group results with 
the findings from the scenario questions in Chapter 4. The results show that the 
participants in the focus groups presented the security awareness information 
effectively in most of the scenario questions.  
Table  6.3: Comparison between employees’ survey and focus group interviews findings 
No Scenario area  Survey findings 
in chapter 4 (%) 
 
Findings from the four 
focus groups interviews in 
chapter 6 (groups)  
1 Not sharing password  29 2 
2 Social Engineering  33 4 
3 Physical security - lock office 
door 
41 3 
4 Not backing up data in 
commercial email servers 
35 4 
5 Report the incident and react 
against viruses  
57 4 
6 Not disabling antivirus  68 3 
 
The findings in the interviews reveal that the four groups of employees indicated 
they would report security threats to the IT administrators (e.g., phishing emails 
and incidents that occur, such as viruses in their computers). Additionally, the four 
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groups indicated they would not back up sensitive data to commercial email 
servers, such as Gmail. However, these results do not match the findings from the 
employee survey, where more than half advised the person in the scenario not to 
report security threats or incidents. 
Conversely, the findings from the focus groups show that employees were willing 
to breach their organisation’s ISP because they trust their co-workers, IT staff and 
system administrators and the person who has more authority in the organisation, 
such as managers. Typically, half of the employees would share their password 
with their manager, whilst a few would share their password with co-workers and 
administrators for several reasons, such as to do work. The findings from the focus 
groups support the results obtained from the employee survey which revealed that 
approximately half the employees thought it was acceptable to share their password 
with their managers, co-workers and IT staff and system administrators. The reason 
behind this is the trust between employees (co-worker and IT staff and system 
administrators) and managers. This confirms that these factors have a strong effect 
on employees contravening the ISP.  
In addition, the focus groups showed that only one group of employees felt it is 
acceptable for colleagues to leave their office doors unlocked for a brief time 
because of a trusting environment and disabling the antivirus for a brief time 
because of workload. This supports the results from the employee survey, although 
with a lower percentage. This illustrates that some employees still fail to lock their 
office doors and ignore policy related to finishing work, such as disabling the 
antivirus.  
6.4.2 Information security awareness 
In general, all groups agreed that an ISP is incredibly important, which shows they 
are aware of information security policy. Additionally, they recommended that the 
ISP should be available to everybody in the organisation, kept up to date and 
distributed to staff. However, the results of the four focus groups interviews 
revealed that employees have a low level of information security awareness 
regarding the existence of the ISP within the organisation. This is despite IT staff 
and system administrators in the first study in same institution (see Chapter 3) 
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indicating that they send security policies to every single employee. Unfortunately, 
only one of the four groups mentioned the availability of their college’s ISP. 
Furthermore, the same group revealed dissatisfaction with their organisation’s 
policies and moreover, that they are actively against policies that ban them from 
downloading software from the internet.  
Therefore, employee behaviour presents a challenge in ensuring ISP compliance. 
Trust between employees and co-workers, managers or technicians has a negative 
impact on employee compliance and overloads them with work. The study suggests 
that organisations need to explain the importance of information security more to 
their staff and all employees should have zero trust in relation to security. In 
addition, the organisation should educate employees that following policy will not 
reduce their productivity.  
Finally, to build employees’ responsibility regarding information security, the 
study suggests that organisations should give their employees awareness 
programmes and feedback with regards to ISP. Furthermore, management should 
be committed to the ISP, monitoring employees’ security behaviour, be more 
serious vis-à-vis ISP compliance and treat the employees well, so as to gain loyalty 
at work, effective communication and sanction non-compliance.     
 Conclusion 6.5
In this chapter, a set of focus groups illustrated that employees are aware of the ISP 
and they all recommended the importance of compliance with them. However, the 
mere existence of a policy is insufficient to ensure compliance. Staff believe that 
when organisations want success in information security they should monitor 
employees’ compliance, distribute written policies, provided employees with 
appropriate IT resources and effective security awareness, treat employees well to 
gain their loyalty at work and senior management must be committed to the 
policies.  
Conversely, this chapter shows that, in general, the participants demonstrated that 
they have an appropriate level of practising information security cases via the 
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scenario questions. However, the result of this study revealed that managers’ 
authority, and trust between staff could compromise compliance. 
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Chapter 7: DISCUSSION  
This chapter provides a comprehensive discussion of the results of the research 
work undertaken.  First, the results of the four different studies are compared, and 
secondly, the results are compared with the findings reported in the literature.  
The purpose of this research was to identify whether or not staff exhibited 
intentions towards compliance with behaviours identified in ISPs, the current 
threats to information policy-compliant behaviours of employees within higher 
education institutions in Oman and to explore the factors that could motivate and 
barriers that could demotivate employees to comply with the information security 
policy. The final aim of the research is to develop recommendations to enhance an 
organisation’s information security environment and improve their employees’ ISP 
compliance. This chapter is divided into three parts: first, information security 
threats and risk assessment, in particular problems caused by employee behaviour; 
secondly, organisational information security culture and human factors influences 
on employee behaviour and thirdly, the challenges of measuring awareness and 
compliance intentions. Finally, a number of recommendations are made, drawing 
from the findings and previous studies to improve organisation information system 
security awareness and guide employees towards better information security 
decisions.   
The results of the four studies suggest that a number of organisational and human 
factors were perceived as reasons why employees do not comply with ISPs. These 
factors were highlighted by participants across the four studies. The results show 
that the main organisational factors that employees believe influence their 
compliance with security policies are top management support, immediate 
managers, IT staff, an effective ISP, communications and information security 
awareness through knowledge, skills and ongoing training and awareness 
campaigns. In addition, an organisation should consider that measuring actual 
employee behaviour is very important in order to discover the actual rather than 
intended ISP compliance.  
A number of demographic characteristics were explored. The results suggest that 
an employee’s organisation, country of origin, length of employment, qualifications, 
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and the availability and understanding of an ISP have no significant effect on their 
scenario ISP scores. This suggests that security behaviours are being learnt and 
adopted, regardless of the ISP.  
In contrast, employment category, gender and admin privileges show a significant 
but small effect. This indicates reliable differences that are worth considering in 
future studies. Worryingly, those with admin privileges were less likely to provide 
policy compliant answers to the scenario questions. In the interviews reported in 
Chapter 6, IT staff discussed academic staff demanding to have admin privileges 
even though this was against policy. Given the culture in Oman, this was a demand 
they felt they could not refuse. This may have resulted in people without sufficient 
IT security knowledge having admin rights. 
Lastly, the employee survey results show different levels of compliance intentions 
depending on the security scenario. Therefore, we need to consider each behaviour 
individually and cannot treat ISP compliance as if it were a single behaviour.  
 Information security threats and risk assessment  7.1
Based on the previous studies in the literature and the findings from this study, 
employees’ behaviour is a major concern for the security of organisations. 
Organisations are concerned by the lack of universal compliance with their 
information security policy. Consequently, to deal with this problem an 
organisation should identify internal and external information security threats by 
risk assessment and remove or reduce the risk (Gupta et al., 2010). 
7.1.1 Security threats  
Once an organisation has identified and understood the internal and external 
information security threats, solutions can be implemented in the workplace to deal 
with and mitigate the associated risk. All IT staff and system administrators in the 
first and third studies thought that the greatest threat to their organisations’ 
information security was employee behaviour, a view which agrees with previous 
research (Jaeger, 2013), while in the questionnaire it became clear that more 
employees would intend to follow some security behaviours than others.  
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While technology helps an organisation to control access to information, monitor 
and detect malicious activities, human factors and the work environment remain the 
real foundation for information security (Colwill, 2009). To build effective and 
high quality information security, organisations should understand employee 
behaviour and how employees may be targeted  (Whitman, 2004) . An organisation 
should focus on both technology (antivirus, firewalls, proxy servers, intrusion 
detection software, etc.) and identify how employees are motivated through 
influencing factors (knowledge and awareness, managers, co-workers, sanctions 
and rewards, etc.) to use that technology reliably. Users behaviour is difficult to 
predict but can effectively cancel out the security afforded by technology (Dodge et 
al., 2007). 
In this work, IT staff and system administrators perceive that their organisations 
have up-to-date software and hardware protection from outsider threats such as 
firewalls, antiviruses and patches. However, most interviewees commented that, 
employees behave in ways that reduce the effectiveness of these technologies, just 
employing a range of technological solutions is insufficient to ensure information 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. This result is similar to Safa et al. (2015).  
7.1.2 Risk assessment  
IT staff and system administrators suggested that organisations should identify the 
sources of threats and vulnerabilities and focus more on improving employee 
behaviour to make their workplace more secure. As Peltier (2005a)  reported 
previously, companies must examine their services, for example, vulnerability, risk 
analysis, assessments, policies, standards, procedures and business continuity 
planning, and subsequently, identify how each of these services supports the 
business objectives.  
To successfully improve information system security, an organisation should 
clearly recognise its assets then identify the employee vulnerabilities and outsider 
threats. In this research the actual number of breaches could not be reliably 
determined from the IT staff and system administrator interviews. This is because 
information security management did not divulge all the incidents that may have 
happened at the organisation in order to protect the organisation’s reputation, 
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customer confidence and financial loss. As Al-Awadi (2009) reported, employees 
will not tell what they have done wrong. However, in this study IT staff and system 
administrators identified some employee behaviours that they believe cause 
problems for the organisation. It should be noted they were talking about other staff 
behaviours, rather than their own. In addition, the survey of employee behaviour 
intentions resulted in employees choosing options that were non-compliant, while 
in the focus groups employees discussed some problematic behaviour. 
In this research, the IT staff and system administrators’ ranked employee insecure 
behaviours as more important if they believed they happened regularly (e.g., 
inappropriately responding to phishing emails) in the workplace or because the 
level of risk to the organisation’s information would be high if the bad behaviour 
persisted (e.g. sharing password). Furthermore, IT staff were willing to accept 
many employee behaviours which contravene the organisation’s policy. This 
revealed the underlying organisational culture. If the IT staff accepted these 
behaviours, then we must question either the appropriateness of the policy (is it 
over strict?) or the knowledge of the IT staff (are they unaware of the risks of these 
behaviours they allow?). 
7.1.2.1 Level of employee information security awareness  
One of the steps towards understanding an organisation’s information security is to 
explore users’ information security knowledge, attitude and/or behaviours. It is 
impossible to evaluate employees’ behaviour from their knowledge and/or attitude 
because the findings suggest that employees know information security policies but 
would not always comply with them. In addition, they believe that policy 
compliance is very important despite not complying themselves. 
The findings of the employee survey show that almost half of employees have a 
lack of information security awareness (or intention to apply those skills) and they 
potentially do not work securely. The employee survey (across the 14 scenarios) 
showed overall that only 57% of employees’ behaviours were ISP-compliant. This 
ranged from 29% of employees complying with one behaviour to 94% complying 
with another, depending on the individual behaviour. For example, over 80% of 
employees stated that they would intend to behave according to policy with regards 
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to reporting an incident if they had lost files, receiving phishing emails from 
unknown sources and not using email for commercial or personal purposes. This 
high level of compliance is not surprising, as losing files or personal use of email 
affects productivity, and there are many awareness campaigns around phishing 
attacks. However, not all behaviours were policy-compliant. For instance, 71% of 
employees would share their passwords with managers. In addition, more than 50% 
of the employees would send confidential files to commercial email servers, not 
lock their office’ doors and windows when they are leaving for short time, share 
their passwords with IT staff and click on a link to confirm personal details.   
7.1.2.2 Security incident response 
Incident reporting can be used as a way of measuring employees’ information 
security awareness levels (Parsons et al., 2014). When employees accidentally or 
deliberately disregard the ISP or identify any information security threats in their 
organisation it is their responsibility to inform the information security team. This 
would help the organisation to react before an incident occurs otherwise these 
activities could cause damage to the organisation’s reputation and have other 
serious consequences. Spilling (2009) determined that the reasons employees do 
not to report incidents is because of a lack of awareness of the incident or that 
employees fear that non-compliance with the strict security regulations could lead 
to personal consequences.   
The interviews of IT staff and system administrators suggest that most employees 
would not report a security threat until that threat happened and affected their work 
negatively and/or they lost important data. These findings align with the findings 
from the survey of employees that employees do not intend to report incidents in all 
cases. Most employees would inform IT staff when they lose their files or some 
changes happen to their computers. Additionally, in another scenario, more than 
two-thirds of employees will inform IT staff when they discovered the threat but 
only when the threat is clearly identified such as when they receive an email from 
an unknown sender which asks them to click on an attachment file.  
However, two-thirds of employees would not inform IT staff when they received 
an email asking them for personal details when it appears that the e-mail came from 
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an administrator. Since employees do not report the threats by phishing emails that 
could mean they are not aware of this being an attack, or are not aware of the need 
to report all incidents and how this would help IT staff to reduce the consequences. 
Furthermore, almost half of them (43%) would not report when there are viruses in 
their computers. 
 Organisational information security culture  7.2
Organisational culture has been characterised in different ways and attributed to 
numbers of identifiable esteem sets, for example, administration styles, manners of 
decision making, communication styles, management style, rewards system, all of 
which help to characterize an organisation’s character and norms (Tang & Zhang, 
2016). Findings from the IT staff and system administrators’ interviews suggest 
that organisational information security culture plays an important role in 
employees’ compliance with the ISP. These factors include the availability of a 
proper information security policy, management support, good information security 
management team, good communications and the use of sanctions and rewards 
systems.    
7.2.1 Information security policy 
Whitman et al. (2001) suggest that the first step in preparing an organisation 
against internal and external threats is the development of an information security 
policy. While it has been shown here that this is not sufficient to ensure secure 
behaviour, it is necessary nonetheless. The IT staff and system administrators 
studied in this thesis stated that they are responsible for writing and implementing 
the information security policies for their organisations. Unfortunately, in some 
organisations the policies were not documented and where a policy did exist, it was 
not well established. An organisation’s ISP should fit with its culture so as not to 
conflict with employee performance and organisational requirements. The IT staff 
and system administrator interviews suggested that employees often do not comply 
with the ISP because they believe doing so would reduce their work productivity 
and they do not have time for additional steps. 
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If the information security policy is not visible to employees, then it is more 
difficult for them to know what behaviour the policy requires. However, as the IT 
staff and system administrators pointed out, merely sending the policy to all staff 
by email is not sufficient. Moreover, the interview findings showed that ISPs were 
often incomplete (in terms of the types of threat they covered) and out of date. 
While many IT staff believe they have a suitable ISP, some employees in the focus 
group interviews suggested that the people responsible for creating security policy 
should make policies available to everyone, involve all employees in writing 
policies, ensure policies are up-to-date and as short as possible, and that policy 
compliance should be monitored. Clearly, there is still work required in developing 
and communicating ISPs effectively.  
The above notwithstanding, the employee survey showed that the existence of an 
ISP had no significant effect on their compliance intentions. In addition, there was 
no significant difference between employees who agreed that they understood the 
policy and those who did not. Availability and understanding of information 
security policy is not sufficient to ensure compliant behaviour. This highlights the 
need for future research to identify where information security behaviours are 
being learnt from, if not the ISP. 
7.2.2 Information security training and awareness  
The findings from the three interview studies suggested that information security 
training and awareness have a significant effect on employees’ intention to comply 
with an ISP and these findings are line with previous research (Al-Kalbani, 2017; 
D'Arcy & Greene, 2014; Haeussinger & Kranz, 2013; Parsons et al., 2014; Safa et 
al., 2015; Siponen et al., 2014; Tsohou et al., 2015).  
In the current research the IT staff and system administrator interviews indicate that 
Omani higher education institutions often lack security awareness training. Those 
that did have awareness training (albeit infrequent) did see improvements in 
security behaviour (such as locking doors and computer screens on leaving the 
office). None of the organisations studied had enough trainers for the number of 
employees. 
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7.2.2.1 Knowledge and skills  
When an information security policy is in place, an organisation should make sure 
that employees are aware of it and possess the basic skills needed to comply with it. 
The findings from the four studies revealed that information security knowledge 
and skills are perceived to be the foundation of information security and the factor 
that they reported having  the most influence on whether employees comply with 
an ISP, especially when they understand the benefits of ISP compliance (see also 
Han et al. (2017). In addition, the interviews revealed that they believe ongoing 
information security awareness and training for all employees would increase the 
employees’ information security knowledge and, it is hoped, their behaviour. 
From the eight proposed influencers of actual employee behaviour, the findings 
suggest that knowledge was thought to be the largest influencing factor. As 
Mahfuth et al. (2017) suggested, the level of knowledge essentially influences 
information security conduct and ought to be considered as a basic factor in the 
viability of information security culture. 
In addition, the IT staff and system administrator interviews highlighted a few 
incidents where awareness training about specific security issues (e.g., looking 
doors when leaving the office) helped to change employees’ behaviour to comply 
with the ISP. However, this behaviour is not necessarily permanent and employees 
need to be regularly reminded.    
IT management should make efforts to understand the organisational and employee 
information security culture to identify and practice motivation mechanisms to 
improve their employees’ information security skills and practice. The survey 
findings show that half the employees in this study lack the confidence and skills 
necessary to comply with a basic information security policy. For instance, only 
around half of employees indicated they would create a new password and 
remember it without writing it down, saving it in a mobile phone or showing it to 
someone else, and more than 40% of them do not have the skills to deal with virus 
infections in their computers.  
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Research suggests that organisations should use different ways to communicate 
with employees and deliver the knowledge, for instance, through an e-learning 
website, video, visiting face to face, workshops, sessions, SMS messages and 
emails (Wood, 1995). Moreover, organisations should investigate employees’ 
acceptance and willingness to put the training and awareness campaigning 
messages into practice. Similarly, Khan et al. (2011) applied different security 
awareness tools such as posters, newsletter articles, educational video games, group 
discussion and computer-based training to measure which tool best raises 
employees’ information security awareness and changes their behaviour and found 
that group discussion was the most effective tool. Nowadays, employees can raise 
their information security awareness through participation in the organisation’s 
social media platform (Dang-Pham et al., 2017). 
The current study demonstrates how an organisation could use scenario-based 
questions as a continuous measure of employee security awareness (Appendix D) 
in the workplace and create scenario behaviour guidelines to improve security 
behaviour and raise awareness.  
7.2.3 Management information security commitment and support   
The level of information security awareness of top managers and department 
managers affects the information system management at the organisation 
(Sonnenschein et al., 2017). The data analysis from this study reveals that top 
management and line managers may have the second strongest effect on whether 
users intend to comply with an ISP. Therefore, it is recommended that 
organisations should make information security a priority to these people. The IT 
staff and system administrator interviews showed that they receive financial 
support and technology from top management and immediate managers but, 
unfortunately, those managers did not commit to enforce the ISP. When top 
management and immediate managers are committed to the ISP and cooperate with 
the information security management team this may have an effect on 
organisational information security culture and could influence employees to 
comply with the policy these findings are line with previous research which 
included some Omani Higher Education Institutions (Al-Kalbani, 2017).  
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Overall, the interviews with IT staff and system administrators reveal that most 
organisations have a lack of management information security support and 
commitment. Only a small number of participants declared that managers have 
good security awareness and support IT staff and system administrators to 
implement the security policy. 
7.2.3.1 Top management support 
The IT staff and system administrators believed that top management support for 
information security can improve the information security environment at an 
organisation which is consistent with other studies (Ezingeard & Bowen-Schrire, 
2007; Knapp, Marshall, Rainer Jr, et al., 2006; Kwon et al., 2012).  Unfortunately, 
some IT staff and system administrators mentioned that top management and 
immediate managers did not see information security as a vital issue and do not 
support them in enforcing the security policy on all users.  
While a minority of IT staff and system administrators were authorised to apply 
more control over information security management, unfortunately, the majority of 
IT staff and system administrators were not so empowered and worked in an  
unacceptable organisational culture where users put them under pressure to provide 
more privileges than they need because they think that it is their right to have these 
privileges, especially managers and academic users, even though it is against 
information security policy. That makes it difficult for IT staff to control the 
devices and the network because their users are not in the organisation domain 
network and some of them have a direct connection to the internet. IT staff and 
system administrators advise that all users at an organisation should join the 
organisation domain network to allow them to easily control and monitor users’ 
systems and the network. This would facilitate immediate deployment of patches 
and automatic updating of all software. It would also prevent users from 
downloading unlicensed software from the internet and disabling the antivirus 
software.   
Top management should support IT staff and system administrators in enforcing 
the policy that all users join the domain and each user (managers, heads of 
departments and sections, deans of colleges) should have limited privileges to 
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access and use software and hardware in a responsible manner when they are 
working individually or in groups. Management can give this by supporting IT 
department with sufficient staff and ensuring that their voices are heard and heeded. 
IT staff and system administrators suggested that top management support would 
influence immediate managers and all end users to comply with the ISP and this 
finding agrees with previous research  (Hu et al., 2012). 
The employee survey indicated that there are significant differences in intentions to 
following the ISP. Those employees who have admin privileges on their systems 
showed lower compliance intentions than those who do not. In three scenarios, 
more than 30% of them would likely go against the ISP because they have the 
privileges to do what they want to do or they think it is correct behaviour (e.g., 
disabling the antiviruses on their computer, installing software from the internet 
and deleting shared files without permission).  
The findings from this study suggest that top management should collaborate with 
information security management to comply with organisational information 
security policy and ensure that all immediate managers and end users in the 
organisation are complying. In addition, organisations should limit access for all 
end users and identify authorisation functions. For example, if a user needs 
elevated privileges for specific work, such as an academic staff request to 
download software from the internet, then they should ask a technician to do it who 
will check if there are any viruses, whether it is a trusted website and if the 
software is licensed to the person requesting the software, before it is downloaded. 
Finally, top management should have good communications with all managers, IT 
staff and end users, and communicate an up-to-date and complete picture of how 
information security should be managed in line with policy.    
7.2.3.2 Immediate managers  
Karjalainen et al. (2013) also suggested that employees of a company with 
operations in China and the UAE were influenced by authority (such as managers 
or directors). Similarly, the four studies in this thesis found that employees’ 
information security behaviour intentions are thought to be influenced by authority 
such as direct managers. 
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The studies indicated that immediate managers, such as heads of departments and 
sections, are one of the most important factors in influencing employees to comply 
with an ISP. Moreover, they play an important role in employee behaviour because 
they have direct influence over enforcing organisational policies. 
Furthermore, top management, immediate managers and information security 
management should not ask for any employees’ username and passwords or put 
pressure on IT staff to give them admin privileges or to share their username and 
passwords. Unfortunately, the IT staff and system administrator interviews pointed 
out that this does happen in some of the organisations studied. 
The IT staff and system administrators’ interviews suggest that managers should be 
committed to the information security policy and use their authority in the right 
way to ensure employees comply. In addition, they ranked managers as the second 
most important influencing factor, after knowledge and awareness, when 
considering how to change employees’ behaviour. Furthermore, participants 
thought that managers should attend awareness training sessions to make them 
aware of the importance of their behaviour in influencing staff behaviours and that 
they should lead by example.       
7.2.4 Information security management team 
Information security management teams must consider the human aspects of 
information security (Loster, 2005; Rhee et al., 2012). Furthermore, IT 
management should make staff in their organisation aware that information security 
is important to the organisation and that changes in staff behaviour can improve the 
organisation’s information security (Herath & Rao, 2009). This was also found in 
this research but the IT staff and system administrators suggested that they need 
support from top management to get more IT staff to deliver training and 
awareness sessions.     
Some of the IT staff and system administrators suggested that organisations should 
have individual information security management or a small team of security staff 
with the responsibility for identifying and controlling organisation security risk, 
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and assisting and guiding employees in avoiding information security breaches and 
complying with the information security policy.  
The information security management team should be available and easy to 
communicate with to provide guidance and problem solving. Unfortunately, with 
one exception, the organisations studied do not have such teams to monitor security 
issues. The IT staff and system administrators in the one organisation that does 
have such a team were not satisfied with the number of staff, feeling the team’s size 
to be insufficient for the size of the organisation and its requirements.  
When comparing the overall survey results of IT staff and system administrators 
with the survey of employees, there is a suggestion that the employee information 
security behaviour is correlated with the IT staff and system administrator 
behaviour. Those questions where higher numbers of IT staff gave policy-
compliant responses were the same questions that employees scored well on and 
vice versa. This suggests that some behaviours within the policy were better 
established than others and a first step in improving employee behaviour would be 
to improve the knowledge and behaviour of the IT staff.   
Network administrators and security experts acknowledge that the significance of 
privacy, information security awareness, knowledge and behaviour among Internet 
users is crucial (Velki et al., 2017). Surprisingly, interviews with IT staff and 
system administrators found that they accepted some employees’ behaviour even 
when that behaviour was not compliant with the ISP. For instance, the ISP does not 
allow anybody at an organisation to ask for usernames and passwords. However, in 
the survey result, IT staff and system administrators did accept sharing passwords 
with co-workers. Around half of IT staff and system administrators (53%) agreed 
that employees could give their password to their managers if managers agreed to 
take responsibility. They also would all accept that confidential data could be sent 
to a commercial email server if they were given permission from their managers 
and that employees could reuse a password if they changed one of the characters. 
In addition, 40% of IT staff and system administrators accepted that employees 
need not lock their doors and windows because that is not their responsibility. 
Similarly, some of the IT staff and system administrators admitted that they do not 
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close their own doors when they leave their offices for a short time because they 
perceive it as a trusted environment and it has become a habit for them.  
This finding was unexpected and suggested that the higher education institutes 
should make sure that all IT staff and system administrators know all information 
security policy requirements and that their responsibilities for information security 
are clear. Clearly, there is further work required to change these levels of 
acceptance and habitual behaviours. First, this may require investment in awareness 
training about the different components of the ISP. In addition, it would be 
necessary to focus this training on the aspects of behaviour where employees are 
scoring badly, and/or behaviours are ranked as most important, rather than always 
going through all the behaviours. Lastly, the fact that so many staff do not comply 
with their policy means it might be worth looking at whether the policies should be 
rewritten and, if possible, simplified.  
7.2.5 Communication 
To improve policy compliance a continuous communication process is needed 
(Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010). In the current research, both interview studies 
suggested that poor internal communication between top management, immediate 
managers, the information security management team and employees was one of 
the possible reasons for lack of good security behaviour at most organisations. For 
example, IT staff and system administrators complained that employees did not 
report possible security incidents because they do not know how or to whom they 
should report the incident. Further work is required to investigate how an 
organisation might adopt a range of techniques to communicate more effectively 
with staff, such as mobile phones, social media and face-to-face meetings, rather 
than depending solely on email communication.    
The interviews identified that email is the most frequently used communication 
method in the organisations between IT staff and system administrators and other 
users. Emails are sent from IT staff and system administrators to spread awareness 
of information security policies and regulations. Once a security threat is detected 
(such as a phishing email), either by them or reported by users, IT staff send emails 
to alert all users not to reply to or interact with these types of emails.  
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IT staff and system administrators suggest that email is not an effective tool to 
disseminate awareness and policies to employees, and that this should be 
supplemented with alternative communication methods such as visiting all 
departments and sections, meeting employees and talking to them face to face. All 
these could be scheduled by an IT security awareness team and may occur every 
semester, or at monthly meetings. In addition, some employees in the focus group 
interviews suggested that experts should share the writing of the security policy 
with them as that would help to increase awareness among employees and motivate 
them to comply with the ISP (Safa, Von Solms, & Furnell, 2016). The aim would 
be for these meetings to be repeated at regular intervals. 
7.2.6 Sanctions and Rewards 
Previous research presented in the literature review has shown mixed results 
regarding how effective sanctions and rewards systems are at influencing 
employees to behave in an ISP-compliant manner.  In the current study most IT 
staff and system administrators recommended that sanctions should be practised to 
encourage employees to comply with the ISP, and half of them recommended that 
reward systems should also be in place to motivate compliant behaviour. In the 
organisations studied, no sanction or reward systems are currently implemented. 
However, from the eight measurements which explore employees’ perceptions of 
what influences their behaviour, employees reported that sanctions were least likely 
to influence how they behave. However, Pahnila et al. (2007)found that sanctions 
do not affect employees’ intentions to comply with security policies and rewards do 
not affect actual compliance behaviour. Here we see a contradiction, where IT staff 
feel that rewards and/or sanctions would improve employees’ security behaviour, 
but employees do not believe they would make a difference. Further research 
should be undertaken to understand how sanctions and rewards systems could 
influence employees’ ISP compliance. 
7.2.7 Summary of discussion on organisational information security culture  
The present study was designed to determine the level of information security 
awareness within higher education institutions in Oman and to identify what factors 
people perceived would influence their security behaviour intentions and thus 
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enhance the information security culture. The results suggest that employees in the 
organisations studied have some poor information system security behaviour 
intentions. Similar results were found in the Zayed University in the UAE (Rezgui 
& Marks, 2008).  
To improve the situation, organisations should consider the following six main 
components of an organisation management culture. First, an organisation has to 
implement a strategic information security plan and consider information security 
as their priority. In addition, organisations should spend time and effort to identify 
security vulnerabilities and threats, as well as having a clear understanding of their 
environment and employee culture and what they are protecting.  
An organisation’s culture should create information security policies which are 
readily available, understandable, complete, up to date, and outline the 
organisational commitments. The organisations should create appropriate and 
continuous training and awareness campaigns for all users as this is necessary to 
improve their skill and to avoid any vulnerabilities being exploited. In addition, top 
management and immediate managers’ commitment play a very important role in 
implementing information security policy. Furthermore, all the security 
management team should have comprehensive knowledge of the information 
security policy and appropriate security skills to enhance the information security 
environment as results show that employees’ behaviour correlates positively with 
IT staff acceptance of behaviour. Flexibility and multiple opportunities for internal 
communication between all members of an organisation are required.  
As the higher education institutions studied are in one country (Oman) the study 
suggested that IT security management from higher education institutions in Oman 
should meet annually or every semester to share: 
a) Current information security threats; 
b) Employee information security behaviour; 
c) Challenges that they face in the organisations;  
d) Methods and tools to evaluate and develop information security 
awareness levels and to improve employee ISP compliance. 
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Finally, a contradictory finding of this study is that IT staff and system 
administrators recommend sanctions and rewards systems should be brought in, 
while employees believe that sanctions are not likely to influence their security 
behaviours. This issue requires further research to resolve.  
 Human factors influence on users’ behavioural intentions 7.3
Even if an organisation puts a robust ISP in place, ensures continuous awareness 
and training, has top managers and immediate managers with a strong commitment 
to information security, maintains good communications between all users, and has 
appropriate sanctions and rewards place, this still may not be sufficient to ensure 
ISP compliance by employees. The organisations need to understand other ways 
human behaviour is influenced.  
Once an organisation ignores their employees’ perceptions of security behaviour, it 
may be more difficult to change behaviour.  For instance, trust and authority were 
found to be particularly important in this research.  
Most of the IT staff and system administrators’ interviews stated that employees 
are not aware about information security and compliance with the ISP. In addition, 
the results identified the reasons why employees do not comply with the ISP and 
that would help organisations to focus on particular factors to improve employee 
compliance. In addition, the IT staff and system administrator survey showed that 
they accepted some employee behaviours that went against the policy.  
7.3.1 Trust  
Most IT staff and system administrators indicated that the greatest threat to 
information system security in their organisations is their employees’ behaviour 
and that means they do not trust their employees to participate effectively in 
security. Furthermore, employees are willing to break their organisation’s 
information security policy because of trusting their managers or co-workers 
(Alotaibi & Furnell, 2016). In chapter 3 and chapter 5, IT staff and system 
administrators reported that they were particularly worried that employees trust 
their co-workers and IT staff and share their passwords with them. In addition, the 
results in chapter 4 and 6 confirmed that some employees would share their 
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passwords with their co-workers and IT staff because of trust and thus IT staff were 
right to be worried. This trust in IT staff and co-workers leads to poor information 
security protection for an organisation and sharing passwords with someone they 
believe to be a member of IT staff could lead to information loss through phishing 
attacks. Initial access (physical access and software) to an organisation is very easy 
to get as people trust others in their environment and so share usernames and 
passwords and do not lock computers screens or doors and windows when they 
leave their offices. Similarly, some IT staff admitted that they do not close office 
doors when they leave for short time because they consider education institutions to 
be a trusted environment.  
Employees refusing to share their password with IT staff or/and co-workers or 
locking their computer’s screen when they leave them for short time is suggesting 
to other staff that they do not trust them.  To remove these barriers, it may be 
necessary to ensure that IT staff stick to policy and do not request passwords or 
send links in emails. However, it may also be necessary to introduce new training 
which helps people learn how to be confident to say no to requests which they 
know are a breach of the ISP.  
7.3.2 Authority  
In this study both employees and IT staff and system administrators suggest they 
find it hard to refuse requests from managers. That is, their behaviour is influenced 
by those in positions of authority. IT staff and system administrators suggest that 
managers play a very important role in establishing security compliance. For 
example, half of the IT staff and system administrators agreed that employees 
could break the policy when they got permission from their managers. However, 
most IT staff and system administrators agreed that employees should not share 
their passwords with anyone (including their managers) under any circumstances.  
71% of employees surveyed selected the option to share usernames and passwords 
with managers because they think managers have the authority to break the 
organisation’s ISP. This behaviour was also reported in the employee focus groups. 
This behaviour has the highest percentage of employees reporting non-compliance 
intentions in the survey. In addition, 31% of employees would send confidential 
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files for back-up to commercial email servers when they got permission from their 
managers. These cases reveal that managers influence employees to break the 
policy. 
7.3.3 Responsibility 
The results suggest that more than half the employees think that locking their office 
door is not their responsibility. The IT staff and system administrator interviews 
highlight that employees do not take responsibility for information security because 
most of them do not report to them when they identify any threats and others only 
report after the incident has occurred because it interrupted their work or caused 
them to lose important information.  
Clearly, employees should take personal responsibility for information security and 
one system administrator suggested that one way may be to get employees to 
commit to this is by signing an agreement that they are responsible for their 
security behaviour and that getting permission from their managers does not negate 
this responsibility. 
7.3.4 Productivity 
The IT staff and system administrator interviews highlight that one of the reasons 
for some of the users failing to comply with the ISP is that they think complying 
will slow their performance (Hwang & Cha, 2018).From the employee survey, it 
was clear that some employees would break the policy to quickly get what they 
needed to do their job such as downloading software from the Internet and 
disabling antivirus software. Since some employees perceive security to be 
counterproductive, IT management should make sure that the ISP is fit for purpose 
and does not cause unnecessary delays.  
7.3.5 Summary of discussion on human factors influence on employee 
behaviour 
An organisation’s security culture and human factors together influence employee 
compliance with the ISP. The findings of this study show that the level of trust, 
authority, responsibility and productivity are the main barriers to compliance. Some 
of these results are in agreement with Al-Awadi (2009) interview findings with 
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employees in Glasgow University which showed that people believed that security 
was someone else’s problem and that individual values and beliefs, work pressure, 
lack of awareness, an invisible security policy, and organisational security culture 
are barriers to compliance.  
In the current study, more than one third of employees believed that they can break 
the ISP: 
 When they feel they can trust people at the workplace, such as IT staff 
and/or co-workers; 
 When someone at the workplace gives authorisation, such as immediate 
managers; 
 Because information security is not their responsibility; 
 When productivity will be negatively affected.   
Trust and authority were the most influential factors on employee non-compliance 
and this is in agreement with Al-Awadi’s findings (interviews with 25 employees 
of the University of Glasgow in the UK) that some employees would give their 
password someone else when asked to do so by a manager or when they were 
giving it to a trusted colleague. In the current study, the levels of trust employees 
have in their IT staff and colleagues at work strongly influenced them to break the 
security policy (e.g., sharing passwords). Therefore, managers’ commitment to the 
ISP is crucial to prevent employees being influenced by authority to break the 
policy.  
Another important finding was that productivity at work and security responsibility 
influenced non-compliance. Therefore, organisations should build on the beliefs of 
their employees that security is not a barrier to productive work. Organisations 
should ensure that staff take personal responsibility for security by explaining to 
them the information security consequences and benefits when they adhere to or 
break the policy. Therefore, it is important that organisations should take into 
consideration all those factors and an understanding of human factors to engage 
employees in security policy compliance.  
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 Chapter summary  7.4
This chapter gathered findings from the four studies and suggested that employees 
cannot be entirely blamed for non-ISP-compliant behaviour (either deliberately or 
as a result of mistakes) when their organisations do not provide: 
a) Strategic security plans.  
b) Ongoing awareness campaigns to all employees to increase employee 
knowledge. An organisation should make it clear to employees that their 
behaviour has a role in securing the organisation data and they should 
know the security benefit and consequences for themselves and the 
organisations. It is essential that employees work securely. In addition, an 
organisation should ensure that their employees understand the threats 
caused by trust and not taking responsibility.  
c) Ongoing identification of the current security threats and specific 
employee security behaviour vulnerabilities and providing training for 
specific skills. In addition, organisations should understand employees’ 
current behaviours to target training more efficiently rather than wasting 
time focusing on good behaviours that already exist.   
d) An information security policy that is understandable, available, up to 
date, fit for the culture and continually communicated to employees 
through different channels such as emails, posters, E-learning, and 
visiting them in their workplaces.  
e) Commitment of top management and immediate managers to compliance 
with policy, and requiring employees to adhere to policy.  
f) Centralised and decentralised information security management team 
members. They should have appropriate knowledge about the ISP and 
appropriate security skills.  
g) Good communications between top management, all managers, IT 
security management team and employees to disseminate awareness, 
enforce the security policy, deter potential attacks and report security 
threats and incidents. 
h) Continuous employee behaviour measurement to identify human 
influences on behaviour. The IT security management should deal with 
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these factors in positive ways to influence employees to comply with 
security policy. 
i) The 14 Information security scenarios could be used as guidelines 
(available on the organisation’s websites). For example, retesting the 
security scenarios keeps an organisation up to date with what employees 
do when they face specific security conditions. The survey questionnaires 
in this study could be used.       
 
  
197 
 
Chapter 8: CONCLUSION  
 Introduction 8.1
This chapter summarises the research undertaken, discusses its contributions, 
assesses its limitations, and offers suggestions for further work.     
 Summary of the research and its contributions 8.2
A study of the literature revealed that organisational management and employee 
behaviour play very important roles in securing an organisation’s information 
assets and researchers have proposed a range of reasons for why employees do not 
comply with information security policies. In addition, the security literature shows 
that there are still challenges and difficulties associated with measuring employee 
behaviour. Therefore, a reliable measure of the intended information security 
behaviour of a large number of employees and analysis of the factors influencing 
that behaviour were needed to address these gaps.  
The research set out in this thesis applied qualitative and quantitative methods in 
four studies of a large number of employees across a range of higher education 
institutions in Oman. The first study conducted interviews with eight IT staff and 
system administrators from four institutions. The second study used questionnaires 
to investigate the security behavioural intentions and motivations of 503 employees 
from 12 Omani higher education institutions. The third study used a combination of 
interviews and a quantitative scenario-based questionnaire to investigate the views 
and behavioural intentions of 17 IT staff and system administrators. The fourth 
study conducted focus groups with 21 employees to explore factors that may 
influence their behavioural intentions with regards to compliance with information 
security policy. 
The empirical investigations were focused on the role of management in 
information security and the behavioural intentions of employees, together with the 
factors that influence that behaviour. 
The results from the four studies allowed the construction of knowledge i) about 
the information security culture in Omani higher education institutions, ii) about 
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the security awareness levels of employees at those institutions, iii) about the level 
of employees’ behaviour intentions in relation to information security policies, and 
iv) about the organisational and human barriers to policy compliance.  
The research showed that authority, trust, responsibility and productivity are major 
factors that influence the way employees approach ISP compliance. For example, 
because of the authority of managers, more than two-thirds of the employees 
surveyed demonstrated motivation to share passwords with managers under various 
circumstances and more than a third would share passwords with co-workers 
because of trust.  
The results of this investigation showed that organisational and human factors 
influence both positively and negatively the ways employees think about their 
behaviour relating to information security. Finally, it was recommended that the 
organisational and human factors should be understood and used in the 
development of information security policies to ensure that they work together to 
improve employees’ security behaviour.   
8.2.1 Contributions of this research 
The research makes contributions in two areas: i) to knowledge about ISP 
compliance and the factors that affect it and ii) to methodology in terms of how to 
measure employee awareness and behavioural intentions and the factors and 
motivational theories that underpin these. 
8.2.1.1 Contributions to knowledge 
The purpose of this research was to identify factors that influence employee 
behavioural motivation and intention in relation to information security policies in 
Omani higher education institutions. Information is an increasingly important 
organisational asset. With the rise of cybercriminal activity, keeping information 
secure assumes ever greater importance. One way to increase information security 
is to develop appropriate information security policies and to ensure that employees 
comply with them. 
The first study conducted in this research applied qualitative and quantitative 
methods in multiple organisations and the results allowed the identification of the 
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organisational and human factor barriers to policy compliance. The contributions of 
the work are as follows. 
The first contribution this research makes is in a novel exploration of the internal 
and external threats to organisations’ information security through the findings of 
interviews and questionnaires with IT staff and system administrators from higher 
education institutions across Oman. They highlighted the importance of 
management behaviour and attitudes on employee behaviour. It was found that 
many employees look to management rather than to formal policies to direct their 
behaviour.   
Secondly, the scenario-based survey (which covered a wider range of security 
issues than previous research) revealed that policy compliance is not a single 
behaviour but a spectrum of behaviours, each with its own level of compliance and 
that each must be addressed individually (e.g., employees sharing passwords with 
co-workers, IT staff or managers). The large sample size of this study (503 
participants of different nationalities drawn from 12 Omani higher education 
institutions) gives a high degree of confidence to the results and means the findings 
are more transferable than those of previous research which had small sample sizes 
(often focusing on a single institution) and which covered a much narrower range 
of security issues.    
The third study revealed shadow security behaviours present in the organisations. 
That is, behaviours that conflict with the ISP but which, nevertheless, those 
responsible for the policy deem as acceptable.    
The four studies combined contribute to knowledge by identifying the 
organisational and human barriers that influence how employees think about 
compliance with information security policies. The organisational barriers were: 
 a lack of information security awareness and training not just for 
employees but also for IT staff; 
 a lack of support from top management to promote compliance; 
 employees’ immediate managers giving permission to behave in a non-
compliant way; 
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 a lack of good communications; and 
 the absence of workable sanctions for non-compliance with the ISP.  
In addition, it was found that when an ISP works against the key human factors of 
trust, authority, responsibility and productivity, employees will tend to display 
strong intentions to behave in a non-compliant manner. Therefore, an organisation 
needs to take organisational human factors into account when developing an ISP to 
maximise the likelihood of compliance.  
From these findings a number of recommendations were formulated to help 
organisations implement effective information security policies and to set up 
effective communication channels and information security awareness and training 
to increase the likelihood of compliance. A major recommendation is that IT 
security management adopt a module of continuous assessment of employee 
information security behaviour with relevant and appropriate training and skills 
updating to be delivered in response to the findings.   
8.2.1.2 Contribution to methodology 
In addition to the contributions to knowledge above, this research makes an 
important contribution to methodology. Studying and measuring behaviour directly 
is problematic because people tend to alter their behaviour when being observed. 
Therefore, previous studies of security policy compliance have tended to focus on 
knowledge or awareness only. Where researchers did attempt to study behavioural 
intentions through the use of scenario questions (D’Arcy, 2009; Farooq et al., 2015; 
Kruger et al., 2010; Vance et al., 2012), phrasing the questions in the second person 
(such as “what would you do in this situation?”) tends to lead to participants giving 
the answer they think the researcher is looking for rather than what they would 
actually (or likely) do.  
The novelty of the approach taken in this thesis lies in the indirect measurement of 
intended behaviour. By asking participants what a third person should do, one is 
able to obtain a more reliable measure of what the participants themselves would 
do. The instrument used in the second study was found to be a reliable way of 
assessing knowledge, awareness, and likely behaviour of participants in a broad 
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range of information security scenarios. The provision of a single policy-correct 
answer plus three other incorrect, but nevertheless plausible, answers also avoided 
the problem of there being an obvious right answer. The plausible incorrect 
answers were designed so as to allow the discovery of what underlying factors 
were influencing participants’ behavioural intentions (according to Protection 
Motivation Theory and the Theory of Planned Behaviour). Thus, the survey 
instrument designed for this research is a contribution to methodology and could be 
applied in future research. 
 Limitations 8.3
The research has several limitations which need to be taken into account. First, it is 
recognised that a small number of institutions took part in the first interview study. 
The interviews were conducted with IT staff and system administrators from four 
higher education institutions which is a small sample relative to the number of 
colleges and universities in Oman. It was beyond the scope of this research to 
extend this study but it would be instructive to study a larger sample to obtain more 
transferable results.  
Secondly, participants in the interviews were not willing to reveal the number of 
the security breaches experienced at their institutions so it was not possible to 
quantify the size of the problem. However, this is consistent with previous research 
reported in the literature which also was not able to obtain exact breach counts.      
A third limitation is that the scope of this research was higher education in Oman 
so the results may not be applicable to organisations in other sectors or, indeed, 
higher education institutions in other countries. However, the wide range of 
nationalities involved in the study might mean the results are more transferable 
than first appears. Therefore, future research is needed to assess how the results 
compare to organisations in other sectors and countries. Doing so was beyond the 
scope of this research.  
It should also be noted that a few institutions had only a small number of 
employees participate in the questionnaire survey because the research was 
conducted at the end of the second semester and those institutions have a long 
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holiday period (June – September). For future research it is recommended to 
consider the timing of questionnaire distribution.    
 Future work 8.4
Based on the results and limitations of this study, there are several directions for 
further work. As this research was conducted in higher education institutions in 
Oman, it would be useful to conduct similar studies in different types of 
organisation, sector, and country (such as healthcare, government ministries, 
companies) and compare the result with the findings of this research.  
The scenarios employed in the questionnaire survey could be used to compare 
organisations that practice sanctions and rewards systems to see whether such 
systems influence employee compliance with information security policies. The 
research could study similar organisations that differ only in whether they have 
sanction or reward systems.    
Conducting interviews with top and middle management would be useful to 
explore the challenges from their perspective and to identify ways management 
could positively influence compliant behaviour and how their undermining of ISPs 
by encouraging employees to engage in non-compliant behaviour could be stopped.  
The scenario questions could also be extended to cover more areas of information 
security and then deployed in a wider range of organisations. The results could then 
be fed back in order to refine and further develop the questionnaire with a view to it 
being used as a standard instrument for measuring employee information security 
behaviour. 
Finally, some of the statistically significant findings of the demographic data from 
the employee survey could be explored in more depth to fully understand why 
these differences exist. For example, why is it that nationalities, gender, age group, 
work experience, qualification level and whether they have more privileges or not 
to have significant effects on policy compliance? Some of these results, while 
statistically significant, nevertheless had a very small effect size, and these could be 
explored further. For example, why was it observed that men had higher knowledge 
and compliance scores than women, and why did those employees with 
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administrative privileges on their computers perform worse than those who did 
not?.   
204 
 
REFERENCES: 
Ahlan, A. R., & Lubis, M. (2011). Information Security Awareness in University: 
Maintaining Learnability, Performance and Adaptability through Roles of 
Responsibility. Paper presented at the IEEE 7th International Conference on 
Information Assurance and Security (IAS)  2011; 246-250. 
Ahmad, A., Hadgkiss, J., & Ruighaver, A. B. (2012). Incident Response Teams–
Challenges in Supporting the Organisational Security Function. Computers & 
Security, 31(5), 643-652.  
Ajzen, I. (1991). The Theory of Planned Behavior. Organizational behavior and 
human decision processes, 50(2), 179-211.  
Akhunzada, A., Sookhak, M., Anuar, N. B., Gani, A., Ahmed, E., Shiraz, M., Furnell, 
S., Hayat, A., & Khan, M. K. (2015). Man-at-the-End Attacks: Analysis, 
Taxonomy, Human Aspects, Motivation and Future Directions. Journal of 
Network and Computer Applications, 48, 44-57.  
Akers, R. (2017). Social learning and social structure: A general theory of crime 
and deviance: Routledge. 
Al-Awadi, M. (2009). A Study of Employees' Attitudes Towards Organisational 
Information Security Policies in the Uk and Oman. (PhD), University of Glasgow, 
Glasgow.    
Al-Kalbani, A. (2017). A Compliance Based Framework for Information Security in 
E-Government in Oman. (PhD), Melbourne, Australia.    
Al-Mukahal, H. M., & Alshare, K. (2015). An Examination of Factors That 
Influence the Number of Information Security Policy Violations in Qatari 
Organizations. Information & Computer Security, 23(1), 102-118.  
Alarifi, A., Tootell, H., & Hyland, P. (2012). A Study of Information Security 
Awareness and Practices in Saudi Arabia. Paper presented at the 2nd 
International Conference on Communications and Information Technology 
(ICCIT): Digital Information Management, Hammamet. 
Albrechtsen, E. (2007). Computers & Security, 26(4), 276-289. 
doi:10.1016/j.cose.2006.11.004 
Albrechtsen, E., & Hovden, J. (2010). Improving Information Security Awareness 
and Behaviour through Dialogue, Participation and Collective Reflection. An 
Intervention Study. Computers & Security, 29(4), 432-445. 
doi:10.1016/j.cose.2009.12.005 
Alexander, C. S., & Becker, H. J. (1978). The Use of Vignettes in Survey Research. 
Public opinion quarterly, 42(1), 93-104.  
Alfawaz, S. M. (2011). Information Security Management: A Case Study of an 
Information Security Culture. (PhD), Queensland University of Technology, 
Australia.    
Aliyu, M., Abdallah, N. A. O., Lasisi, N. A., Diyar, D., & Zeki, A. M. (2010). 
Computer Security and Ethics Awareness among Iium Students: An 
205 
 
Empirical Study. Paper presented at the Computer Security and Ethics 
awareness among IIUM Students: An Empirical Study. Journal of 
Information Technology. 
Alotaibi, T., & Furnell, S. (2016). Assessing Staff Acceptance and Compliance with 
Information Security. Advances in Communications, Electronics, Networks, 
Robotics and Security Volume 13, 13, 9.  
Aloul, F. A. (2010). Information Security Awareness in Uae: A Survey Paper. Paper 
presented at the IEEE International Conference for Internet Technology and 
Secured Transactions (ICITST) 2010, pp. 1-6. 
Anderson, C. L., & Agarwal, R. (2010). Practicing Safe Computing: A Multimedia 
Empirical Examination of Home Computer User Security Behavioral 
Intentions. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 613-643.  
Aurigemma, S., & Mattson, T. (2017). Deterrence and Punishment Experience 
Impacts on Isp Compliance Attitudes. Information & Computer Security, 
25(4), 421-436.  
Baker, W. H., Wade, H. B., Linda, W., & Wallace, L. (2007). Is Information 
Security under Control?: Investigating Quality in Information Security 
Management. IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine, 5(1), 36-44. 
doi:10.1109/MSP.2007.11 
Baranowski, T., Cullen, K. W., Nicklas, T., Thompson, D., & Baranowski, J. (2003). 
Are Current Health Behavioral Change Models Helpful in Guiding 
Prevention of Weight Gain Efforts? Obesity research, 11(S10), 23S-43S.  
Bates, D. (1990). 1., Plog F. Cultural anthropology, 3rd edn. New York: McGraw-
Hill.  
Beautement, A., Becker, I., Parkin, S., Krol, K., & Sasse, A. (2016). Productive 
Security: A Scalable Methodology for Analysing Employee Security 
Behaviours. Paper presented at the 12th Symposium on Usable Privacy and 
Security (SOUPS). 
Beautement, A., Sasse, M. A., & Wonham, M. (2009). The Compliance Budget: 
Managing Security Behaviour in Organisations. Paper presented at the 
Proceedings of the 2008 workshop on New security paradigms. 
Biddle, R., Chiasson, S., & Van Oorschot, P. C. (2012). Graphical Passwords: 
Learning from the First Twelve Years. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 
44(4), 19.  
Bogdan, R., & Biklen, S. K. (1992). Qualitative Research for Education: An 
Introduction to Theory and Methods. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Bosworth, S., & Kabay, M. E. (2002). Computer Security Handbook. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
Boulder, C. (2010). New Webroot Survey Reveals Poor Password Practices That 
May Put Consumers' Identities at Risk: Retrieved from 
https://www.webroot.com/us/en/about/press-room/releases. 
206 
 
Bulgurcu, B., Cavusoglu, H., & Benbasat, I. (2010). Information Security Policy 
Compliance: An Empirical Study of Rationality-Based Beliefs and 
Information Security Awareness. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 523-548.  
Caputo, D. D., Pfleeger, S. L., Freeman, J. D., & Johnson, M. E. (2014). Going 
Spear Phishing: Exploring Embedded Training and Awareness. IEEE 
Security & Privacy, 12(1), 28-38. doi:10.1109/MSP.2013.106 
Carr, L. T. (1994). The Strengths and Weaknesses of Quantitative and Qualitative 
Research: What Method for Nursing? Journal of Advanced Nursing, 20(4), 
716-721.  
Caulfield, T., & Parkin, S. (2016). Case Study: Predicting the Impact of a Physical 
Access Control Intervention. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 6th 
Workshop on Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust. 
Chipperfield, C., & Furnell, S. (2010). From Security Policy to Practice: Sending the 
Right Messages. Computer Fraud & Security, 2010(3), 13-19.  
Choi, M. (2016). Leadership of Information Security Manager on the Effectiveness 
of Information Systems Security for Secure Sustainable Computing. 
Sustainability, 8(7), 638.  
Coe, R. (2002). It's the Effect Size, Stupid: What Effect Size Is and Why It Is 
Important. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the British 
Educational Research Association, University of Exeter, England.  
Cohen, J. (1992). A Power Primer. Psychological bulletin, 112(1), 155.  
Colwill, C. (2009). Human Factors in Information Security: The Insider Threat–Who 
Can You Trust These Days? Information Security Technical Report, 14(4), 
186-196.  
Conway, D., Taib, R., Harris, M., Yu, K., Berkovsky, S., & Chen, F. (2017). A 
Qualitative Investigation of Bank Employee Experiences of Information 
Security and Phishing. Paper presented at the Thirteenth Symposium on 
Usable Privacy and Security ({SOUPS} 2017). 
Coventry, L., Briggs, P., Jeske, D., & van Moorsel, A. (2014). Scene: A Structured 
Means for Creating and Evaluating Behavioral Nudges in a Cyber Security 
Environment. Paper presented at the International Conference of Design, 
User Experience, and Usability. 
Crossler, R. E. (2010). Protection Motivation Theory: Understanding Determinants 
to Backing up Personal Data. Paper presented at the System Sciences 
(HICSS), 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference on. 
Crossler, R. E., Johnston, A. C., Lowry, P. B., Hu, Q., Warkentin, M., & Baskerville, 
R. (2013). Future Directions for Behavioral Information Security Research. 
Computers & Security, 32, 90-101.  
D'Arcy, J., & Greene, G. (2014). Security Culture and the Employment Relationship 
as Drivers of Employees’ Security Compliance. Information Management & 
Computer Security, 22(5), 474-489.  
207 
 
D'Arcy, J., & Hovav, A. (2007). Deterring Internal Information Systems Misuse. 
Communications of the ACM, 50(10), 113-117.  
D’Arcy, J., Hovav, A., and Galletta, D. (2009). User Awareness of Security 
Countermeasures and Its Impact on Information Systems Misuse: A 
Deterrence Approach. Information System Research, 20(1), 79-98. 
doi:10.1287/isre.1070.0160 
Dang-Pham, D., Pittayachawan, S., & Bruno, V. (2017). Applications of Social 
Network Analysis in Behavioural Information Security Research: Concepts 
and Empirical Analysis. Computers & Security, 68, 1-15.  
David, J. (2002). Policy Enforcement in the Workplace. Computers & Security, 
21(6), 506-513.  
Dinev, T., & Hu, Q. (2007). The Centrality of Awareness in the Formation of User 
Behavioral Intention toward Protective Information Technologies. Journal of 
the Association for Information Systems, 8(7), 386.  
Dodge, R. C., Carver, C., & Ferguson, A. J. (2007). Phishing for User Security 
Awareness. Computers & Security, 26(1), 73-80.  
Drevin, L., Kruger, H. A., & Steyn, T. (2007). Value-Focused Assessment of Ict 
Security Awareness in an Academic Environment. Computers & Security, 
26(1), 36-43. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2006.10.006 
Durgin, M. (2007). Understanding the Importance of and Implementing Internal 
Security Measures. SANS Institute Reading Room (https://www2. sans. 
org/reading_room/whitepapers/policyissues/1901. php).  
Eining, M. M., & Christensen, A. L. (1991). A Psycho-Social Model of Software 
Piracy: The Development and Test of a Model. Ethical issues in information 
systems, 182-188.  
Eminağaoğlu, M., Uçar, E., & Eren, Ş. (2009). The Positive Outcomes of 
Information Security Awareness Training in Companies–a Case Study. 
Information Security Technical Report, 14(4), 223-229.  
Eyong, B. K. (2014). Recommendations for Information Security Awareness 
Training for College Students. Information Management & Computer 
Security, 22(1), 115-126. doi:10.1108/IMCS-01-2013-0005 
Ezingeard, J.-N., & Bowen-Schrire, M. (2007). Triggers of Change in Information 
Security Management Practices. Journal of General Management, 32(4).  
Farooq, A., Isoaho, J., Virtanen, S., & Isoaho, J. (2015). Information Security 
Awareness in Educational Institution: An Analysis of Students' Individual 
Factors. Paper presented at the Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA, 2015 IEEE. 
Fatani, H. A., Zamzami, I. F., Aydin, M., & Aliyu, M. (2013). Awareness toward 
Wireless Security Policy: Case Study of International Islamic University 
Malaysia. 
Field, A. (2009). Comparing Several Means: Anova (Glm 1). In Discovering 
Statistics Using Spss (3rd Ed., Pp. 347-394). London: Sage: Sage 
publications. 
208 
 
Florêncio, D., & Herley, C. (2010). Where Do Security Policies Come From? Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium on Usable Privacy and 
Security. 
Flores, W. R., & Ekstedt, M. (2016). Shaping Intention to Resist Social Engineering 
through Transformational Leadership, Information Security Culture and 
Awareness. Computers & Security, 59, 26-44.  
Goo, J., Yim, M.-S., & Kim, D. J. (2013). A Path Way to Successful Management of 
Individual Intention to Security Compliance: A Role of Organizational 
Security Climate. Paper presented at the System Sciences (HICSS), 2013 
46th Hawaii International Conference on. 
Gross, J. B., & Rosson, M. B. (2007). Looking for Trouble: Understanding End-User 
Security Management. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 2007 
Symposium on Computer Human interaction For the Management of 
information Technology. 
Guo, K. H., Yuan, Y., Archer, N. P., & Connelly, C. E. (2011). Understanding 
Nonmalicious Security Violations in the Workplace: A Composite Behavior 
Model. Journal of Management Information Systems, 28(2), 203-236.  
Gupta, S., Bostrom, R. P., & Huber, M. (2010). End-User Training Methods: What 
We Know, Need to Know. ACM SIGMIS Database, 41(4), 9-39.  
Haeussinger, F., & Kranz, J. (2013). Information Security Awareness: Its 
Antecedents and Mediating Effects on Security Compliant Behavior.  
Han, J., Kim, Y. J., & Kim, H. (2017). An Integrative Model of Information Security 
Policy Compliance with Psychological Contract: Examining a Bilateral 
Perspective. Computers & Security, 66, 52-65.  
Hansen, J. M., Saridakis, G., & Benson, V. (2018). Risk, Trust, and the Interaction 
of Perceived Ease of Use and Behavioral Control in Predicting Consumers’ 
Use of Social Media for Transactions. Computers in Human Behavior, 80, 
197-206.  
Hasan, M. R., & Hussin, H. (2010). Self Awareness before Social Networking: 
Exploring the User Behaviour and Information Security Vulnerability in 
Malaysia. 
Heary, C. M., & Hennessy, E. (2002). The Use of Focus Group Interviews in 
Pediatric Health Care Research. Journal of pediatric psychology, 27(1), 47-57.  
Hellqvist, F. (2014). Design of Business Information Security Policy: A Case Study 
on Orebro County Council´ S Work with Information Security.  
Herath, T., & Rao, H. R. (2009). Encouraging Information Security Behaviors in 
Organizations: Role of Penalties, Pressures and Perceived Effectiveness. 
Decision Support Systems, 47(2), 154-165. doi:10.1016/j.dss.2009.02.005 
Hina, S., & Dominic, D. D. (2016). Information Security Policies: Investigation of 
Compliance in Universities. Paper presented at the 2016 3rd International 
Conference on Computer and Information Sciences (ICCOINS). 
209 
 
Hina, S., & Dominic, D. D. (2017). Need for Information Security Policies 
Compliance: A Perspective in Higher Education Institutions. Paper presented 
at the 2017 International Conference on Research and Innovation in 
Information Systems (ICRIIS). 
Hoppe, M. J., Wells, E. A., Morrison, D. M., Gillmore, M. R., & Wilsdon, A. (1995). 
Using Focus Groups to Discuss Sensitive Topics with Children. Evaluation 
Review, 19(1), 102-114.  
Hovav, A., & D’Arcy, J. (2012). Applying an Extended Model of Deterrence across 
Cultures: An Investigation of Information Systems Misuse in the Us and 
South Korea. Information & Management, 49(2), 99-110.  
Hu, Q., Dinev, T., Hart, P., & Cooke, D. (2012). Managing Employee Compliance 
with Information Security Policies: The Critical Role of Top Management 
and Organizational Culture. Decision Sciences, 43(4), 615-660.  
Hwang, I., & Cha, O. (2018). Examining Technostress Creators and Role Stress as 
Potential Threats to Employees' Information Security Compliance. 
Computers in Human Behavior, 81, 282-293.  
Ifinedo, P. (2012). Understanding Information Systems Security Policy Compliance: 
An Integration of the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Protection 
Motivation Theory. Computers & Security, 31(1), 83-95. 
doi:10.1016/j.cose.2011.10.007 
Ifinedo, P. (2014). Information Systems Security Policy Compliance: An Empirical 
Study of the Effects of Socialisation, Influence, and Cognition. Information 
& Management, 51(1), 69-79. doi:10.1016/j.im.2013.10.001 
ITA. (2017). Information Technology Authority Annual Report 2016, Information 
Technology Authority Oman.   Retrieved from 
https://www.ita.gov.om/ITAPortal/MediaCenter/Document_detail.aspx?NID
=115  
Jaeger, J. (2013). Human Error, Not Hackers, Cause Most Data Breaches. 
Compliance Week, 10(110), 56-57.  
Janes, P. (2012). People, Process, and Technologies Impact on Information Data 
Loss. SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room.  
Jansen, J. (2015). Studying Safe Online Banking Behaviour: A Protection 
Motivation Theory Approach. Paper presented at the HAISA. 
Karjalainen, M., Siponen, M., Puhakainen, P., & Sarker, S. (2013). One Size Does 
Not Fit All: Different Cultures Require Different Information System 
Security Interventions.  
Karlsson, F., Hedström, K., & Goldkuhl, G. (2017). Practice-Based Discourse 
Analysis of Information Security Policies. Computers & Security, 67, 267-
279.  
Katz, F. H. (2005). The Effect of a University Information Security Survey on 
Instruction Methods in Information Security. 
210 
 
Kaur, J., & Mustafa, N. (2013). Examining the Effects of Knowledge, Attitude and 
Behaviour on Information Security Awareness: A Case on Sme. 
Kearney, W. D., & Kruger, H. A. (2016). Theorising on Risk Homeostasis in the 
Context of Information Security Behaviour. Information & Computer 
Security, 24(5), 496-513.  
Khalfan, A. M. (2004). Information Security Considerations in Is/It Outsourcing 
Projects: A Descriptive Case Study of Two Sectors. International Journal of 
Information Management, 24(1), 29-42. doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2003.12.001 
Khan, B., Alghathbar, K. S., Nabi, S. I., & Khan, M. K. (2011). Effectiveness of 
Information Security Awareness Methods Based on Psychological Theories. 
African Journal of Business Management, 5(26), 10862-10868. 
doi:10.5897/AJBM11.067 
Kirlappos, I., Parkin, S., & Sasse, M. A. (2014). Learning from “Shadow Security”: 
Why Understanding Non-Compliance Provides the Basis for Effective 
Security.  
Kissel, R. (2009). Small Business Information Security: The Fundamentals: DIANE 
Publishing. 
Klahr, R., Shah, J., Sheriffs, P., Rossington, T., Pestell, G., Button, M., & Wang, V. 
(2017). Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2017: Main Report.   Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/609186/Cyber_Security_Breaches_Survey_2017_main_report_PUBLIC.pd
f 
Knapp, K. J., Marshall, T. E., Kelly Rainer, R., & Nelson Ford, F. (2006). 
Information Security: Management's Effect on Culture and Policy. 
Information Management & Computer Security, 14(1), 24-36.  
Knapp, K. J., Marshall, T. E., Rainer Jr, R. K., & Morrow, D. W. (2006). The Top 
Information Security Issues Facing Organizations: What Can Government 
Do to Help. Network security, 1, 327.  
Knapp, K. J., Morris Jr, F., Marshall, T. E., & Byrd, T. A. (2009). Information 
Security Policy: An Organizational-Level Process Model. Computers & 
Security, 28(7), 493-508.  
Krueger, R. (1994). Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research 2nd Edn 
Sage. Thousand Oaks CA.  
Kruger, H., Drevin, L., & Steyn, T. (2010). A Vocabulary Test to Assess 
Information Security Awareness. Information Management & Computer 
Security, 18(5), 316-327.  
Kruger, H. A., & Kearney, W. D. (2006). A Prototype for Assessing Information 
Security Awareness. Computers & Security, 25(4), 289-296. 
doi:10.1016/j.cose.2006.02.008 
Kruger, H. A., & Kearney, W. D. (2008). Consensus Ranking–an Ict Security 
Awareness Case Study. Computers & Security, 27(7-8), 254-259.  
211 
 
Kwon, J., Ulmer, J. R., & Wang, T. (2012). The Association between Top 
Management Involvement and Compensation and Information Security 
Breaches. Journal of Information Systems, 27(1), 219-236.  
Kyobe, M. (2010). Towards a Framework to Guide Compliance with Is Security 
Policies and Regulations in a University. Paper presented at the Information 
Security for South Africa (ISSA), 2010. 
Lacey, D., & James, B. E. (2010). Review of Availability of Advice on Security for 
Small/Medium Sized Organisations. Retrieved, 2(28), 2013.  
Lang, M., Devitt, J., Kelly, S., Kinneen, A., O'Malley, J., & Prunty, D. (2009). 
Social Networking and Personal Data Security: A Study of Attitudes and 
Public Awareness in Ireland. 
Lebek, B., Uffen, J., Breitner, M. H., Neumann, M., & Hohler, B. (2013). 
Employees' Information Security Awareness and Behavior: A Literature 
Review. 
Lee, C., Lee, C. C., & Kim, S. (2016). Understanding Information Security Stress: 
Focusing on the Type of Information Security Compliance Activity. 
Computers & Security, 59, 60-70.  
Li, H., Sarathy, R., & Zhang, J. (2010). Understanding Compliance with Internet Use 
Policy: An Integrative Model Based on Command-and-Control and Self-
Regulatory Approaches. Paper presented at the ICIS. 
Liginlal, D., Sim, I., & Khansa, L. (2009). How Significant Is Human Error as a 
Cause of Privacy Breaches? An Empirical Study and a Framework for Error 
Management. Computers & Security, 28(3), 215-228.  
Locke, S. D., & Gilbert, B. O. (1995). Method of Psychological Assessment, Self-
Disclosure, and Experiential Differences: A Study of Computer, 
Questionnaire, and Interview Assessment Formats. Journal of Social 
Behavior and Personality, 10(1), 255.  
Lohrmann, D. (2014). Ten Recommendations for Security Awareness Programs.   
Retrieved from http://www.govtech.com/blogs/lohrmann-on-
cybersecurity/Ten-Recommendations-for-Security-Awareness-Programs.html 
Loster, P. C. (2005). Managing E-Business Risk to Mitigate Loss. Financial 
Executive, 21(5), 43-45.  
Madigan, E. M., Petrulich, C., & Motuk, K. (2004). The Cost of Non-Compliance: 
When Policies Fail. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 32nd annual 
ACM SIGUCCS conference on User services. 
Mahabi, V. (2010). Information Security Awareness: System Administrators and 
End-Users Perspectives at Florida State University: Florida State University. 
Mahfuth, A., Yussof, S., Baker, A. A., & Ali, N. (2017). A Systematic Literature 
Review: Information Security Culture. Paper presented at the 2017 
International Conference on Research and Innovation in Information Systems 
(ICRIIS). 
212 
 
Mahmood, M. A., Siponen, M., Straub, D., Rao, H. R., & Raghu, T. (2010). Moving 
toward Black Hat Research in Information Systems Security: An Editorial 
Introduction to the Special Issue. MIS Quarterly, 34(3), 431-433.  
Marks, A., & Rezgui, Y. (2009). A Comparative Study of Information Security 
Awareness in Higher Education Based on the Concept of Design Theorizing. 
Masrom, M., & Ismail, Z. (2008). Computer Security and Computer Ethics 
Awareness: A Component of Management Information System. Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of International Symposium on Information 
Technology 2008, Kuala Lumpur Convention Centre, Malaysia (26-29 
August 2008). 
Maynard, S., & Ruighaver, A. (2006). What Makes a Good Information Security 
Policy: A Preliminary Framework for Evaluating Security Policy Quality. 
Paper presented at the Proceedings of the fifth annual security conference, 
Las Vegas, Nevada USA. 
McCormac, A., Zwaans, T., Parsons, K., Calic, D., Butavicius, M., & Pattinson, M. 
(2017). Individual Differences and Information Security Awareness. 
Computers in Human Behavior, 69, 151-156.  
Meso, P., Ding, Y., & Xu, S. (2013). Applying Protection Motivation Theory to 
Information Security Training for College Students. Journal of Information 
Privacy and Security, 9(1), 47-67.  
Mishra, S., & Dhillon, G. (2006). Information Systems Security Governance 
Research: A Behavioral Perspective. Paper presented at the 1st Annual 
Symposium on Information Assurance, Academic Track of 9th Annual NYS 
Cyber Security Conference. 
Mwagwabi, F., McGill, T., & Dixon, M. (2014). Improving Compliance with 
Password Guidelines: How User Perceptions of Passwords and Security 
Threats Affect Compliance with Guidelines. Paper presented at the System 
Sciences (HICSS), 2014 47th Hawaii International Conference on. 
Myers, M. D., & Newman, M. (2007). The Qualitative Interview in Is Research: 
Examining the Craft. Information and Organization, 17(1), 2-26. 
doi:10.1016/j.infoandorg.2006.11.001 
NCSC. (2015). National Cyber Security Centre. The Problems with Forcing Regular 
Password Expiry.   Retrieved from 
https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/articles/problems-forcing-regular-password-expiry 
Ngoqo, B., & Flowerday, S. V. (2015). Information Security Behaviour Profiling 
Framework (Isbpf) for Student Mobile Phone Users. Computers & Security, 
53, 132-142.  
North, M., George, R., & North, S. (2006). Computer Security and Ethics Awareness 
in University Environments: A Challenge for Management of Information 
Systems. 
213 
 
Pahnila, S., Siponen, M., & Mahmood, A. (2007). Employees' Behavior Towards Is 
Security Policy Compliance. Paper presented at the System sciences, 2007. 
HICSS 2007. 40Th annual hawaii international conference on. 
Parsons, K., McCormac, A., Butavicius, M., Pattinson, M., & Jerram, C. (2014). 
Determining Employee Awareness Using the Human Aspects of Information 
Security Questionnaire (Hais-Q). Computers & Security. 
doi:10.1016/j.cose.2013.12.003 
Pattinson, M., Pattinson, M., Butavicius, M., Butavicius, M., Parsons, K., Parsons, 
K., McCormac, A., McCormac, A., Calic, D., & Calic, D. (2017). Managing 
Information Security Awareness at an Australian Bank: A Comparative 
Study. Information & Computer Security, 25(2), 181-189.  
Peltier, T., R. (2005a). Implementing an Information Security Awareness Program. 
Information Systems Security, 14(2), 37-49. 
doi:10.1201/1086/45241.14.2.20050501/88292.6 
Peltier, T. R. (2004). Information Security Policies and Procedures: A Practitioner's 
Reference (2nd edition ed.). Boca Raton, Florida: Auerbach Publications. 
pp.8-47 
 
Peltier, T. R. (2005b). Information Security Risk Analysis (2 ed.). Auerbach 
Publications, Boca Raton, Fla. 
Podsakoff, P. M., & Organ, D. W. (1986). Self-Reports in Organizational Research: 
Problems and Prospects. Journal of management, 12(4), 531-544.  
Posey, M. C. (2010). Protection-Motivated Behaviors of Organizational Insiders: 
Louisiana Tech University. 
Puhakainen, P., & Siponen, M. (2010). Improving Employees' Compliance through 
Information Systems Security Training: An Action Research Study. MIS 
Quarterly, 757-778.  
Rader, E., Wash, R., & Brooks, B. (2012). Stories as Informal Lessons About 
Security. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Eighth Symposium on 
Usable Privacy and Security. 
Raderman, L., & Markiewicz, D. (2015). Guidelines for Data Classification. 
Carnegie Mellon University.   Retrieved from 
https://www.cmu.edu/iso/governance/guidelines/data-classification.html 
Ramalingam, R., Khan, S., & Mohammed, S. (2016). The Need for Effective 
Information Security Awareness Practices in Oman Higher Educational 
Institutions. arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.06510.  
Rezgui, Y., & Marks, A. (2008). Information Security Awareness in Higher 
Education: An Exploratory Study. Computers & Security, 27(7), 241-253. 
doi:10.1016/j.cose.2008.07.008 
Rezmierski, V. E., Seese Jr, M. R., & St Clair II, N. (2002). University Systems 
Security Logging: Who Is Doing It and How Far Can They Go? Computers 
& Security, 21(6), 557-564.  
214 
 
Rhee, H.-S., Kim, C., & Ryu, Y. U. (2009). Self-Efficacy in Information Security: 
Its Influence on End Users' Information Security Practice Behavior. 
Computers & Security, 28(8), 816-826. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2009.05.008 
Rhee, H.-S., Ryu, Y. U., & Kim, C.-T. (2012). Unrealistic Optimism on Information 
Security Management. Computers & Security, 31(2), 221-232.  
Rimal, R. N. (2001). Longitudinal Influences of Knowledge and Self-Efficacy on 
Exercise Behavior: Tests of a Mutual Reinforcement Model. Journal of 
Health Psychology, 6(1), 31-46.  
Ritchie, J., Spencer, L., Bryman, A., & Burgess, R. (1994). Analysing Qualitative 
Data.  
Rogers, R. W. (1983). Cognitive and Physiological Processes in Fear Appeals and 
Attitude Change: A Revised Theory of Protection Motivation. Social 
psychophysiologyJ. Cacioppo and R. Petty (Eds.), Guilford, New York,, 153-
176.  
Safa, N. S. (2017). The Information Security Landscape in the Supply Chain. 
Computer Fraud & Security, 2017(6), 16-20.  
Safa, N. S., & Ismail, M. A. (2013). A Customer Loyalty Formation Model in 
Electronic Commerce. Economic Modelling, 35, 559-564.  
Safa, N. S., Sookhak, M., Von Solms, R., Furnell, S., Ghani, N. A., & Herawan, T. 
(2015). Information Security Conscious Care Behaviour Formation in 
Organizations. Computers & Security, 53, 65-78.  
Safa, N. S., & Von Solms, R. (2016). An Information Security Knowledge Sharing 
Model in Organizations. Computers in Human Behavior, 57, 442-451.  
Safa, N. S., Von Solms, R., & Furnell, S. (2016a). Information Security Policy 
Compliance Model in Organizations. Computers & Security, 56, 70-82.  
Safa, N. S., Von Solms, R., & Futcher, L. (2016). Human Aspects of Information 
Security in Organisations. Computer Fraud & Security, 2016(2), 15-18.  
Scholl, M. C., Fuhrmann, F., & Scholl, L. R. (2018). Scientific Knowledge of the 
Human Side of Information Security as a Basis for Sustainable Trainings in 
Organizational Practices. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 51st 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. 
Schultz, E. (2005). The Human Factor in Security. Computers & Security, 24(6), 
425-426. doi:10.1016/j.cose.2005.07.002 
Siponen, M., Mahmood, M. A., & Pahnila, S. (2014). Employees’ Adherence to 
Information Security Policies: An Exploratory Field Study. Information & 
Management, 51(2), 217-224.  
Skinner, B. F. (2014). Contingencies of reinforcement: A theoretical analysis (Vol. 
3): BF Skinner Foundation. 
Siponen, M., Pahnila, S., & Mahmood, M. A. (2010). Compliance with Information 
Security Policies: An Empirical Investigation. Computer, 43(2), 64-71. 
doi:10.1109/MC.2010.35 
215 
 
Sommestad, T., Hallberg, J., Lundholm, K., & Bengtsson, J. (2014). Variables 
Influencing Information Security Policy Compliance: A Systematic Review 
of Quantitative Studies. Information Management & Computer Security, 
22(1), 42-75.  
Sommestad, T., Karlzén, H., & Hallberg, J. (2015). The Sufficiency of the Theory of 
Planned Behavior for Explaining Information Security Policy Compliance. 
Information & Computer Security, 23(2), 200-217.  
Sonnenschein, R., Loske, A., & Buxmann, P. (2017). The Role of Top Managers’ It 
Security Awareness in Organizational It Security Management.  
Soomro, Z. A., Shah, M. H., & Ahmed, J. (2016). Information Security Management 
Needs More Holistic Approach: A Literature Review. International Journal of 
Information Management, 36(2), 215-225.  
Spender, J.-C. (1998). The Dynamics of Individual and Organizational Knowledge. 
Managerial and organizational cognition, Sage, London, 13-39.  
Spilling, J. M. H. a. P. (2009). Do Organisational Security Measures Contribute to 
the Detection and Reporting of It-System Abuses? Proceedings of the Third 
International Symposium on Human Aspects of Information Security & 
Assurance, 71-81.  
Spruit, M. (1998). Competing against Human Failing. 15th IFIP World Computer 
Congress. ‘The Global Information Society on the Way to the Next 
Millennium’. SEC, TC11, Vienna. 
Srivastava, A., & Thomson, S. B. (2009). Framework Analysis: A Qualitative 
Methodology for Applied Policy Research.  
Straub, D. W., & Welke, R. J. (1998). Coping with Systems Risk: Security Planning 
Models for Management Decision Making. MIS Quarterly, 441-469.  
Talib, S., Clarke, N. L., & Furnell, S. M. (2010). An Analysis of Information 
Security Awareness within Home and Work Environments. Paper presented 
at the Availability, Reliability, and Security, 2010. ARES'10 International 
Conference on. 
Tang, M., & Zhang, T. (2016). The Impacts of Organizational Culture on 
Information Security Culture: A Case Study. Information Technology and 
Management, 17(2), 179-186.  
Tatu, T., Ament, C., & Jaeger, L. (2018). Lessons Learned from an Information 
Security Incident: A Practical Recommendation to Involve Employees in 
Information Security. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences. 
Teodor, S., Jonas, H., Kristoffer, L., & Johan, B. (2014). Variables Influencing 
Information Security Policy Compliance. Information Management & 
Computer Security, 22(1), 42-75. doi:10.1108/IMCS-08-2012-0045 
Thomson, K.-L., von Solms, R., & Louw, L. (2006). Cultivating an Organizational 
Information Security Culture. Computer Fraud & Security, 2006(10), 7-11.  
216 
 
Thomson, M. E., & Solms, R. v. (1998). Information Security Awareness: Educating 
Your Users Effectively. Information Management & Computer Security, 6(4), 
167-173.  
Tipton, H. F., & Krause, M. (2006). Information Security Management Handbook: 
Auerbach. 
Trevino, L. K. (1992). Experimental Approaches to Studying Ethical-Unethical 
Behavior in Organizations. Business Ethics Quarterly, 2(02), 121-136.  
Truss, K., Soane, E., Edwards, C. Y. L., Wisdom, K., Croll, A., & Burnett, J. (2006). 
Working Life: Employee Attitudes and Engagement 2006: Chartered Institute 
of Personnel and Development. 
Tsai, H.-y. S., Jiang, M., Alhabash, S., LaRose, R., Rifon, N. J., & Cotten, S. R. 
(2016). Understanding Online Safety Behaviors: A Protection Motivation 
Theory Perspective. Computers & Security, 59, 138-150.  
Tsohou, A., Karyda, M., & Kokolakis, S. (2015). Analyzing the Role of Cognitive 
and Cultural Biases in the Internalization of Information Security Policies: 
Recommendations for Information Security Awareness Programs. Computers 
& Security, 52, 128-141.  
Tsohou, A., Kokolakis, S., Karyda, M., & Kiountouzis, E. (2008). Investigating 
Information Security Awareness: Research and Practice Gaps. Information 
Security Journal: A Global Perspective, 17(5-6), 207-227. 
doi:10.1080/19393550802492487 
Vance, A., Siponen, M., & Pahnila, S. (2012). Motivating Is Security Compliance: 
Insights from Habit and Protection Motivation Theory. Information & 
Management, 49(3), 190-198.  
Velki, T., Solic, K., Gorjanac, V., & Nenadic, K. (2017). Empirical Study on the 
Risky Behavior and Security Awareness among Secondary School Pupils-
Validation and Preliminary Results. Paper presented at the Information and 
Communication Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics (MIPRO), 
2017 40th International Convention on. 
Vroom, C., & Von Solms, R. (2004). Towards Information Security Behavioural 
Compliance. Computers & Security, 23(3), 191-198.  
Walsham, G. (2002). Cross-Cultural Software Production and Use: A Structurational 
Analysis. MIS Quarterly, 359-380.  
Walton, R. (2006). Balancing the Insider and Outsider Threat. Computer Fraud & 
Security, 2006(11), 8-11.  
Waly, N., Tassabehji, R., & Kamala, M. (2012). Improving Organisational 
Information Security Management: The Impact of Training and Awareness. 
Whitman, M., & Mattord, H. (2012). Principles of Information Security, Course 
Technology 
 
  
217 
 
Whitman, M. E. (2004). In Defense of the Realm: Understanding the Threats to 
Information Security. International Journal of Information Management, 
24(1), 43-57.  
Whitman, M. E., Townsend, A. M., & Aalberts, R. J. (2001). Information Systems 
Security and the Need for Policy.  
Wiant, T. L. (2005). Information Security Policy's Impact on Reporting Security 
Incidents. Computers & Security, 24(6), 448-459.  
Wilson, M., & Hash, J. (2003). Building an Information Technology Security 
Awareness and Training Program. NIST Special publication , Washington, 
U.S. Government Printing Office 800-50.  
Wood, C. (1995). Information Security Awareness Raising Methods. Computer 
Fraud & Security Bulletin, 1995(6), 13-15.  
Zhang, P., & Li, X. (2015). Determinants of Information Security Awareness: An 
Empirical Investigation in Higher Education.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
218 
 
APPENDIX A: ETHICS PROCEDURES 
 
1. Confirmation ethical approval by the standard Northumbria University 
Ethics:  
 
A. First study: 
 Research ethics project number: RE-EE-12-130625-51c9a4e67b604  
 Date ethical approval granted: 27/03/2014  
 
B. Second study  
 Research ethics project number: Submission code: SUB075_Al 
Mahri_040615 
 Date ethical approval granted: 04/06/2015  
 
C. Third study: 
 Research ethics project number: SUB037_Almahri_14.12.15 
 Date ethical approval granted: 14/12/2015  
 
2. Build relationships with people in universities and colleges in Oman 
Site visits were undertaken to universities and colleges in Oman to establish 
relationships for participant recruitment. In addition, several communications tools 
(mobiles phones and emails) were used to communicate with authorised people in 
the higher education institutions.   
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Letter to University and colleges’ Deans (for interviews) 
Dear …..    
I am a PhD student at Northumbria University and would like to invite you to take 
part in a research project to assess how individuals use computers as part of their 
job role. 
Researchers from the Psychology and Communication Technology Lab at 
Northumbria University are investigating employees’ attitudes and behaviour 
towards using computers within their workplace in higher education sectors in 
Oman. 
This is the last study and I would like to have interview with IT and network 
administrators to study employee awareness of information security in Omani 
educational establishments. 
I hope that I can have interview more than five persons and the interview will take 
less than 30 minutes for each one. 
If you have any questions, please email me as it is shown below. This study has 
received full ethical approval from the Faculty of Health & Life Sciences Ethics 
Committee at Northumbria University. The survey is available in Arabic and 
English language; please choose the appropriate language from the top of the page. 
Your help would be very much appreciated! 
Researcher details (name, address and email) 
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- Letter sent to contacts (e.g. Deans and assistant Deans) in the universities 
and colleges in Oman for participant recruitment (Online Survey)  
Dear…. 
I am a PhD student at Northumbria University and would like to invite you to take 
part in a research project to assess how individuals use computers as part of their 
job role. 
Researchers from the Psychology and Communication Technology Lab at 
Northumbria University are investigating employees’ attitudes and behaviour 
towards using computers within their workplace in higher education sectors in 
Oman. 
If you are in full time or part time employment and use a computer as part of your 
job role, you are eligible to participate. Participation is anonymous and simply 
involves completing an online questionnaire about your computer usage. You will 
be asked for some basic demographic information but no identifiable information 
will be requested. The information you provide will only be available to the 
researchers at Northumbria. The questionnaire will take you between (15) to (20) 
minutes to be completed.  
Please visit this website to take part: (The link [Only the researcher has the 
authorisations for this link]) 
If you have any questions please email me as it is shown below. This study has 
received full ethical approval from the Faculty of Health & Life Sciences Ethics 
Committee at Northumbria University. By clicking "Next", you agree to participate 
in this survey. 
Your help would be very much appreciated! 
Researcher details (name, address and email) 
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3.  Interview procedures 
Faculty of Health & Life Sciences 
 
Project Title:  
 
Principal Investigator:  
 
I hereby confirm that I give consent for the following recordings to be made: 
Recording Purpose Consent 
Voice recording 
 
Interviews will be recorded for 
transcription  
 
 
Clause A: I understand that other individuals may be exposed to the recording(s) 
and be asked to provide ratings/judgments. The outcome of such ratings/judgments 
will not be conveyed to me. My name or other personal information will never be 
associated with the recording(s).  
 
 
Tick or initial the box to indicate your consent to Clause A              
 
Clause B: I understand that the recording(s) may also be used for teaching/research 
purposes and may be presented to students/researchers in an educational/research 
context. My name or other personal information will never be associated with the 
recording(s). 
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Please read and tick the box below.    
The investigator has explained to me the nature of the study, and what is required 
from me. They have given me a debrief sheet providing me with their contact 
details. I understand I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, without 
having to give a reason for withdrawing, and without prejudice. I agree to provide 
information to the investigator and understand that my contribution will remain 
anonymous and confidential  
 
 
 
Signature ofparticipant................................................    Date.....……………….. 
 
 
Signature of researcher.......................................................    Date.....……………….. 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION 
 
This information sheet provides you with sufficient information so that you can 
then give your informed consent. It is thus very important that you read this 
document carefully, and raise any issues that you do not understand with the 
investigator.  
 
Name of Researcher:  
 
Name of Supervisor:  
Project Title:  
 
1. The purpose of this study is to explore the relative importance of different 
security behaviours, whether there are suitable alternatives and what factors you 
think influence whether or not a member of staff will adopt those behaviours 
 
2. You have been asked to take part because you are a member of IT or Network 
administration within an Oman University or College. 
 
3. You will be asked to rank behaviours in order of importance to security, list 
acceptable alternative behaviours and discuss why you think staff in your 
organisation do – or don’t – adopt these behaviours.  
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4. There is no physical or psychological discomfort or embarrassment associated 
with this task.  
 
5. We will ensure your  confidentiality by making sure that your name or other 
personal information is not be associated with any information you provide. All of 
the information you provide will be associated with the participant code at the top 
of your page. Only the research team will have access to your data.  
 
6. You will NOT receive any financial rewards / travel expenses for taking part? 
 
7. You can withdraw your data from the study up to a month after you have taken 
part by emailing the researcher (email) 
 
8. If you require any further information about this project you should email the 
researcher (email) or his supervisor (Name) and (email). 
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If you have any concerns or worries concerning this research or if you wish to 
register a complaint, please direct it to the Department of Psychology Ethics 
(Name) (Post-graduate) at the address below, or by Email:…………………….   
The data collected in this study will be used for a Post-graduate Psychology Thesis. 
It may also be published in scientific journals or presented at conferences.  Any 
information and data gathered during this research study will only be available to 
the research team identified in the information sheet. Should the research be 
presented or published in any form, all data will be anonymous (i.e. your personal 
information or data will not be identifiable). 
All identifiable paper records will be stored in a locked filing cabinet, accessible 
only to the research team and all electronic information will be stored on a 
password-protected computer. All of the information you provide will be treated in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act. This information will be destroyed 6 
months after completion of the project. If the research is published in a scientific 
journal it may be kept for up to 7 years before being destroyed.  During that time 
the data may be used by members of the research team only for purposes 
appropriate to the research question, but at no point will your personal information 
or data be revealed.  
This study and its protocol have received full ethical approval from the Department 
of Psychology Ethics Committee (Post-graduate) in accordance with the School of 
Life Sciences Ethics Committee. If you require confirmation of this please contact 
the (Name) of this Committee, stating the title of the research project and the name 
of the researcher: 
Chair of Department of Psychology Ethics Committee (Post-graduate) name and 
address 
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Debrief Sheet  
Name of Researcher:  
 
Name of Supervisor:  
 
Project Title:  
 
The purpose of this study is to explore the relative importance of different security 
behaviours, whether there are suitable alternatives and what factors you think 
influence whether or not a member of staff will adopt those behaviours 
 
If you would like to see the overall results of this study please email me and I will 
send you the summary results (Email) 
 
 
The information you provided will be analysed to look for overall answers to the 
question of what behaviours are the most important for security. The results will 
form part of my PhD thesis and may be published.  
 
 
You have NOT been deceived in any way during the project. 
 
 
If I change my mind and wish to withdraw your data from the study, you can do so  
up to a month after you have taken part by emailing the researcher (Email) 
 
 
If you would like to discuss any issues further please do not hesitate to contact the 
researcher.  
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If you have any concerns or worries concerning the way in which this research 
has been conducted, or if you have requested, but did not receive feedback 
from the researcher concerning the general outcomes of the study within a few 
months after the study has concluded, then please contact the researcher via email at 
(researcher email) my supervisor (Name and email) or the chair of ethics (name and 
email) 
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FOURTH STUDY: FOCUS GROUP ETHICS PROCEDURES AND 
QUESTIONS  
 
 
 
 
      Faculty of Health & Life Sciences 
 
 
Project Title: EMPLOYEES’ INFORMATION SECURITY AWARENESS AND 
BEHAVIOUR IN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN OMAN 
 
Principal Investigator: Mohammed al-Mahri 
 
 
I hereby confirm that I give consent for the following recordings to be made: 
 
Recording Purpose Consent 
e.g. voice recordings 
 
Interviews will be recorded for 
transcription  
 
 
Clause A: I understand that other individuals may be exposed to the recording(s) 
and be asked to provide ratings/judgments. The outcome of such ratings/judgments 
will not be conveyed to me. My name or other personal information will never be 
associated with the recording(s).  
 
Tick or initial the box to indicate your consent to Clause A              
 
Clause B: I understand that the recording(s) may also be used for teaching/research 
purposes and may be presented to students/researchers in an educational/research 
context. My name or other personal information will never be associated with the 
recording(s). 
 
Tick or initial the box to indicate your consent to Clause B              
 
Clause C: I understand that the recording(s) may be published in an appropriate 
journal/textbook or on an appropriate Northumbria University webpage. My name or 
other personal information will never be associated with the recording(s). I 
understand that I have the right to withdraw consent at any time prior to publication, 
but that once the recording(s) are in the public domain there may be no opportunity 
for the effective withdrawal of consent. 
 
Tick or initial the box to indicate your consent to Clause C            
 
Please read and tick the box below.    
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The investigator has explained to me the nature of the study, and what is 
required from me. They have given me a debrief sheet providing me with 
their contact details. I understand I am free to withdraw from the study at 
any time, without having to give a reason for withdrawing, and without 
prejudice. I agree to provide information to the investigator and 
understand that my contribution will remain anonymous and confidential  
 
 
 
Signature of participant.......................................................    
Date.....……………….. 
 
 
Signature of researcher.......................................................    
Date.....……………….. 
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION 
 
This information sheet provides you with sufficient information so that you can then give your 
informed consent. It is thus very important that you read this document carefully, and raise any issues 
that you do not understand with the investigator.  
 
Name of Researcher: Mohammed al-Mahri 
 
Name of Supervisors: Professor Lynne Coventry, Dr Paul Vickers 
  
Project Title: EMPLOYEES’ INFORMATION SECURITY AWARENESS AND 
 BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN  
OMAN 
1. The purpose of this study is to explore different security behaviours, which are 
the most important and whether there are suitable alternatives. This study will 
also explore what factors you think influence security behaviours in your 
workplace.  
 
2. You have been asked to take part because you are a member of staff within an 
Oman University or College. 
 
3. You will be asked to take part in a group discussion about your organisations 
information security policies, what you know about them, whether you think 
they are good and bad and why you think people follow (or don’t follow) the 
policy.  This will take approximately 1 hour.  
 
4. There is no physical or psychological discomfort or embarrassment associated 
with this task.  
 
5. We will ensure your confidentiality by making sure that your name and 
institution is not associated with any information you provide. All of the 
information you provide will be associated with the participant code at the top of 
your page. Only the research team will have access to your data.  
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6. You will NOT receive any financial rewards / travel expenses for taking part. 
 
7. You can leave the discussion at any time if you wish to. You can also withdraw 
your data from the study up to a month after you have taken part by emailing 
the researcher (mohammed.al.mahri <mohammed.mahri@northumbria.ac.uk>) 
 
8. If you require any further information about this project you should email the 
researcher (mohammed.mahri@northumbria.ac.uk) or his supervisor Prof. 
Lynne Coventry (lynne.coventry@northumbria.ac.uk 
 
 
If you have any concerns or worries concerning this research or if you wish to register a 
complaint, please direct it to the Department of Psychology Ethics Chair (Post-graduate) at 
the address below, or by Email: (Post-graduate)    
  
The data collected in this study will be used for a Post-graduate Psychology Thesis. It may 
also be published in scientific journals or presented at conferences.  Any information and 
data gathered during this research study will only be available to the research team 
identified in the information sheet. Should the research be presented or published in any 
form, all data will be anonymous (i.e. your personal information or data will not be 
identifiable). 
 
All identifiable paper records will be stored in a locked filing cabinet, accessible only to the 
research team and all electronic information will be stored on a password-protected 
computer. All of the information you provide will be treated in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act. This information will be destroyed 6 months after completion of the 
project. If the research is published in a scientific journal it may be kept for up to 7 years 
before being destroyed.  During that time the data may be used by members of the 
research team only for purposes appropriate to the research question, but at no point will 
your personal information or data be revealed.  
 
This study and its protocol have received full ethical approval from the Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee (Post-graduate) in accordance with the School of Life 
Sciences Ethics Committee. If you require confirmation of this please contact the Chair of 
this Committee, stating the title of the research project and the name of the researcher: 
 
Dr Nick Neave  
Chair of Department of Psychology Ethics Committee (Post-graduate) 
Northumberland Building, 
Northumbria University, 
Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST 
UK 
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Debrief Sheet  
Name of Researcher: Mohammed al-Mahri 
 
Name of Supervisor: Professor Lynne Coventry, Dr Paul Vickers 
 
Project Title: Exploring the importance and acceptability of individual security tasks in  
Oman Higher Education Institutions 
 
 
1. The purpose of this study is to explore  where people find out about security 
behaviours, the relative importance of different security behaviours, whether 
there are suitable alternatives to what is written in the policy and what 
factors influence whether or not a member of staff will adopt those 
behaviours.  
 
2. If you would like to see the overall results of this study please email me and I 
will send you the summary results (mohammed.mahri@northumbria.ac.uk) 
 
 
3. The information you provided will be analysed to look for overall answers to 
the question of what behaviours are the most important for security. The 
results will form part of my phd thesis and may be published.  
 
 
4. You have NOT been deceived in any way during the project. 
 
 
5. If I change my mind and wish to withdraw your data from the study, you can 
do so  up to a month after you have taken part by emailing the researcher 
(mohammed.al.mahri <mohammed.mahri@northumbria.ac.uk>) 
 
 
6. If you would like to discuss any issues further please do not hesitate to 
contact the researcher.  
 
 
7. If you have any concerns or worries concerning the way in which this research 
has been conducted, or if you have requested, but did not receive feedback 
from the researcher concerning the general outcomes of the study within a 
few 
months after the study has concluded, then please contact Mohammed al-
Mahri via email at mohammed.mahri@northumbria.ac.uk; my supervisor 
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Professor Lynne Coventry (Email) or the chair of ethics (Name) (Post-graduate 
email) 
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Procedure and Interview questions with employees  
 
1. First Part asking them scenario questions   
i. Fahad’s manager has forgotten his password and needs some 
important files. He asks Fahad for his user name and password so 
he can continue to work. What should Fahad do? 
ii. Ali has received an email that appears to have come from an IT 
technician asking him to go to a specific web link to confirm his 
personal details. What should he do? 
iii. Noor works in her own office, and is going to the staff room for a 
short tea break time. What he should do? 
iv. Ahmed wants to work on an important file at home but does not 
have access to the institutions network at home – what should he 
do? 
v. Soliman’s computer is behaving strangely. He is worried that his 
computer has a virus. What should he do? 
vi. Mona computer is slow and she feels that the anti-virus software 
is slowing it? What should she do? 
 
2. Second part ask them general question (information security policy and 
behaviours) 
i. Do you have information security policy? Get a count of those 
who say, yes/no/don’t know.  
ii. Have you ever read the information security policy of your current 
institution? 
iii. Have you read other information security policies? What sort of 
institution? 
iv. What would you say are the good and bad things about this policy?  
 Only used if they say they have read it.  
v. Where else do you get information about information security? 
vi. What do you think influences people’s security behaviours at 
work – both positively and negatively? 
vii. What advice/behaviours do you think are important to follow at 
work? 
(You could give them sticky notes to write down the topics and 
stick on a board) 
viii. Which of these advice/behaviours do you always follow? Why is 
do you follow this advice? 
ix. Which of these advice/behaviours do you not follow sometimes? 
In what circumstance do you not follow the advice? 
x. Is there any advice/behaviours that you never follow? What are 
your reasons for this? 
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xi. If you were to write a new information policy for the institution 
what advice would you put in it and why.  
xii. How do you think your organisation could improve information 
security behaviours? 
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APPENDIX B: JOB TITLES  
 
- Job titles of employees from multiple universities and colleges in Oman  
From 503 participants, around 100 of them did not type their job title. The table 
below shows job title for more than one participant have same job title.     
No Job title 
1 Lecturer  
2 Assistant lecturer  
3 Assistant professor   
4 Researcher  
5 Head of department  
6 Head of section 
7 Laboratory technician  
8 Technician  
9 Assistant Librarian 
10 Secretary 
11 Coordinator 
12 Accountant  
13 Financial  
14 Store technician 
15 Writer 
16 Admission and registration 
17 Data entry 
18 Instructor 
19 Pharmacist 
20 Engineer  
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APPENDIX C: QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHODS 
WITH IT STAFF AND SYSTEM ADMINISTRATORS 
1. Quantitative method: there are two parts 
Part one: Ranking the most important behaviour from 1 to 14  
Security is defined as maintaining the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information and systems. Please rank the following behaviours in order of 
importance to security. Place the numbers 1 – 14 next to the statements, where 1 is 
the most important behaviour and 14 the least. Order the statements by importance 
for security? 
Behaviour  Rank 
Order  
Adam wants to back up a confidential file. He does not   email it to his Gmail 
account.  
 
Fatima is asked to create a new username and strong password to log in to a new 
service at work. She makes sure she does not write it down, save it on a device or 
tell it to anybody. 
 
Fahad’s manager is very busy and asks Fahad to log into the college server using 
his own username and password to retrieve some files for him. Fahad refuses to 
do this. 
 
Ali is having a day off and refuses to give his co-worker his password in order to 
access an important email he has received.  
 
Sami works in his own office, and makes sure he locks the door, windows, and his 
computer’s screen takes time even if he leaves the office for a few minutes.  
 
Khalfan received an email that appears to have come from administrator asking 
him for his username and password as the IT staff want to perform some 
troubleshooting. He deletes it.  
 
Said has received an email that appears to have come from an administrator 
asking him to go to a specific web link to confirm his personal details. He phones 
the administrator to report the email as it may be a phish.  
 
Aisha is working on her computer when the applications windows start to move 
around on their own and many new windows suddenly appear. She disconnects 
her computer from the network and informs the IT staff. 
 
Badr receives an email with an attachment from an unknown source. The email 
says that the attachment should be opened which will get rid of the virus. He 
deletes the email immediately without opening the attachment 
 
Ahmed is very busy and has a lot of work to do. He doesn’t disable the antivirus 
software even though he thinks it slows down his computer.  
 
Hasan urgently needs to install some free software that he has downloaded from 
the Internet for work proposes. He waits until the technician has time to check 
this for him.  
 
Noor never uses her work email for her own commercial purposes.   
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Bakhit has discovered that some files are missing from his computer and some 
changes have happened to his computer. He informs IT staff immediately.  
 
Mohammed and his colleagues in the department have shared access to some 
files needed for a joint project. When the project is finished Mohammed asks 
permission from all the colleagues to delete files that are no longer required.  
 
 
 
Part two: Acceptable and unacceptable behaviours in your organisation  
 Thinking about maintaining security, please put Y in the box if the option is 
an acceptable behaviour in your institution and an N if it is not. 
 Please if there are alternative acceptable behaviours in your organisation or 
unacceptable behaviours relating to those scenarios please add them in the 
table below. 
 
1. Adam wants to back up a confidential file and is considering emailing it to his 
Gmail account. What should he do? 
He should send the file to his Gmail account to have more copies.  
He shouldn't send the file to his Gmail account.  
He should ask the manager’s permission to send the file to his Gmail account.  
He should email the file to a trusted colleague.  
  
  
 
2. Fatima is asked to create a new username and strong password to log in to a new 
service at work but she is worried about remembering a strong password. What 
should she do? 
She should write it on paper and put it in her drawer until she remembers it.  
She should save it in her mobile phone or computer.  
She should remember it and should not write it down, save it in mobile phone or 
tell anyone. 
 
She should use a password she has for another service but change one of the 
characters in it. 
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3. Fahad’s manager is very busy and asks him to log into the college server using 
his username and password to retrieve some files for him. What should he do? 
He should do what his manager asks.  
He should decline the order and remind his manager that is not allowed.  
He should do this if the manager agrees to take responsibility.  
He should perform the request if the files are not sensitive.  
  
  
 
4. Ali is having a day off. His co-worker phones him and asks for Ali’s password in 
order to access an important email he has received. What should he do? 
He should give him his password because his co-worker is a trustworthy person.  
He should not give him his password.  
He should give him it if the email does not contain sensitive information.  
If he is a close friend it is fine to give it to him.  
  
  
 
5. Sami works in his own office, and sometimes locking the door, windows, and his 
computer’s screen takes time during the working day. What he should do? 
He should lockup the office or work area (doors, windows) and his computer’s 
screen even when he leaves for just a few minutes. 
 
If he leaves his office for a few minutes he should not lock the door just his 
computer’s screen. 
 
If his colleagues are in the office he need not lock his computer’s screen.  
He should lock his computer’s screen but locking up the office or work area (doors, 
windows) is not his responsibility. 
 
  
  
 
6. Khalfan received an email that appears to have come from administrator asking 
him for his username and password as the IT staff want to perform some 
troubleshooting. What should he do? 
He should do what the IT staffs have requested.  
He should check the email’s source and, if it is correct, send the information.  
He should delete the email without replying to it.  
He should reply to the sender to ask who they are.  
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7. Said has received an email that appears to have come from an administrator 
asking him to go to a specific web link to confirm his personal details. What should 
he do? 
Click on the link to check what is there  
Delete the email  
He should check the email’s source and, if it is correct, click on the link  
Phone the administrator to report the email.  
  
  
 
8. Aisha is working on her computer when the applications windows start to move 
around on their own and many new windows suddenly appear. What should she 
do? 
She should make sure that antivirus is on.  
She should log out of her account.  
She should disconnect her computer from the network and inform the IT staff.  
She should call her co-workers over so they can witness what is happening.  
  
  
 
9. Badr receives an email with an attachment from an unknown source. The email 
says that the attachment should be opened which will get rid of the virus. What 
should he do? 
Open the email attachment to see what it says.  
Delete the email immediately without opening the attachment.  
Reply to the sender and ask who they are.  
Forward the email to a co-worker and ask him what to do.  
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10. Ahmed wants to disable the antivirus software in his computer when he is very 
busy and has a lot of work to do because he thinks it slows down his computer. 
What he should do? 
Since it is only for a short time it is OK to disable the antivirus software.  
He should not disable the antivirus software.  
He should ask the IT staff to disable the antivirus software for a short time.  
He should ask the IT staff to have administrator privileges to save time.  
  
  
 
11. Hasan urgently needs to install some free software that he has downloaded from 
the Internet for work proposes. What should he do? 
He should install the software immediately if he can.  
If he cannot install the software he should ask the technician for their username 
and password, in order to install it himself. 
 
He should make sure that the software does not have a virus and then install it 
himself. 
 
He should ask a technician to install the software.  
  
  
 
12. Noor wants to use her email for her own commercial purposes. What should 
she do? 
She should not use her account for personal or commercial purposes.  
She should not sell products through her university email account but it is OK to 
use it to reply to her customers. 
 
It is fine for her to use her email with attached files as people would trust her 
more when they see her organisation’s email address. 
 
She can send emails without an attached file.  
  
  
 
13. Bakhit has discovered that some files are missing from his computer and some 
changes have happened to his computer. What should he do? 
He might have deleted the files by mistake and so he should wait until it happens 
again. 
 
He should inform the IT staff immediately.  
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It is OK if he just informs his colleagues  
If the information was not important then he should just ignore it and not tell 
anyone. 
 
  
  
 
14. Mohammed and his colleagues in the department have shared access to some 
files needed for a joint project. When the project is finished Mohammed wants to 
delete the files because he no longer needs them. What should he do? 
He should go ahead and delete the files he has access to.  
He should ask permission from all the colleagues he works with.  
He should delete the files but make sure he saves copies onto his USB memory 
stick first. 
 
He should delete only the unimportant files.  
  
  
 
2. Qualitative method: Procedure and Interview questions with IT staff and 
system administrators   
1. Why those 5 questions on the top are important and on the bottom are not 
important?  
a. What is your experience for what happened when employees do not 
comply with bottom 5 questions?  
i. For each scenario have you experience of things going wrong 
ii. Are employees reporting information security incidents to 
you?   
2. What factors influence employees to comply with ISP in an organisation? 
a. From your experiences, which factors do you think would encourage 
the employees to change their behaviour to comply with ISP? 
i. Do you think knowledge would change employees’ behaviour 
positively or negatively? Do you have experienced or example 
you have seen knowledge change users’ behaviour positively 
or negatively or negative behaviour in specific security area? 
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ii. Do you think when employees comply with ISP or not would 
change other employees’ behaviour positively or negatively in 
same organisation? Do you have experienced or example you 
have seen others change users’ behaviour positively or 
negatively or negative behaviour in specific security area? 
iii. Do you think when managers would change employees’ 
behaviour positively or negatively? Do you have experienced 
or example you have seen managers change users’ behaviour 
positively or negatively or negative behaviour in specific 
security area? 
iv. Do you think sanctions would change employees’ behaviour 
positively or negatively? Do you have experienced or example 
you have seen sanctions change users’ behaviour positively or 
negatively or negative behaviour in specific security area? 
v. Do you think rewords would change employees’ behaviour 
positively or negatively? Do you have experienced or example 
you have seen rewards change users’ behaviour positively or 
negatively or negative behaviour in specific security area? 
3. What are the main barriers to not comply with the information security 
policy?  
4. Ranking important effects on employees’ behaviour such as rewards, 
sanctions, awareness, knowledge or managers? What are your 
recommendations to improve information security policy compliance at 
organisation? 
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APPENDIX D: ONLINE SURVEY  
 
English  
 
 
 
 
 
Information Security 
 
Introduction:  
  
I am a PhD student at Northumbria University and would like to invite you to take part in a research 
project to assess how individuals use computers as part of their job role.  
Researchers from the Psychology and Communication Technology Lab at  
Northumbria University are investigating employees' attitudes and behaviour towards using computers 
within their workplace.  
If you are in full time or part time employment and use a computer as part of your job role, you are 
eligible to participate.  
Participation is anonymous and simply involves completing an online questionnaire about your 
computer usage. You will be asked for some basic demographic information but no identifiable 
information will be requested. The information you provide will only be available to the researchers 
at Northumbria. The questionnaire will take you between (15) to (20) minutes to be completed.  
If you have any questions please email me, name and email. This study has received full ethical 
approval from the Faculty of Health & Life Sciences Ethics Committee at Northumbria University.  
Your help would be very much appreciated! 
Researcher details (name, address and email). 
 
If you want to withdraw your data in the future (within a month of your participation) 
please write your usercode* (letters and numbers) to identify yourself and keep it with 
you. (Optional)   
*Usercode:In order to match your responses across questionnaires, we ask you to provide a user 
code on the questionnaires. This user code does not allow us to identify you. The usercode is the 
first four letters of your favourite name and the last three numbers of your favourite year. For 
example Ahmed’s favourite name is “Suleiman” and favourite year is “1990”. Ahmed’s usercode 
would be (SULE990). But please make sure it is memorable as you will be asked to write it for 
withdrawal your data.         
 
 
 
 
  
#General Information:  
- Please answer all questions below and thank you for participating 
in this research study 
 
 
A) Organisation's name (University or College)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
B) Category 
 Academic  
 Non-Academic  
 
 
 
 
C) Job title (option)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D) What is your nationality?  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
E) What is your gender? 
 Male  
 Female  
 
 
 
 
F) Please indicate your age group? 
 18-25 years  
 26-35 years  
 36-45 years  
 46-55 years  
 56-65 years  
 66 years or more  
 
 
 
 
G)  How many years have you worked at this organisation for? 
 less than 1 year  
 1-5 years  
 6-10 years  
 11-15 years  
 16-20 years  
 21 years or more  
  
 
 
 
 
H) What is your highest qualification level? 
 High school  
 Diploma  
 Bachelor’s degree  
 Master’s degree  
 Doctorate  
Other ____________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
I) Do you have administrator privileges in your organisation's network*? 
*Note: administrator privileges allows you to disable antivirus and download software from the internet and run on your 
organisation's network. 
 Yes  
 No  
 
 
 
 
J) Does your organisation have an information security policy*?   
*Note: This outlines how you should use your computer and protect the organisation's information 
 Yes  
 No  
 I don’t know 
 
*Note: Display This Question: 
If J) Does your organisation have an information security policy? Yes Is Selected 
 
 
K) Please answer the following regarding Information security policy  
 
 
 Strongly 
Agree  
Agree  Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Disagree  Strongly 
Disagree  
1. I understand the rules 
and regulations prescribed 
by the information security 
policy of my organisation.  
 
 
          
 
# Questions about employees' behavior towards information security & what influences 
behaviours    
- Please answer each of the following questions by selecting the answer that you think is correct. 
Select only one answer for each question. 
  
1. Adam wants to back up a confidential file and is considering emailing it to his Gmail account.  
What should he do?  
 
 
a) He should send the file to his Gmail account to have more copies.  
b) He shouldn't send the file to his Gmail account.  
c) He should ask the director's permission to send the file to his Gmail account.  
d) He should email the file to a trusted colleague.  
 
 
 
1.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
6. I believe I will always behave in  
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not  
behave in this way  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
2. Fatima is asked to create a new username and strong password to log in to a new service at  
  work but she is worried about remembering a strong password.What should she do?
  
 
 
a) She should write it on paper and put it in her drawer until she remembers it.  
b) She should save it in her mobile phone or computer.  
c) She should try to remember it and not write it down, save it in mobile phone or not show it to 
anyone.  
d) She should use a password she has for another service but change one of the characters 
in it.  
 
2.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
 
6. I believe I will always behave in     
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not      
behave in this way  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
 
 
3. Fahad's manager is very busy and asks him to log into the college server using his username 
 and password to retrieve some files for him. What should he do?  
 
a) He should do what his manager asks.  
b) He should decline the order and remind his manager that is not allowed.  
c) He should do this if the manager agrees to take responsibility.  
d) He should perform the request if the files are not sensitive.  
 
 
 
 
3.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
 
6. I believe I will always behave in     
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not      
behave in this way  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
 
4. Ali is having a day off. His co-worker phones him and asks for Ali's password in order to      
access an important e-mail he has received. What should he do?  
 
a) He should give him his password because his co-worker is a trustworthy person.  
b) He should not give him his password.  
c) He should give him it if the email does not contain sensitive information. 
d) If he is a close friend it is fine to give it to him.  
 
 
  
 
4.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
 
 
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
Strongly  
   Agree  
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
Agree  
Neither 
Agree nor  
Disagree  Disagree  
Strongly  
Disagree  
 
6. I believe I will always behave in     
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not      
behave in this way  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
 
5. Sami works in his own office, and sometimes locking the door, windows, and his computer's   
screen takes time during the working day. What he should do?  
 
a) He should lock-up the office or work area (doors, windows) and his computer's screen even 
when he leaves for just a few minutes.  
b) If he leaves his office for just a few minutes he should not lock the door just his  
computer's screen.  
c) If his colleagues are in the office he need not lock his computer's screen.  
d) He should lock his computer's screen but locking up the office or work area (doors,  
windows) is not his responsibility.  
 
 
 
 
5.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
   Agree  
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
 
3. I believe that this is how other 
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
6. I believe I will always behave in  
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not  
behave in this way  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
 
6. Khalfan received an email that appears to have come from administrator asking him for his 
username and password as the IT staff want to perform some troubleshooting. What should he 
 do?  
 
a) He should do what the IT staff have requested.  
b) He should check the email's source and, if it is correct, send the information. c) He 
should delete the email without replying to it.  
d) He should reply to the sender to ask who they are.  
 
  
 
6.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree 
  
5. I believe this is what my  
 
organisation policy says I should  
do  
    
 
 
 
 
    
 
6. I believe I can always behave in     
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not      
behave in this way  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
 
7. Said has received an e-mail that appears to have come from an administrator asking him to 
go to a specific web link to confirm his personal details. What should he do?  
 
a) Click on the link to check what is there  
b) Delete the email  
c) He should check the email's source and, if it is correct, click on the link. 
d) Phone the administrator to report the email.  
 
 
 
 
7.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
  
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
6. I believe I will always behave in     
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not      
behave in this way  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
 
8. Aisha is working on her computer when the applications windows start to move around on     
their own and many new windows suddenly appear. What should she do?  
 
a) She should make sure that anti-virus is on.  
b) She should log out of her account.  
c) She should disconnect her computer from the network and inform the IT staff. 
d) She should call her co-workers over so they can witness what is happening.  
 
 
 
 
8.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
 
6. I believe I will always behave in     
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not      
behave in this way  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
9. Badr receives an e-mail with an attachment from an unknown source. The email says that the  
attachment should be opened which will get rid of the virus. What should he do?  
 
a) Open the e-mail attachment to see what it says.  
b) Delete the email immediately without opening the attachment.  
c) Reply to the sender and ask who they are.  
d) Forward the email to a co-worker and ask him what to do.  
 
 
 
 
9.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
6. I believe I will always behave in  
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not  
behave in this way  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
 
10. Ahmed wants to disable the antivirus software in his computer when he is very busy and    
has a lot of work to do because he thinks it slows down his computer. What he should do?  
 
a) Since it is only for a short time it is OK to disable the antivirus software.  
b) He should not disable the anti-virus software.  
c) He should ask the IT staff to disable the anti-virus software for a short time. 
d) He should ask the IT staff to have administrator privileges to save time.  
10.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
6. I believe I will always behave in  
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not  
behave in this way  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
 
11. Hasan urgently needs to install some free software that he has downloaded from the Interne
t for work proposes. What should he do?  
 
a) He should install the software immediately if he can.  
b) If he cannot install the software he should ask the technician for their username and  
password, in order to install it himself.  
c) He should make sure that the software does not have a virus and then install it himself. 
d) He should ask a technician to install the software.  
  
 
11.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
     Agree  
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
 
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
6. I believe I will always behave in     
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not      
behave in this way  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
 
12. Noor wants to use her e-mail for her own commercial purposes.What should she do?  
 
a) She should not use her account for personal or commercial purposes.  
b) She should not sell products through her university email account but it is OK to use it to  
reply to her customers.  
c) It is fine for her to use her email with attached files as people would trust her more when  
they see her organisation's email address.  
d) She can send emails without an attached file.  
 
 
 
 
12.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
 4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
6. I believe I will always behave in  
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not  
behave in this way  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
 
13. Bakhit has discovered that some files are missing from his computer and some changes    
 have happened to his computer. What should he do?  
 
a) He might have deleted the files by mistake and so he should wait until it happens again.  
b) He should inform the IT staff immediately.  
c) It is OK if he just informs his colleagues  
d) If the information was not important then he should just ignore it and not tell anyone.  
 
 
 
 
13.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
 
6. I believe I will always behave in     
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not      
behave in this way  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way  
 
 
14. Mohammed and his colleagues in the department have shared access to some files needed 
for a joint project. When the project is finished Mohammed wants to delete the files because 
he no longer needs them. What should he do?  
 
a) He should go ahead and delete the files he has access to.  
b) He should ask permission from all the colleagues he works with.  
c) He should delete the files but make sure he saves copies onto his USB memory stick first.  
d) He should delete only the unimportant files.  
 
 
 
14.1 Thinking about your previous answer:  
 
Neither  
Strongly  Agree nor  Strongly  
  
1. I believe that this is the right  
way to behave in this situation  
2. I believe this action will keep  
information secure  
3. I believe that this is how other  
people in my organisation would  
behave  
4. I believe this is how my  
manager would want me to  
behave  
5. I believe this is what my  
organisation policy says I should  
do  
   Agree  
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
Agree  Disagree  Disagree  Disagree  
 
6. I believe I will always behave in     
this way  
7. I believe there would be  
disciplinary actions if I did not      
behave in this way  
 
8. I believe there will be benefits to     
me if I behave in this way
PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF  
Title of project: Exploring Employees’ Information Security Awareness in Higher Education 
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findings within eight weeks of completing the research.  
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5. If I change my mind and wish to withdraw the information I have provided, how do I 
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If, for any reason, you wish to withdraw your data please contact the investigator at the email 
address above within a month of your participation and you will be asked for your usercode 
to identify your data. After this date, it may not be possible to withdraw your individual data 
as the results may already have been published. As all data are anonymised, your individual 
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investigator concerning the general outcomes of the study within a few weeks after the study 
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